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This thesis presents three essays, each seeking to deepen our understanding of labour
markets. The first essay studies the responses of real wages and hours worked of new
hires to changes in the unemployment rate during the UK’s Great Recession. The
responses of these variables are interesting, because a firm’s hiring decision depends
to a large extent on the costs that it incurs if it hires a new employee. I find that real
wages and hours worked of new hires significantly declined when the unemployment
rate increased. This can potentially explain the relatively small decline of employment
that was observed during the Great Recession: firms kept hiring because of falling
costs and hours worked of new hires.
Another important determinant of a firm’s hiring decision is its expectation about
future labour market conditions. For example, if a firm expects that it will be relatively
costly to find new employees in the next year, then this firm might already increase
recruiting and worker-retaining efforts today. Usually it is assumed in economic
models that firms form their expectations in a way which implies they predict future
labour market conditions on average correctly. The second essay studies in how
far the short-run labour market dynamics and long-run outcomes, for example, the
long-run level of the unemployment rate, change if firms and unemployed workers
have to use simple statistical methods to form forecasts, rather than “knowing” it. I
show that the long-run outcomes are mostly unchanged, but the short-run dynamics of
unemployment depend on the assumptions made about the formation of expectation.
The final essay computes the share of labour income in total income, for both
the services and the goods sector, in a large cross-section of countries. The labour
income shares of both sectors increase across countries with the level of development,
measured by real output per person. Because no comparable data on these shares were
available across countries, economists usually assumed that these income shares do
not differ from their corresponding U.S. values. This assumption resulted in incorrectly
measured productivity levels: the gaps in productivity levels across countries are larger
than previously computed in other studies.
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Abstract
This thesis presents three essays, each seeking to deepen our understanding of labour
markets. The first essay studies the response of real wages and hours of new hires to the
business cycle during the UK’s Great Recession. The second essay analysis in how far
the assumption of rational expectations in the Mortensen-Pissarides model is required
for the economy to converge to an equilibrium. In particular, it asks if it is possible for
economic agents to use simple linear forecast rules and still ensure convergence to the
rational expectations equilibrium. The final essay seeks to determine whether labour
income shares at the sectoral level are constant across countries, as is usually assumed
in the literature, and whether this assumption quantitatively matters. Therefore, it takes
the input-output structures across countries into account, and conducts a development
accounting exercise.
Real wages and hours in the Great Recession: Evidence from firms and their
entry-level jobs
Using employer-employee panel data, I provide novel facts on how real wages and
working hours within jobs responded to the UK’s Great Recession. In contrast to
previous studies, my data enables me to address the cyclical composition of jobs. I
show that firms were able to respond to the Great Recession with substantial real wage
cuts and by recruiting more part-time workers. A one percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate led to an average decline in real hourly wages of 2.8 per cent
for new hires and 2.6 per cent for job stayers. Hours of new hires in entry-level jobs
were also substantially procyclical, while job-stayer hours were nearly constant. My
findings suggest that models assuming rigid labour costs of new hires are not helpful
for understanding the behaviour of unemployment over the business cycle.
Unemployment and econometric learning
I apply well-known results of the econometric learning literature to the
Mortensen-Pissarides real business cycle model. Agents can always learn the unique
rational expectations equilibrium (REE), for all possible well-defined sets of parameter
values, by using the minimum-state-variable solution to the model and decreasing gain
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learning. From this perspective, the assumption of rational expectations in the model
could be seen as reasonable. But using a parametrisation with UK data, simulations
show that the speed of convergence to the REE is slow. This type of learning dampens
the cyclical response of unemployment to small structural shocks.
Measuring sectoral income shares: Accounting for input-output structures across
countries
I use input-output tables to measure the labour income shares of the goods and the
services sector for a large cross-section of mostly developed countries. I present
two novel findings: sectoral labour income shares significantly increase with the
level of development, and within-country differences between these income shares
are uncorrelated with the level of development. These cross-country differences are
not caused by variation in the input-output structure or final demand, but originate
at the production-side of the economy. I measure sectoral total factor productivity
using a development accounting framework to assess the quantitative importance of
my findings. The goods sector of less developed countries is relatively less productive
than the services sector; assuming that the values of the sectoral labour income
shares across countries are identical to their corresponding U.S. values leads to an
underestimation of productivity differences across countries. All findings are robust to
different adjustments for the labour income of the self-employed.
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Introduction
The UK’s Great Recession was the most severe economic contraction since the Second
World War, yet employment declined less than in previous recessions. This resilience
of UK employment has been attributed to flexible labour costs (Blundell et al., 2014),
but economy-wide averages tell nothing about the responses of wages and hours within
jobs, which is what determines a firm’s employment decision in frictional labour
markets (Pissarides, 2009). For example, if workers switch from high- to low-paying
jobs during recessions, and vice versa during booms, then worker-level regressions
will find very flexible and procyclical wages, even if wages within jobs are unchanged.
In the first essay I use the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), a matched
employer-employee dataset, to control for this cyclical job-switching. Only three other
studies exist that control for job-switching when estimating the response of new hires’
wages to the business cycle: Carneiro et al. (2012) and Martins et al. (2012), who use
Portuguese data, and Stüber (2017) who uses German data. This essay offers multiple
contributions: first, it extents the list of countries, for which results of new hires’ wage
flexibility exist, to the UK. This is important, because the UK is generally considered
to have the most flexible labour markets among European countries, and thus results
for countries with relatively strong unions and labour protection laws, such as Portugal
and Germany, might not apply to the UK. The second contribution is that I provide
robust job-level measures of the responses of real wages and hours worked for both,
new hires and job stayers. In particular, I compute median real wages and hours of
new hires and job stayers in each job (firm-occupation pair) and year, which extends
the framework of Martins et al. (2012) by allowing for a direct comparison with job
stayers’ wages and hours in the same firm. Third, this essay provides novel evidence
that job stayers’ hours do not respond to the Great Recession, but new hires’ hours are
significantly reduced in large firms, mostly due to a shift from full-time to part-time
hiring.
I estimate the response of these job-level variables to the aggregate unemployment
rate, controlling for the changing composition of jobs over the business cycle by
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including job-fixed effects. However, I follow Martins et al. (2012) and select a
particular sample of jobs for which I repeatedly observe hiring over the business cycle
to ensure that my estimates are not affected by endogenous sample selection: for
example, if jobs with more rigid hiring wages stopped hiring during recessions, then
this would lead to an overestimation of the flexibility of hiring wages. In other words,
I forego representativeness for certainty of what I’m measuring. I show that firms were
able to respond to the Great Recession with substantial real wage cuts and by recruiting
more part-time workers. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
led to an average decline in real hourly wages of 2.8 per cent for new hires and
2.6 per cent for job stayers. Hours of new hires in entry-level jobs in large firms
were also substantially procyclical, while job-stayer hours were nearly constant. This
substantial flexibility for new hires could explain the relatively high job-finding rate
during the UK’s Great Recession (Elsby and Smith, 2010). My findings suggest that
models assuming rigid labour costs of new hires are not helpful for understanding the
behaviour of unemployment over the business cycle.
The second essay studies the Mortensen-Pissarides business cycle model. Because
of the absence of a centralised market for labour, the assumption implicit in this model
that firms and unemployed workers “know” the fundamentals of their economy, such
as the cost of posting vacancies or the equilibrium ratio of vacancies-to-unemployed,
seems relatively strong. Therefore, I ask how the dynamics and equilibrium properties
of the Mortensen-Pissarides model change when firms and unemployed workers
have to use simple linear forecast rules, which are updated every period, to form
expectations about future values of relevant variables. In other words, agents are
assumed to “learn” the underlying parameters of the economy rather than to “know”
them.
I apply well-known results of the econometric learning literature (Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001), and show that agents can always learn the unique rational
expectations equilibrium (REE), for all possible well-defined sets of parameter values.
This means that the equilibrium quantities and ratios of the Mortensen-Pissarides
model are unaffected by the behavioural assumption that agents are learning. In
parallel work, Di Pace et al. (2016) arrive at similar results, however, in contrast to their
work I use a simpler version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model, which enables me to
derive analytical results instead of having to rely on numerical simulations. Therefore,
this essay contributes to the literature on search in macroeconomic models of the
labour market by showing that the standard assumption of rational expectations in these
models seems to be a reasonable assumption with respect to the implied equilibrium
quantities and ratios.
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Additionally, this essay shows, by using a simulation which is parametrised with
UK data, that the speed of convergence to the REE is slow. This means that,
although the equilibrium will be reached asymptotically, aggregate variables such
as the unemployment rate, could be persistently some distance away from their
equilibrium values. Therefore, the rational expectations model of unemployment
fluctuations could in fact be a poor approximation to an economy in which agents more
realistically learn as econometricians, especially in the presence of frequent structural
or permanent shocks. Moreover, this type of adaptive learning dampens the cyclical
response of unemployment to small structural shocks, by making wages adjust more
gradually after shocks, instead of jumping to their respective steady state values as
under rational expectations.
The final essay measures the labour income shares of the goods sector and services
sector for a large cross-section of mostly developed countries. The reason for this is
that the literature on development economics and economic growth usually makes the
assumption that these sectoral labour income shares are identical to the ones measured
in the United States by Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008). This assumption is not based
on theoretical arguments or direct empirical evidence, but rather a necessity because
of a lack of comparable data on sectoral income shares across countries. The only
indirect evidence so far are the results provided by Gollin (2002), who found that the
aggregate labour income shares are not correlated with the level of income.
The aim of this last essay is simple: to understand whether the assumption
of constant sectoral labour income shares across countries holds. Therefore, I
use input-output tables to measure the labour income shares of the goods and the
services sector for a large cross-section of mostly developed countries, following
the method of Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008). I present two novel findings:
sectoral labour income shares significantly increase with the level of development,
and within-country differences between these income shares are uncorrelated with the
level of development. The first finding does seem to contradict the results of Gollin
(2002), which could be due to the absence of least developed countries from the sample
of countries which I analyse.
This essay then decomposes the measured labour income shares to provide a better
understanding of the causes of the observed differences. I find that the cross-country
differences are not caused by variation in the input-output structure or final demand,
but originate at the production-side of the economy. Consequently, value-added labour
income shares provide a good, and less data-demanding, approximation of the sectoral
labour income shares.
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Finally, I measure sectoral total factor productivity using a development accounting
framework, similar to Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012), to assess the quantitative
importance of my findings. The goods sector of less developed countries is relatively
less productive than the services sector. Assuming that the values of the sectoral labour
income shares across countries are identical to their corresponding U.S. values leads to
an underestimation of productivity differences across countries. All findings are robust
to different adjustments for the labour income of the self-employed. Therefore, my
findings suggest that future research should not use the U.S. labour income shares in
cross-country studies, but rather use the shares provided in this essay, or the aggregate
labour income shares as approximation.
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Chapter 1
Real wages and hours in the Great
Recession: Evidence from firms and
their entry-level jobs
Note: This chapter has also been published as CESifo Working Paper No. 6766, and
was co-authored with Carl Singleton, who is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the University
of Edinburgh, School of Economics; e-mail: carl.singleton@ed.ac.uk. Carl has agreed
that this essay represents in the majority my work, and that it can appear within
this thesis. In addition to those already acknowledged, I am especially grateful to
Steven Dieterle, Mike Elsby, Jonathan Thomas, and Ludo Visschers for their advice
and comments. This work was presented at the 2017 Aarhus Conference on Markets
with Search Frictions, the 8th ifo Conference on Macroeconomics and Survey Data,
the 42nd Simposio of the Spanish Economic Association, and the internal seminar of
the School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. The data used in this chapter are
accessible from the UK Data Service, having been collected by the Office for National
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1.1 Introduction
The Great Recession was the most severe economic contraction in the UK since
the Second World War, yet employment declined less than in previous recessions. This
resilience of employment has been attributed to flexible labour costs because aggregate
real wages and working hours fell during the recent downturn (Crawford et al., 2013;
Blundell et al., 2014; Gregg et al., 2014). But economy-wide averages tell nothing
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about the response of wages and hours within jobs, which is what determines firms’
employment decisions in frictional labour markets. For example, suppose that wages
within jobs are completely rigid, and workers switch from high- to low-paying jobs
during recessions. In this case aggregate real wages would decline, even if firms’
payments to employees are unchanged. In contrast to previous studies for the UK, we
use a linked employer-employee dataset, which allows us to measure the response of
real hourly wages and weekly hours worked within particular jobs.
Our main contribution is to combine the robust job-level measurement of responses
in real wages and hours worked within the same methodological framework, for
both new hires and job stayers. We present two novel findings: first, firms
significantly reduced the real wages of new hires and job stayers within jobs during
the downturn; second, the same firms kept the hours worked of job stayers unchanged,
but significantly reduced the hours of new hires. A one percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate leads to an average decline in real hourly wages of 2.8 per
cent for new hires and 2.6 per cent for job stayers. Weekly hours worked of new hires
decline by 1.5 per cent, but for job stayers remain nearly constant. A shift from full-
to part-time work explains over half of the decline in the hours of new hires, however
we find no significant difference between the wage responses of full- and part-time
workers. This substantial flexibility for new hires could explain the relatively high
job-finding rate during the UK’s Great Recession.
In a wide class of labour market models, firms’ employment decisions are
forward-looking and dependent on expected labour costs. Therefore, we track new
hires over three years in continuing matches to understand how persistent their initial
real hiring wages and hours are. We find strong cohort effects: accounting for
unobserved match quality, real wage growth came to a complete halt for cohorts hired
during the Great Recession. For these employees, stagnant wages were only partially
compensated for by larger increases in working hours with tenure on the job. These
findings suggest that the sum of real wage payments in a job-match over time, i.e. the
present value of labour costs for new hires, is even more responsive to business cycle
conditions than initial hiring conditions.
We use a simple empirical approach to measure the responses of real wages and
hours to the business cycle. To obtain job-level measures of wages and hours, we
first compute the median real wages and hours of new hires and job stayers in each
job and year. We then estimate the semi-elasticity of these job-level measures to the
unemployment rate, controlling for the changing composition of jobs over the cycle
by including job-fixed effects. We identify a particular sample of jobs into which
firms consistently hired before and during the recession. This matters, because we
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use within-job variation to measure responses to the Great Recession. If jobs with
relatively rigid wages and hours simply stopped hiring during the recent downturn,
then our sample would over-represent jobs with particularly flexible hiring conditions.
Our sample mostly consists of jobs with high turnover and low wages, which
we call “entry-level”. Since the employment of low-wage workers typically declines
sharply during UK recessions (Blundell et al., 2014), it matters from an aggregate
perspective why this group’s employment did not drop more during the recent
downturn. On average our entry-level jobs account for two-thirds of hires within their
respective firms and a quarter of all new hires in the UK. These proportions increased
during the Great Recession, both within firms and the whole economy, underlining the
importance of these jobs in understanding the performance of the UK’s labour market.
Since Solon et al. (1994) it has been recognised that the measured business
cycle response of the average real wage typically underestimates the true response
because of composition bias: the share in total hours worked of low-wage workers
decreases during recessions, inducing a countercyclical bias. Several studies have used
longitudinal data to address this bias (see the survey by Abraham and Haltiwanger,
1995). Most recently, Elsby et al. (2016) find that real wages are procyclical for
UK employees working in the same job for at least one year, with an especially large
response to the Great Recession. Pissarides (2009) however argues that what matters
for a firm’s hiring decision, and thus vacancy creation, are wages in new worker-firm
matches. There exists some evidence that the wages of workers who change employers
respond to the business cycle (see Bils, 1985; Shin, 1994; Devereux, 2001, and Gertler
et al., 2016 for US evidence). Devereux and Hart (2006) and Hart and Roberts (2011)
find that the cyclicality of wages for British job changers significantly exceeds that of
stayers.
But Gertler and Trigari (2009) explain why this worker-level evidence does not rule
out wage rigidity within jobs: for example, if workers switch from high- to low-paying
jobs during recessions, and vice versa during booms, then worker-level regressions will
find a procyclical response of real hiring wages to business cycle conditions, even if
wages within jobs are unchanged. But for firms’ vacancy creation, and thus job-finding
rates, this form of worker-level wage flexibility is not relevant. In frictional labour
markets, firms will create vacancies so long as they expect a profit from doing so. This
profit depends on expected revenue and the job-level hiring wages. Whether a new hire
was previously employed at a higher or lower wage does not affect these costs.
If firms hire into jobs with relatively rigid wages in recessions, then the weighting
in worker-level regressions is endogenous, and hence estimates are biased. Martins
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et al. (2012) propose measuring the cyclicality within jobs, by using the “typical”
real wages of new hires in a case study of certain jobs. This approach trades off
representativeness of the whole economy for confidence that economically meaningful
responses can be estimated, at least from the perspective of what matters to firms.
Martins et al. find that in Portugal real wages decrease significantly by 1.8 per cent
when the unemployment rate increases by one percentage point. This is lower than our
similarly obtained UK estimate of 2.8 per cent.
Our approach differs from Martins et al. (2012) in a subtle but important respect: in
contrast to their study, we measure the responses of real wages and hours of job stayers
using the same approach as for new hires. This provides a comparable benchmark
value of real wage and hours flexibility, and allows us to assess whether these variables
are especially flexible for new hires. Because we restrict attention to job stayers among
the same firms as new hires, we can exclude firm-level differences as a source of bias
when comparing the measured responses across the two groups of workers and jobs.
The institutional framework of labour markets is likely to affect the flexibility of
wages and hours worked. Therefore, we further expand on Martins et al. by taking
the effects of the National Minimum Wage on our estimates seriously. Intuitively,
some entry-level jobs with relatively low hiring wages will be constrained in how
they can adjust their wages downwards in response to the Great Recession. We
compute counterfactual hiring wages using the method of DiNardo et al. (1996), and
our findings suggest that the real wages of new hires would have declined a further 10
per cent if the National Minimum Wage had remained at its lower pre-crisis level.
Apart from the studies of Carneiro et al. (2012) and Martins et al. (2012) for
Portugal, the only other estimates of hiring wage cyclicality at the job level are
the findings of Stüber (2017) for Germany. He first measures the business cycle
response of wages at the worker-level, controlling for unobserved worker and job
heterogeneity. Stüber finds a semi-elasticity of average daily real wages to the
unemployment rate of 1.3, which does not significantly differ between new hires and
job stayers. Because of the potential problems of endogenous sample selection when
running worker-level regressions, he also estimates a job-level version. His findings
suggest that job-level real daily wages of new hires and job stayers decline by 0.9 per
cent if the unemployment rate increases by one percentage point in Germany. But,
unlike the approach of Martins et al. (2012), he does not fix a particular sample of
jobs. Again, if firms stop hiring into jobs with relatively flexible wages, and thus only
rigid job-level real hiring wages are observed, then his results will be biased towards
finding smaller semi-elasticities.
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As Stüber explains, the method applied by Martins et al. and us is not immune
from composition bias: within jobs it is likely that relatively low-skilled and
low-wage workers are the first to become unemployed in recessions. This induces
a countercyclical bias, and so our results provide lower bounds for the response of
hiring wages within jobs. However, because the jobs in our entry-level sample are
mostly low-skilled and concentrated in the hospitality and trade services industries,
we expect that changes in the composition of workers within jobs do not substantially
affect typical job-level wages. This is in line with Yagan (2017), who argues that,
conditional on firm-fixed effects, the composition of workers and the tasks performed
by them does not vary notably in the US retail industry.
All of the aforementioned studies focus on real wages. But firms can also
adjust their labour costs by decreasing the hours worked per employee. Our detailed
dataset allows us to also examine the responses of weekly hours worked for the same
employees and jobs, which previous studies could not address. We present a novel and
robust finding that firms responded to the Great Recession by significantly decreasing
hiring hours. We find that a shift from full- to part-time explains half of the overall
decline in hiring hours within jobs. However, hours worked were not responsive to the
Great Recession for job stayers.
1.2 Measuring how real wages and hours responded to
the Great Recession
To measure the response of real hourly wages and weekly hours to the Great
Recession we use a two-step regression approach (Solon et al., 1994; Martins et al.,
2012). Compared to the alternative one-step approach, the results are more transparent
and we do not have to rely on asymptotic theory to obtain robust estimates of standard
errors. We expand on our choice of method further below. In the first step, for hiring
wages we use least squares to estimate
w jt = α j +βt + x′jtδ + ε jt , (1.1)
where w jt is the median log real hiring wage in the 4-digit occupation-firm pair j
(hereafter job j) and period t. We include job-fixed effects α j and period-fixed effects
βt . The error term ε jt gives the remaining heterogeneity in w jt which is not job- or
period-specific, after controlling for time-varying job characteristics in the vector x jt .
The baseline set of covariates for new hires at the job level are: a cubic function in
age and firm size, the share of female employees and the share of employees covered
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by a collective agreement. Our results remain virtually unchanged when we instead
use dummies for ranges of these variables. We include these covariates to control to
some extent for changes in the composition of employees within jobs over the business
cycle.
The parameter estimates β̂t from (1.1) are a series of period-means of log wages,
regression adjusted for changes in the composition of jobs in the sample. In the second
step, we relate this series to the Great Recession by regressing it on the unemployment
rate Ut :
β̂t = c0 + c1t + γUt + et . (1.2)
We vary the specification of both steps for robustness, but the baseline second step
includes a constant and a linear time trend. We measure the response of real wages
to the Great Recession by the coefficient estimate γ̂ , the semi-elasticity of real wages
with respect to the unemployment rate. If instead we regressed job-level wages directly
on the unemployment rate, then errors would be cross-sectionally correlated. This
is because the cyclical indicator does not vary across jobs: usual standard errors
would underestimate the uncertainty of coefficient estimates.1 Therefore, following
the recommendations of Donald and Lang (2007) and Angrist and Pischke (2009), we
use a two-step procedure on within-period averages. This approach is transparent and
standard error estimates are more reliable than estimating a covariance matrix that is
robust to cross-sectionally correlated errors (or “cluster robust”) with relatively few
periods.
For job-stayer wages we alter the first-step regression. Let wqk be the median wage
of job stayers in some job q, which is specific not only to some occupation-firm pair,
as per j above, but is also specific to two consecutive periods: i.e. job stayers observed
between years 1998-9 and 2008-9 who work in the same occupation-firm pair j would
have different values for q. Whether the wage refers to stayers in the first or second
consecutive period is indicated by k, equal to zero or one respectively. We thus account
for wages rising with tenure, using least squares to estimate
wqk = αq +βT (qk)+λk+ x
′
qkδ + εqk , (1.3)
where T (qk) is a function indicating that a job q is observed in period t, and x′qk
contains time-varying characteristics: age squared and cubed, tenure in the firm
1For an illustration, note that the error term v jt of the one-step regression
w jt = α j + c1t + γUt + x′jtδ + v jt
consists of a job-specific component ε jt and a period-specific term et , such that v jt = ε jt + et . The error
term v jt is cross-sectionally correlated because of et , which is common across all jobs j within a period.
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squared and cubed, firm size and its square, and the share of employees covered by
a collective agreement. Linear terms for age and tenure are omitted as these would
be collinear with k, and the average effect of these variables is controlled for by the
estimated linear trend λ̂ . Although rewriting and estimating (1.3) in first differences
over k is a more intuitive representation of how we estimate job-stayer wage cyclicality,
we proceed with the equation in levels to obtain more directly comparable estimates of
β̂t . The second step regressions for job-stayer and hiring wages are identical.
To measure the response of hours worked we estimate the same two-step models,
replacing the dependent variables in (1.1) and (1.3).
1.2.1 The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings and other data
used
The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), 1997-2016, is based on a one per
cent random sample of employees, drawn from HM Revenue and Customs Pay As You
Earn (PAYE) records. A small number of workers not registered for PAYE, who tend to
receive very low pay, either due to low hourly wages or hours worked, or both, are not
sampled. Questionnaires are sent to employers, who are legally required to complete
them with reference to payroll for a period in April. The ASHE is generally considered
to provide accurate records of pay components (Nickell and Quintini, 2003).
The dataset can be viewed as a panel of employees without attrition, forming
an approximate one per cent random and representative sample of UK employees in
every year.2 Particularly valuable for our analysis are the longitudinal identifiers for
individuals (1997-2016) and enterprises (2003-2016). We use the terms “firm” and
“enterprise” synonymously. The latter in this case is a specific administrative definition
of UK employers, which could contain several local units (or plants). We believe this
is the appropriate level to study firm- or job-level wages, because in most organisations
pay-setting practices are determined at the enterprise level.
In another paper we use a combination of the exact number of employees, 4-digit
industry classification and information on the legal status of an enterprise to define
the boundaries of larger firms within each year back to 1996 (Schaefer and Singleton,
2017). But, here we want to link firms longitudinally before and after 2003. Therefore
we impute values of the enterprise identifier backwards from 2003, using consecutive
observations of individuals who have not changed jobs between years, as well as
2The two main reasons why an individual might not be observed in some year are: either being truly
non-employed, or having changed employer between January and April. Since the survey questionnaires
are in most cases sent in April to the employer’s registered address from January PAYE records, workers
who switch employers during these months are undersampled.
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using employment start dates. We then use the available within-year employer local
unit identifiers to impute more enterprise values. For further information on how
we construct this employer-employee panel from ASHE cross-sections, and other
adjustments made to the data and the sample selection, see Appendix A.1.
Our analysis focuses on two main variables: basic weekly paid hours and the
hourly wage rate, which equals the ratio of gross weekly earnings to the former,
all excluding overtime. We refer to these simply as hours and wages. Monetary
values are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).3 For comparability with
other studies, we include some statistics about nominal wage changes in Appendix
A.5. We consider working-age employees (aged 16-64) in the private sector, who have
non-missing records of earnings and hours. We include only the main job observation
of an individual, which must not be at trainee or apprentice level, and not have incurred
a loss of pay in the reference period for whatever reason. To avoid some spurious
hourly wage rates we only keep observations with 1-100 basic paid weekly hours.
Since the data are not top-coded, we drop the highest one per cent of weekly or hourly
earners.
Our main indicator variable for the Great Recession is the working-age
unemployment rate: the number of people unemployed divided by the economically
active population.4 To correspond with the timing of the ASHE, we use average values
over the previous four quarters for all price series and business cycle indicators. For
example, an estimate of the 2009 wage for new hires is compared with the average
unemployment rate over the preceding twelve months, when those hires would have
been made. We use the unemployment rate for comparability with the wider literature.
In Section 1.4 we discuss the robustness of our main results to this choice.
1.2.2 Constructing the baseline sample of entry-level jobs and
their firms
We create a sample of entry-level jobs following Martins et al. (2012), applying
similar selection criteria. We first restrict our sample to observations for the years
2003-16, because for this period we have almost complete records of firm identifiers
and employment start dates. We exclude all firms which are observed for less than three
years. Jobs are defined at the 4-digit occupational level within firms (for example,
“Housekeeper” vs. “Waiter or waitress” in a hotel), whereby the same occupation
3For robustness we also compute results using the Retail Price Index (RPI). All prices were obtained
from UK National Statistics, accessed 24/04/2017.
4Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, April 2017, available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/.../apr2017;
accessed 24/04/2017.
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in two different firms is treated as two separate jobs. We define a new hire as any
employee with less than one year of tenure with a firm.
For a job to be defined as entry-level, we require at least three observations of new
hires in a year, and this must be the case for the job in at least half of the years when
the firm is observed in 2003-16. Recalling that the ASHE is an approximate one per
cent random employee sample, these requirements impose an effective lower bound on
firm size in our entry-level jobs samples. Of the firms in our baseline sample, 95 per
cent have more than five hundred employees. After identifying entry-level jobs over
2003-16, we add further observations of new hires in these jobs back to 1998. These
earlier hires in the sample tend to be older individuals and subsequently have longer
tenure with the firm, a result of how we recursively impute firm identifiers before 2003.
We do not claim that this sample represents all entry-level jobs in the economy, nor
that the firms always hire into the same jobs. Instead the analysis of wages and hours in
this sample should be viewed as a case study, where we do what is possible to control
for composition bias in hiring over the economic cycle: we only study the real wages
and hours of new hires in jobs where we can observe at least some hiring regardless
of the economic cycle. In what follows we refer to the sample of firms which have
these jobs as consistent-hiring-firms (CH-firms). The selection criteria are naturally
somewhat arbitrary, though hopefully reasonable. We vary them for robustness when
discussing our main empirical results.
1.2.3 Summary of new hires, job stayers and entry-level jobs
The entry-level jobs sample consists of 309 firms hiring into 391 jobs (Table 1.1). Our
sample is unbalanced since some jobs are not observed in all years during 1998-2016.
As Martins et al. (2012) note, the most important consideration is that the number
of entry-level jobs should not vary systematically over the business cycle, as this
would result in endogenous sample selection. The contemporaneous correlation of the
number of entry-level jobs in our sample and the unemployment rate is insignificant
(p-value: 0.49), and no other cyclical patterns are evident in Table 1.1 column (1). The
median number of new hires per entry-level job is seven over the sample period.
A contribution of this paper is that we analyse the real wages and hours of
job-stayers within firms which have at least one entry-level job. Job stayers are
employees who are still working in the same occupation-firm as in the last reference
period, hence we exclude the effects of cyclical job-switching into better or worse
matches. We include only jobs with at least three job stayers in at least half of the
years when the firm is observed during 2003-16. The sample consists of 7,779 repeated
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TABLE 1.1: Number of new hires, entry-level jobs, and consistent-hiring-firms by
year
Year New hires Entry-level jobs Firms Unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1998 948 116 93 6.80
1999 1,244 139 113 6.28
2000 1,358 148 113 5.94
2001 2,496 198 152 5.33
2002 2,821 219 180 5.15
2003 2,319 234 183 5.22
2004 2,460 252 191 4.98
2005 3,802 290 224 4.78
2006 3,502 289 225 5.02
2007 3,499 294 225 5.55
2008 3,609 289 221 5.34
2009 3,414 272 213 6.23
2010 2,781 258 203 7.96
2011 3,254 276 213 7.99
2012 3,178 262 206 8.37
2013 3,221 249 193 8.09
2014 3,374 262 206 7.48
2015 3,890 262 203 6.04
2016 3,507 242 186 5.39
Total 54,677 4,551 3,543
Unique 48,744 391 309
Notes.- age 16-64, private sector only. Source of the unemployment rate series is discussed in
Section 1.2.
observations of occupation-firm pairs, totalling 158,194 job stayers. The selected jobs
represent on average nearly 90 per cent of all job stayers in the CH-firms sample over
the whole period.
New hires in the CH-firms sample are younger, more likely to be female, and less
likely to work full-time than job stayers (columns (1) and (2), Table 1.2). The wages
and basic hours of new hires are lower than for job stayers. The same statements
hold for the entire ASHE, (columns (3) and (4), Table 1.2), though the difference
between the hours worked by all new hires and job stayers is considerably smaller:
almost two-thirds of hires into entry-level jobs are part-time. When compared with the
whole economy, the lower average age, real wages, and basic hours in the CH-firms
sample can be explained by differences in industry and occupation composition. Over
two-thirds of new hires are made by firms in the “accommodation and restaurant”
and the “industrial cleaning and labour recruitment” industry. Similarly, the largest
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TABLE 1.2: Descriptive statistics for employees: comparison of the
consistent-hiring-firms sample and the whole ASHE (all firms and jobs), 1998-2016
CH-firms ASHE
New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean age (years) 28 37 32 41
Female share 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.42
Full-time share 0.36 0.70 0.66 0.79
Median real hourly wage 5.24 7.04 6.29 8.43
Median basic weekly hours 21.6 36.0 36.5 37.4
Median real weekly earnings 117 260 225 313
Median firm size (n. of empl.) 6,588 6,588 45 29
Firm size growth (p.a.) 4.3% 4.3% 7.9% 7.9%
N (000s) 55 158 222 1,307
Notes.- age 16-64, private sector only. Monetary values in GBP, deflated to 1998 prices using
CPI. Descriptives for job stayers refer to their latter longitudinally linked observations.
shares are employed as service or sales workers (see Tables A.4-A.5 for the complete
industries and occupation breakdowns). Firms in these industries account for
approximately a third of all employees in the private sector (Jäger, 2016). This is
also reflected in larger firms dominating the CH-firms sample. These large firms have
average annual growth in the number of their employees of around four per cent,
while the average for all firms is around eight per cent. Although the observable
characteristics of new hires in entry-level jobs exhibit secular trends during 1998-2016,
we do not see any notable cyclical patterns (Appendix Figure A.1).5
Since our subsequent analysis takes place at the job level, we compute median
wages and hours within jobs each year (our results do not change significantly when
we use average wages and hours instead). Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of real
wages of new hires after subtracting their respective entry-level job median wages.
Although we can expect some dispersion around these median wages, the
robustness of our econometric approach and the meaningful interpretation of any
results to some extent depends on us capturing “typical” hiring wages. Some dispersion
around the median hiring wages, indicated by zero, is visible in Figure 1.1. More than
50 per cent of hiring wages lie within a range of five log points, and almost 90 per cent
within 10 log points around the job-specific median. The dispersion around the typical
5Appendix Figure A.1 shows that the share of men among new hires increases steadily by around
ten per cent from 1998 to 2016, while the share of full-time employees decreases. As a consequence of
our recursive sample construction prior to 2003, the average age of hires decreases by over five years
from 1998 to 2003. Including controls for the average age of hires within a job in the following analysis
does not change our results.
30
CHAPTER 1 SECTION 1.3
FIGURE 1.1: Distribution of differences between log real wages of new hires
and their median values within entry-level jobs, 1998-2016
Notes.- within each entry-level job and year, the median hiring wage is subtracted
from all hiring wages in that job and the resulting log differences are collected in bins
with a width of two log points.
hiring wage is approximately constant over time and does not vary systematically with
the business cycle. In particular, the mass in the tails of the distribution does not
change and the inter quartile range is constant over the sample period. In the robustness
discussion below we show that our results do not notably change if we use mean wages
or hours within jobs instead.
1.3 Main results: Estimated job-level responses to the
Great Recession
Figure 1.2 shows the estimated time series β̂t for new hires and job stayers in
CH-firms from regression models (1.1) and (1.3) over the period 1998-2016. The
short-dashed lines indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals for the point estimates
of β̂t for new hires, using standard errors robust to serial correlation at the job-level.
The confidence intervals for job stayers (not shown) are very narrow and lie within
the intervals for new hires, except in 2015-16 for real wages and 2011-16 for hours
worked. All series are normalised to zero in 2003 and series-specific linear trends
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FIGURE 1.2: Estimated period-fixed effects for log real wages and log hours worked,
including 95% confidence intervals for new hires, 1998-2016.
Notes.- the 95% confidence interval for job stayers (not shown) is very narrow and lies within
the interval for new hires except in 2015-16 for real wages and 2011-16 for hours worked.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the firm-level. Excluded reference category in
first-step regression (1.1) is 1998 for new hires, and regression (1.3) excludes 1998 & 2016.
Series-specific linear trends removed from panel A. Series normalised to zero in 2003. Shaded
area marks official UK recession dates. “New hires" are for wages in entry-level jobs where
employees have less than twelve months of tenure. “Job stayers in sample firms" are for jobs
and employees who have tenure greater than twelve months, and only for firms which are ever
represented in the CH-firms sample.
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have been removed from the series for wages for comparability. We estimate (1.1)
with the unbalanced baseline panel of jobs described in Table 1.1, using period and job
dummies. Thus, these time series should be interpreted as composition-adjusted real
wages and hours of new hires and job stayers. In Appendix Figure A.5 we show the
series for real wages without removing their respective linear trends.
Panel A shows that real hiring wages increased above trend by around 10 log
points between 1998 and 2008, similar to job stayers in the same firms. During the
Great Recession hiring wages remained below trend by around 10 log points until
2014, before slightly recovering over the next two years. The real wages of job
stayers plummeted by almost 15 log points during the downturn, relative to trend.
For comparison, Elsby et al. (2016) document a decline in job-stayer real wages in
the whole economy between 2008 and 2012 of 14 log points for men and eight log
points for women. Panel B shows the estimated series for hours worked among the
same employees, jobs and time period. Hiring hours decreased by over 10 log points
between 2007 and 2012, being approximately constant before and after. In contrast, the
hours worked by job stayers saw no significant change during the Great Recession.6
We measure the response of real wages and hours to the Great Recession by
estimating the second-step regression (1.2) using least squares. As recommended
by Solon et al. (2015), we do not use weighted least squares (WLS) in our baseline
regressions, because the least squares residuals do not display significant evidence
of heteroskedasticity. Nevertheless, we later compare estimates from our baseline to
those obtained using two different WLS estimators: (1) weights equal to the number
of new hires; (2) weights equal to the number of entry-level jobs. Estimates from the
first WLS estimator suffer from endogenous sample selection, because hiring volume
is likely to depend on the cyclical response of wages and hours. However, the sign of
the induced bias is informative about the bias in other studies using worker-level data.
The second estimator is the WLS procedure applied by Martins et al. (2012), which
accounts for the varying sample sizes of entry-level jobs over time.
The first row of Table 1.3 displays the main (or baseline) results, measuring
the semi-elasticity with respect to a one percentage point (p.p.) increase in the
unemployment rate: real hourly wages of new hires and job stayers decrease by 2.8
and 2.6 per cent if the unemployment rate increases by one p.p.. These estimates
are significantly different from no response, but do not significantly differ from one
another: Appendix Table A.3 shows the coefficient estimates when we regress the
difference between new hires and job stayers in the estimated series of β̂t on the
6Appendix Tables A.6-A.7 display the underlying values of all series in Figure 1.2.
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unemployment rate, using our two-step approach. In column (3) we find that hiring
hours respond by around 1.5 per cent, compared to only 0.2 per cent for job stayers
in column (4). The significant decline in average hours per worker during the Great
Recession has been discussed before (Blundell et al., 2014; Pessoa and Van Reenen,
2014; Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé, 2017), though not at the job level. Blundell et al.
(2008) find that UK workers adjust hours worked in response to welfare reforms
usually by changing firms, and this is particularly true for larger firms and in the
services industry. To the best of our knowledge, the relatively greater and large
response of hiring hours has not been documented previously.
TABLE 1.3: Estimated semi-elasticity of real wages and hours with respect to the
unemployment rate, 1998-2016
Wages Hours
New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Baseline −2.83∗∗∗ −2.60∗∗ −1.47∗∗∗ −0.20
(0.87) (1.13) (0.42) (0.22)
2. Including controls for −2.78∗∗∗ −2.71∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗ −0.04
share of full-time workers (0.88) (1.17) (0.26) (0.19)
3. Job hires in at least 25% of −2.44∗∗∗ −2.61∗∗ −0.43 −0.16
years when firm is observed (0.85) (1.11) (0.28) (0.13)
4. All jobs observed −2.48∗∗∗ −2.90∗∗ −0.47∗∗ −0.16
in at least 2 years (0.86) (1.16) (0.18) (0.10)
5. Baseline sample, but weighted −2.15∗∗∗ −1.88 −2.72∗∗∗ −0.43
by number of employees per year (0.64) (1.03) (0.68) (0.22)
Notes.- second-step regression results, estimates γ̂: responses of the period-fixed effects β̂t
to the unemployment rate; regression specifications as in (1.1)-(1.3). First row refers to the
main/baseline estimates. Second row includes an additional time-varying control for the share
of full-time workers in a job. Third row changes the selection criteria for entry-level jobs, such
that they have to be fulfilled in at least a quarter of years when the firm is observed, instead
of a half, and those firms have to be observed for at least five years. Fourth row includes all
job observations which hire in at least two years, or with at least two consecutive years of
observations for job stayers. Fifth row uses WLS in the first-step, with weights proportional to
the number of new hires or stayers in each job.
Newey-West standard error estimates robust to first-order serial correlation in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
We also find that real weekly earnings (excl. overtime) of new hires decline by
4.7 per cent if the unemployment rate increases by one p.p., while job-stayer earnings
decline by 2.9 per cent. Because the covariance between wages and hours is positive,
these estimates exceed the sum of the corresponding values in the first row of Table 1.3.
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We re-estimate regression (1.1), but in addition control for changes in the share of
full-time workers within jobs. The second row of Table 1.3 shows that for hiring hours
the semi-elasticity estimate falls to 0.7: over half of the recessionary decrease in hiring
hours can be attributed to a shift from full- to part-time hiring. However, the response
of real wages to the unemployment rate does not differ significantly between full- and
part-time hires and job stayers.
In the third row of Table 1.3 we include jobs which hire less frequently, increasing
the sample number of entry-level hires by 25 per cent. We find a slightly smaller
response of hiring wages to the recession, while the response of hours becomes
insignificant. This suggests that not keeping the sample of jobs fixed induces
a countercyclical bias in our estimates. When we create a balanced panel, by
considering only jobs which fulfil our selection criteria in all years 2003-16 (not
shown in Table 1.3), we find semi-elasticities of hiring wages and hours of 2.6 and
1.3 respectively. Therefore, our composition-adjusted baseline sample is relatively
unaffected by selection bias over the business cycle.
As previously explained, the approach of Martins et al. (2012) has the advantage
that we can be confident that what we measure is the response of real wages and
hours of new hires in entry-level jobs. The potential disadvantage is that this response
may not be representative of the whole economy. When we additionally include all
other jobs in the ASHE for which we observe hiring in at least two periods (and
similarly for job stayers), then the estimated time series of period-fixed effects from
the first step resembles the series from our baseline sample (Appendix Figures A.3
and Figures A.4). The exception is hiring hours, which are less cyclical at the job
level in the whole economy. This sample contains over twice as many hires and six
times as many job stayers as our baseline, and the fourth row in Table 1.3 shows
comparable estimates to our baseline. Real wages of all new hires and job stayers in
this sample decrease by 2.5 and 2.9 per cent, respectively, for each p.p. increase in the
unemployment rate. However the response of hiring hours is less pronounced in this
larger but more representative sample, though still significant at the five per cent level.
Thus, jobs with less flexible hiring wages and hours were more likely to stop hiring
altogether during the Great Recession, inducing a countercyclical selection bias. In
contrast, the selection bias for real wages of job stayers seems to be procyclical.
The final row of Table 1.3 shows values for γ̂ when we estimate the first step
using WLS, with weights proportional to the number of employees in each job. In
this case the semi-elasticity estimate for hiring wages of 2.2 is the smallest of all
the specifications described here. Therefore, weighting jobs by the number of hires
induces a countercyclical bias in the estimated response of real wages to business
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cycle conditions: relatively more hires are made in jobs with relatively rigid hiring
wages. Jobs which hired relatively more employees than others during the downturn
also decreased the hours worked per hire more: the response to a one p.p. increase in
the unemployment rate for entry-level hiring hours is more than 85 per cent larger than
without endogenous weighting. Therefore, weighting by hiring volume overestimates
the responsiveness of hiring hours. Not surprisingly, the firms who hire relatively
more during recessions are also able to move their workforces towards shorter hours
and part-time working. When Stüber (2017) similarly weights his job-level regression,
German real hiring “wages” become more procyclical, seemingly contradicting our
findings. But the results here could explain why we reach an opposite conclusion
on the direction of bias induced by the endogenous hiring volume of jobs, which is
also more in line with the hypotheses by Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Martins et al.
(2012): the German data offers information on annual earnings and the number of
days worked, and so Stüber’s measures of real wages are better understood as average
daily earnings. As our estimates show, the procyclical bias in hiring hours is large, and
exceeds the countercyclical bias in hiring wages. When combined, this can cause a
procyclical bias in earnings.
Finally, we make the sample selection criteria more exclusive, by increasing the
required minimum number of hires in a job per year for it to be included as an
entry-level job. The estimated semi-elasticity of hiring hours significantly increases in
the number of minimum hires (see column (3) of Appendix Table A.2), nearly doubling
when we require at least 10 hires per job and year. The estimated semi-elasticity of
real hiring wages slightly increases in absolute terms, peaking at 2.9 when we raise
the minimum number of hires to 7 per job and year. Varying the minimum number
of hires generally affects the measured response to the Great Recession of both wages
and hours. However, our main finding is unchanged: real wages of new hires are
marginally more responsive to the unemployment rate than wages for job stayers in
the same firms. Similarly, hiring hours always respond more strongly to the Great
Recession than job-stayer hours.
1.4 Robustness and further discussion
The main results described above show that UK firms were able to significantly
decrease the real labour cost per employee in response to the Great Recession.
To address robustness, in this section we apply alternative estimation procedures.
We further discuss the measurement of real wage cyclicality, as well as the wider
implications of these results. All of the additional analysis here uses the baseline
consistent-hiring-firms sample of employees and jobs.
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1.4.1 Using other specifications of the regression model
Table 1.4 displays results from varying the specification of the second-step regression
(1.2), while the first step remains unchanged. The main baseline results are repeated in
the first row. The second row shows that when we include a quadratic time trend, wages
decline marginally less when the unemployment rate increases, but the hours responses
are approximately unchanged. We prefer to only include a linear trend because of the
small number of periods in our dataset.
TABLE 1.4: Estimated semi-elasticity of real wages and hours with respect to the
unemployment rate, 1998-2016: varying the specification of the second-step regression
Wages Hours
New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Baseline (OLS) −2.83∗∗∗ −2.60∗∗ −1.47∗∗∗ −0.20
(0.87) (1.13) (0.42) (0.22)
2. Baseline with −2.33∗∗∗ −1.96∗∗∗ −1.42∗∗∗ −0.13
quadratic trend (0.48) (0.51) (0.46) (0.15)
3. First differences (OLS) −1.64∗∗∗ −1.84∗∗∗ −0.23 −0.09
(0.59) (0.40) (0.72) (0.16)
4. Baseline sample, but weighted −2.64∗∗∗ −2.43∗∗ −1.49∗∗∗ −0.10
by number of jobs per year (0.78) (0.95) (0.48) (0.14)
Notes.- second-step regression results of estimated period effects on unemployment rate, γ̂ .
First row is identical to Table 1.3, included here for comparison. Second row shows estimates
when the second-step includes an additional quadratic time trend term. Third row estimates
(1.2) in first differences, so measures the response of the log change in wages to a one
percentage point increase in the change in unemployment. Fourth row applies WLS in the
second step, with weights in proportion to the number of jobs observed per year.
Newey-West standard error estimates robust to first-order serial correlation in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
We also re-estimate (1.2) in first differences, to address potentially spurious
estimates if wages, hours, or the unemployment rate are integrated. As in our baseline
results, the real wage growth of new hires and job stayers does not respond significantly
differently to changes in the unemployment rate: if the change in the unemployment
rate increases by one p.p., then the growth of hiring wages decreases by 1.6 per
cent, and for job-stayers’ wages by 1.8 per cent. This is comparable to the finding
by Devereux and Hart (2006) of 1.7 per cent for all job stayers in the UK during
1975-2001.
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For comparability with Martins et al. (2012), we re-estimate (1.2) using WLS, with
weights proportional to the number of jobs per period in the first step. The resulting
estimates in the final row of Table 1.4 are qualitatively unchanged from the baseline.
However real wages and hours are slightly less cyclical. Overall, our results that both
the real wages of hires in entry-level jobs and of job stayers declined in response
to the Great Recession are robust to the specification of the second-step regression.
The finding that hiring hours declined more than for job stayers is also robust, except
for the first-differenced version of (1.2), which indicates that the decrease in hiring
hours is better understood as a medium-run and persistent development since 2008. In
Appendix A.2 we discuss the results of further robustness checks, which also do not
affect our confidence in the main results.
1.4.2 Using labour productivity as the business cycle indicator
As an alternative indicator for the Great Recession we consider labour productivity,
measured by log real gross value added per hour.7 Measures of labour productivity are
particularly relevant for a firm’s hiring decisions. As Haefke et al. (2013) explain, the
estimated response to this measure has an intuitive interpretation in standard search
and matching models of the labour market: if real wages are perfectly rigid, then
they should not respond to labour productivity, while a one-to-one response indicates
fully flexible wages.8 Table 1.5 shows the estimated elasticity when we use labour
productivity instead of the unemployment rate in regression (1.2). In the first row we
use aggregate labour productivity as the business cycle indicator. The estimates are
significantly smaller than one, but positive. Hiring hours also respond significantly,
though less than real wages.
Because over 90 per cent of jobs in our baseline sample belong to the services
industry, and the response of labour productivity to the Great Recession was not the
same across sectors, we also use labour productivity of the services sector as the
cyclical indicator. The second row of Table 1.5 shows a higher estimated elasticity
of real wages and hours worked with respect to services sector labour productivity.
Real wages of new hires and job stayers significantly decrease by 0.9 and 1.0 per
cent when aggregate labour productivity decreases by one per cent. The difference
between these values is insignificant. The estimates for job stayers and new hires do
not significantly differ from one at the 99 per cent and 95 per cent confidence level
7Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, April 2017, available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/.../apr2017;
accessed 24/04/2017.
8Appendix Figure A.3 shows the time series of each business cycle indicator used and Appendix
Table A.8 shows the underlying values.
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TABLE 1.5: Estimated elasticity of real wages and hours with respect to labour
productivity, 1998-2016
Wages Hours
New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Labour productivity (I) 0.82∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
whole economy (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04)
2. Labour productivity (II) 0.88∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ −0.01
services sector (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04)
Notes.- second-step regressions of estimated period effects on alternative indicator of the
business cycle. First-step estimated according to (1.1) and (1.3). “Labour productivity (I)”
uses the log of real whole economy gross value added (GVA) per hour: ONS series LZVB.
“Labour productivity (II)” uses the log of real gross value added (GVA) per hour in Services
(sectors G-U): ONS series DJP9. We adjust both series by multiplying by the ratio of CPI to
Producer Price Index of the services sector.
Newey-West standard error estimates robust to first-order serial correlation in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
respectively: suggestively, real wages in the UK were perfectly flexible to aggregate
labour productivity over the sample period.
Our estimated hiring wage elasticity is of a comparable magnitude to that found
by Haefke et al. (2013). These authors find an elasticity for the real wages of new
hires of around 0.8 with respect to real output per hour in the non-farm business sector
in the US. Similarly, Carneiro et al. (2012) find that the real wages of both stayers
and hires increase approximately one-to-one with aggregate real output per worker in
Portugal. Stüber (2017) finds that average real daily earnings of incumbent German
workers increase by 0.5 per cent if aggregate real output per worker increases by one
per cent, and he estimates a significantly smaller coefficient for new hires.
1.4.3 The role of the National Minimum Wage
Our results suggest that the real wages of new hires are just slightly more responsive
to business cycle conditions than for job stayers. One potential explanation for this
finding is the presence of a wage floor. This could constrain firms in how far they
can reduce hiring wages. In 1999 such a floor was introduced in the UK in the form
of the National Minimum Wage (NMW), with both adult and youth rates applying
nationwide. These are usually uprated on an annual basis.9 Collectively bargained
wages can also limit a firm’s flexibility in setting hiring wages. However, at the onset
9Source: https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates; accessed 01/07/2017.
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of the Great Recession, only six per cent of new hires in our sample were covered
by a national or industry-level collective agreement (affecting working conditions, not
necessarily pay). Therefore we consider the NMW to be the more likely limit on the
responsiveness of hiring wages.
Figure 1.3 displays the real NMW rate that applied to workers aged 21 and older,
along with the 10th percentile, 25th percentile, and median real wages of new hires
within entry-level jobs for each year.10 These hiring wages are not adjusted for changes
in sample composition and include only workers aged 22-64. Between 2006 and 2015
new hires at the 10th percentile of the wage distribution were paid the legal minimum,
i.e. the real value of the adult rate. In 2016, the 10th percentile of new hires increased
more than the adult rate, which followed the introduction of a higher NMW rate for
workers aged 25 and over. We also observe a narrowing of the gaps between the
minimum wage and both the 25th percentile and median of hiring wages over the
sample period. In other words, the domain of the distribution of real hiring wages at
the job level, for employees aged 22-64, became more restricted from below at the level
of the real NMW adult rate during the recent downturn. The wages of job stayers in
CH-firms were less constrained by the minimum wage than hiring wages, since stayers
are generally paid more than new hires (see Figure A.1D).
To answer the question of how hiring wages might have responded to the Great
Recession in the absence of a binding minimum wage, we use the kernel re-weighting
method of DiNardo et al. (1996). A description of this method is provided in
Appendix A.6. A partial equilibrium assumption underlies this method: the number
and composition of entry-level jobs is not affected by the NMW. This assumption is
unlikely to hold in reality. Nevertheless, this method allows us to assess the impact of
the NMW in a simple and transparent way.
Here we briefly explain the intuition. For each year following 2004, we replace the
density of job-level real hiring wages which was at or below the real value of the NMW
in that year, with the corresponding section of the 2004 density, adjusted for differences
in observable job characteristics. Then, we re-scale this counterfactual density so that
the two sections integrate to one. We select 2004 as the base year because this was
the last year when the real value of the NMW was below its lowest level in 2014
(see Figure 1.3). For this estimation we use the plug-in method of Sheather and Jones
(1991) to select the optimal bandwidth, which ranges from 0.01 to 0.04 for our sample.
The most important parameter in this kernel re-weighting exercise is the assumed
size of the spillover effect of the minimum wage, i.e. the highest value of the real
10The adult rate age limit was decreased from 22 to 21 in 2010.
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FIGURE 1.3: Real hourly wages of new hires and NMW adult rate, ages
22-64
Notes.- National Minimum Wage adult rate and 10th, 25th, and median percentile of
job-level hourly hiring wages, ages 22-64. All monetary values are deflated to 1998
values using the CPI. Shaded area marks official UK recession.
hiring wage density which is affected by the NMW. The more spillover we assume
in a period, the more of this period’s density - the section below the real value of the
minimum wage plus any spillover - is replaced with the corresponding section of the
2004 density.
To the best of our knowledge, the extent to which the minimum wage is affecting
real hiring wages in the UK has not been addressed. Varying estimates exist for the
size of the spillover on UK wages in general, with estimates ranging from almost no
spillover effects (Dickens and Manning, 2004) to relatively small effects up to the 5th
percentile of wages above the NMW (Stewart, 2012), and up to 40 per cent above the
NMW (Butcher et al., 2012). Therefore, we estimate counterfactual real wage densities
for new hires, assuming spillover effects ranging from 0 to 10 p.p. above the real NMW
in a given year.
To compute hiring wages at the job-level from counterfactual densities, we assume
that the rank of a job in the distribution of hiring wages is preserved under different
values of the NMW. Then we re-estimate regressions (1.1) and (1.2), using each of the
counterfactual real hiring wage samples estimated with different spillover parameters.
Figure 1.4 displays the point estimates of the counterfactual semi-elasticity of real
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hiring wages with respect to the unemployment rate across a range of assumed
parameters of the spillover.
FIGURE 1.4: Counterfactual estimates of the semi-elasticity of real hiring
wages, 1998-2016: varying the assumed spillover effect of the NMW
Notes.- each circle represents an estimate of the semi-elasticity of real hiring wages
with respect to the unemployment rate. Standard errors lie outside of the figure. The
horizontal axis shows the assumed spillover effect in p.p.. Dashed line shows the
baseline estimate of semi-elasticity. We use a Gaussian kernel, and the bandwidth is
selected using the Sheather-Jones plug-in estimator.
Assuming that there is no spillover effect, the left-most circle shows that the
responsiveness of real hiring wages to the unemployment rate increases from -2.83
to -2.97 per cent. The standard errors are comparable to the baseline value (0.9)
and lie outside the range of this figure. The semi-elasticity falls below -3.1 when the
spillover effect increases to five p.p. If the spillover increases above seven p.p., then
the responsiveness of real hiring wages to changes in the unemployment rate begins
to decrease towards the baseline estimate: the shape of the counterfactual density
increasingly resembles the shape of the density observed in 2004 when we assume
larger spillover effects, and hence the variation of hiring wages over time in entry-level
jobs declines. These results suggest that the NMW constrained firms in how far they
could reduce wages of new hires during the Great Recession.
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1.5 How did wages and hours evolve after hiring?
So far we have demonstrated that both real hiring wages and hours worked in
entry-level jobs significantly decreased during the UK’s Great Recession. However,
Haefke et al. (2013) and Elsby et al. (2016) argue that a firm’s decision to hire an
additional worker should depend on the expected present value of the marginal profit
from a successful match. The initial hiring wage and hours worked only form part of
this expected value, with hours only relevant if there are non-linearities in the firm’s
production or labour cost functions. If firms who can hire at lower wages and hours
during a recession also have to deliver greater wage growth in the job, then the expected
present value of the marginal product is potentially less cyclical than measured for the
hiring wage. Thus our previous estimates of wage flexibility may be less important for
understanding the muted employment response of the UK’s Great Recession than first
imagined.
As an initial assessment of the importance of cohort effects, Figure 1.5 plots the
real hourly wages and hours worked averaged over employees instead of jobs, for
each cohort of entry-level new hires, conditional on these employees staying in their
respective jobs. The average hiring wages and hours in each year are shown as solid
lines. Panel A suggests that wages exhibit cohort effects: the real wages of hiring
cohorts from 1998 to 2005 mostly seem to have parallel trends in the first three years
on the job, similar to the findings of Baker et al. (1994) for one US firm. But, unlike
these authors, we see that the cohort-specific paths of wages respond to the business
cycle, as shown by a decline in wage growth during the years of the Great Recession.
Cohorts hired during this time seem to be locked into low wage growth trajectories.
For example, the mean wages of the 2013 cohort in 2015 were still below the mean
wages of the 2014 cohort in 2015. Panel B of Figure 1.5 similarly suggests that the
path of hours worked depends on cohort effects, though less strikingly so than for
wages, as growth trends remained mostly parallel throughout the period. In other
words, differences in cohort hiring wages and hours over the business cycle seem to
persist, and may even reinforce the initial decline in labour costs.
Comparing sample averages over time is likely to be subject to a composition
bias, since relatively low-wage employees are given less weight during downturns
than in normal times (Solon et al., 1994). Therefore we estimate how the wages and
hours of new hires in entry-level jobs evolved over three years of subsequent tenure,
including match-fixed effects to control for the changing composition of matches over
the business cycle. We include only consecutive observations of a worker in some job,
such that a worker with three years of tenure must be observed the previous two years.
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FIGURE 1.5: Paths of real wages and hours for cohorts of new hires
Notes.- the solid lines give the average real hiring wage and weekly hours worked for each
cohort of new hires in our sample of entry-level jobs (i.e. column (1), Table 1.1). Each line
branching off from the solid line shows the paths of wages or hours of these hiring cohorts over
time, as their tenure in the job increases. When employees leave their hiring jobs they also exit
the samples of their respective cohorts.
The sample of workers for each hiring year is unbalanced, since workers exit from
entry-level jobs: either they switch jobs within the same firm or across firms, or they
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exit into non-employment. Using least squares we estimate
wmτ = θm +ψS(m)τ + x
′
mτφ +ηmτ , (1.4)
where the dependent variable is the log real wage of some match m between a worker
(i) and job ( j) with tenure τ , where S(m) is a function indicating in which year s a
match was formed. θm is a match-fixed effect and ψsτ are cohort-tenure-fixed effects
for any matches beginning in year s= 2001, ...,2013 with years of tenure τ ∈ [0,3]. The
sample size per cohort is initially over a thousand employees with tenure greater than a
year, and then declines to around four hundred employees per cohort with tenure over
three years. The vector xmτ contains time-varying quadratic controls for the size of the
firm, and ηmτ is the error term. We estimate (1.4) by excluding the effects ψs0, so the
estimated values of ψ̂sτ for τ > 0 are interpreted as log changes relative to the hiring
wages in entry-level jobs. Although there is certainly endogenous selection of the
employees who stay in these jobs for up to three years, the match-fixed effect should
partially address this concern. We similarly estimate (1.4) with log basic weekly hours
worked as the dependent variable.
The sample of new hires used for this analysis is a subset of our baseline sample,
because we require at least one completed year of tenure. Therefore, some jobs
included in the baseline sample are no longer represented here: the sample size of
jobs is around 25 per cent smaller. The estimated real wage semi-elasticity of new
hires with respect to the unemployment rate for this group of workers is 3.2, and is
slightly larger in absolute terms than in our baseline sample, while hours worked are
just as responsive as measured before.
We plot the estimated cohort-tenure-fixed effects in Figure 1.6 for selected hiring
years, and the underlying estimates are displayed in Appendix Table A.9 for all years
with confidence intervals. The last cohort of hires unaffected by the Great Recession
within three completed years of tenure was 2005. Panel A shows a clear U-shaped
response of real wage growth at all levels of tenure over the Great Recession. Over the
first year on the job, the wages of workers hired in 2009 were stagnant, while for those
hired before the recession they grew on average by two percent, and for those in the last
cohort by three per cent. Similarly, there was no real wage growth over the subsequent
three years for 2009 hires, compared with over eight per cent for 2005 hires.
The cyclical differences in hours growth in these jobs are less pronounced. Initially
the increases over three years were smaller in 2008 than pre-recession, with negative
growth over the first year of tenure. However the average increases following the
recession were greater. This latter period coincides with the persistent rise and peak
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FIGURE 1.6: Estimated composition-adjusted and cohort-specific log changes ψ̂ in
real wages and hours relative to hiring levels: workers who stay in entry-level jobs
Notes.- cohort average change in log wages and log hours with tenure, relative to respective
hiring values, in entry-level jobs. Composition adjusted by controlling for match-fixed effects.
See Appendix Table A.9 for standard errors and results for all other hiring years in 2001-13.
in part-time employment in the UK following the financial crisis. In roughly equal
parts, the changes of hours worked within jobs, represented by the data here, are
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due to switches between part- and full-time work and increasing hours within these
categories. Thus the pattern within these particular jobs suggests a caveat to the
findings of Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2017), who use worker-level flows to show
that within employment switches mostly accounted for the rise and persistence of
part-time employment during the UK’s Great Recession. Their finding of cyclical
transition rates at the average worker level, which go against our job-level results,
could be the outcome of job switching within the same firm. Also, the findings
of Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé could mostly apply to workers with longer tenure
than three years or shorter than one year. Similarly, Kurman and McEntarfer (2017)
document that employees who stay for at least two years in the same firm, as opposed
to the same job, experience cyclical variation in hours worked. Future research should
try to address whether or not a large part of the measured worker-level cyclical hours
adjustments at the average (or aggregate) level involves cyclical job switching, if not
also firm switching.
The findings in this section suggest that firms were not only able to significantly
reduce the real wages and hours of new hires in response to the Great Recession, but
also depress wage growth with subsequent tenure. However there are at least two
reasons this evidence is only suggestive. First, it only applies to workers who stay in
the exact same job in the firm, whereas in reality, expected employee progression or
reallocation to other jobs within the firm also affects the ex ante present value of a
match and the hiring decision. Second, the regression in (1.4) is subject to the same
measurement criticism which the majority of this paper shows is important: it does not
control for the endogenous selection and weighting of matches over time, which we
are unable to adequately address due to a small number of degrees of freedom at the
job level here.
1.6 Discussion of findings and possible explanations
Using essentially the same dataset but without firm-identifiers, Elsby et al. (2016)
show that UK real wages behaved very differently during the Great Recession when
compared with previous recessions: during the 1980s and 1990s downturns the growth
in real wages for British job stayers slowed, whereas it turned markedly negative in the
most recent downturn. This matches the findings of Gregg et al. (2014), who document
that UK wages became significantly more sensitive to changes in local unemployment
rates sometime in the early 2000s. Both Elsby et al. (2016) and Gregg et al. (2014)
emphasise that the decline in unionisation in the UK since the 1970s could only
account for a small part of these observed changes in the behaviour of real wages.
One argument for this is that US real wages remained relatively constant in the years
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following the 2008 financial crisis, while US employment fell sharply, despite the US
seeing a greater decline and lower contemporary level of unionisation than the UK.
A similar line of argument applies for the role inflation. In both countries price
inflation was historically low before and during the Great Recession. In Appendix A.5
we further dispel the notion that price inflation could account for the high level of real
wage flexibility in the Great Recession, by demonstrating that there is a lack of absolute
nominal wage rigidity among UK job stayers. We extend the time period of Elsby
et al.’s account of UK nominal wage rigidity, and specifically consider year-to-year
hourly wage changes among the job stayers in the baseline sample from our main
analysis. As many as two-thirds of these employees experienced annual real wage
cuts at the height of the downturn, while around a quarter also experienced nominal
wage cuts. The incidence of exactly zero annual nominal wage changes increased
from approximately 0-2 per cent of employees before 2008-09 to 3-5 per cent in the
years after. Our main findings on the extent of UK real wage flexibility reflect the
fact that large numbers of employees experience yearly nominal wage cuts, almost
independently of the economic cycle.
Blundell et al. (2014) argue that the UK’s labour supply curve shifted to the right
during the Great Recession. This was most likely caused by welfare reforms, which led
to the addition, and stricter enforcement, of job search requirements for several groups
of non-employed persons. For example, lone parents, who constitute approximately
a quarter of all UK family households, were particularly affected. The age of the
youngest child, at which lone parents are entitled to unconditional income support,
was gradually reduced from sixteen to five years old between 2008 and 2012. If their
youngest child was older than these lowered thresholds, then lone parents would have
had to show evidence that they were searching for work in order to receive the same
income support as they were entitled to previously without searching. It has been
estimated that these particular policy changes led to an increase of almost ten per cent
in the employment rate among UK lone parents, despite this occurring throughout a
major recession (Avram et al., 2016). It is plausible that increased competition for jobs,
brought on by the cumulative and extensive changes in the UK’s active labour market
policy since the last major downturn in the early 1990s, resulted in large decreases in
the real values of workers’ reservation wages and outside options, and thus led to new
hires and job stayers accepting large decreases in real wages.
Perhaps our most striking finding for the behaviour of the UK labour market since
2008 is the extent to which hiring hours in jobs were reduced. How could this shift
from full- to part-time recruitment be explained? Shifts in the labour supply curve,
particularly for part-time work, are again potentially relevant. The UK has a system of
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tax credit benefits for working families with children similar to the US earned income
tax credits. Entitlement for the work-contingent component requires at least one adult
to work for a minimum of sixteen hours per week. There is observable bunching in the
distribution of employee hours worked around the thresholds in the UK tax credits
system, which is unsurprising given the large differences in the amount of credits
families receive around these levels (see Blundell et al. (2016) for a more detailed
discussion). This part of the UK welfare system cushions workers from income loss
when their working hours decline, as well as encouraging them to take part-time work
more readily than they perhaps would otherwise. In fact, the number of people in the
UK who said that they were working part-time because they could not find a full-time
job in 2013 stood at the highest level on records: almost 1.5 million (6 per cent of all
employees), compared with 2.5 million unemployed, and compared with 0.7 million
involuntary part-time employed in 2007.11
Another possible cyclical feature of labour markets is the so-called “Added Worker
Effect”, whereby individual household members will increase their labour supply when
the household experiences persistent income shocks, typically thought of as resulting
from a partner’s job loss. There is some aggregate evidence of this effect for the UK,
based on individual-level labour force transition rate data (Razzu and Singleton, 2016).
However, Bryan and Longhi (2013) have shown that while this effect seems to draw
individuals into the UK unemployment pool, it does not significantly increase their
likelihood of becoming employed. The added worker effect is therefore unlikely to be
a large part of the overall story of why hiring hours were flexible since 2008.
Montgomery (1988) discusses the factors which determine firms’ demand for
part-time employees. If there are fixed costs of hiring and training new employees,
then these costs are unlikely to vary between part- and full-time hires in the same
job: the ratio of hours to fixed costs will often be lower for part-time hires. Firms
require compensation for this lower return from part-time hiring, that is, the hourly
wage per worker has to be lower. This firm-side compensating differential should be
stronger for higher-skilled jobs, where hiring and training costs are typically greater.
Montgomery (1988) provides evidence for these features of wage-setting and hiring
behaviour in the presence of fixed costs among US establishments. Moreover, if firms
have to pay all workers in some job the same hourly rate, then firms are more likely to
employ full-time employees when there are fixed hiring costs. However, fringe benefits
(pension contribution, health care) function as quasi-fixed costs which might only
be offered to full-time employees, and thus shift the demand from full- to part-time
11Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, October 2017, available at
https://www.ons.gov.uk/.../october2017; accessed 07/11/2017. See also Bell and Blanchflower
(2013) for more details about the so-called “Underemployment” in the UK.
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workers. To the extent that these fixed costs depend on the level of productivity, it
is possible that they decline during recessions, and thus make part-time hiring more
likely. The cyclical properties of fixed hiring costs in the UK is an interesting empirical
question for future research.
In summary, some combination of increasing labour supply and the institutional
framework surrounding the UK’s labour market are the most likely explanations of
our main findings. However more research is needed to understand if this flexibility
over the business cycle in working conditions will become the new normal for the UK
labour market. Further, the novel fact documented here regarding the extent of hours
reductions in job-level hires over the business cycle should be explored outside the
specific context of the UK’s Great Recession.
1.7 Conclusion
We provide new estimates on the flexibility of UK wages during the Great
Recession. Most importantly this is measured at the job level, which is the correct
approach to understanding how firms adjust their labour costs in response to business
cycle conditions in frictional labour markets. We find that job-stayer real wages
respond by as much as 2.6 per cent for every one percentage point rise in the
unemployment rate. Their elasticity with respect to aggregate labour productivity
equals approximately one. Hiring wages are at least as responsive to the business
cycle as the wages of job stayers. This conforms with results from other countries,
suggesting that rigid hiring wages are not the appropriate way to model and understand
the observed fluctuations in unemployment.
Several other studies have also measured real wages in Britain’s Great Recession,
concluding that the magnitude of their response likely explains the high-employment
and low-productivity experience of the subsequent decade, compared with previous
downturns and other countries (Blundell et al., 2014; Gregg et al., 2014; Elsby et al.,
2016). Once we strip away cyclical job composition bias, our estimates of the real
wage response are a magnitude greater than found in these previous studies. While
this large and significant wage response now seems even more likely to account for the
UK economy’s unusual experience of the Great Recession, the puzzle still remains as
to why firms were able to adjust wages so freely, and why workers were so willing to
accept these changes.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to combine the robust job-level
measurement of cyclical responses in real wages with hours worked for new hires
and job stayers, within the same methodological framework. We find that the hours
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worked by job stayers did not respond to the Great Recession. Conversely, the hours
of new hires among the same firms responded significantly, decreasing by 1.5 per cent
for every one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate, mostly through firms
switching between full- and part-time workers. We believe this is a new empirical
account of cyclical firm behaviour, which should in the first instance be tested outside
the specific UK context, and subsequently reflected on when modelling how firms
adjust their workforces to shocks.
We also find evidence that hours response estimates, like wages, can be subject
to a large bias induced by the endogenous cyclical selection of jobs, though this is
pro- as opposed to countercyclical as in the case of wages. Some recent studies
have explained procyclical average hours worked in the whole economy by changes in
worker transition rates between part- and full-time employment. However, changes in
aggregate hours, like real wages, tell us very little about what happens at the job level,
where we find no significant response to the unemployment rate for employees who
stayed with the same job and firm. The robust distinction here between the responses
of wages and hours within jobs also offers insight into the results for Germany in
Stüber (2017), which are somewhat atypical for this literature: wages in these German
data are perhaps better interpreted as average daily earnings.
While the approach to measurement here is inspired by Solon et al. (1994) and
closely follows Martins et al. (2012), by forgoing representativeness for greater
certainty on what wage responses are actually being identified, we also offer some
original methodological insights. Unlike previous job-level studies, we are sure to
compare the wages of new hires and job stayers within the same sample of firms, and
in the latter case also account for endogenous cyclical selection. This enables us to be
more confident when comparing the estimated hiring and job-stayer responses to the
business cycle.
We also offer some evidence that the UK’s National Minimum Wage restricts how
far firms can reduce wages, and our estimate of hiring wage flexibility could have been
even greater without this restraint. In this regard, it is surprising that other related
studies do not similarly consider this when interpreting their main findings, given that
elsewhere and historically large fractions of employees and jobs could be subject to
tight and infrequently negotiated (collectively bargained) wage floors.
Cohorts hired during the Great Recession were not only paid lower wages initially,
but were also locked into low-wage growth paths. This significantly reduced the
present value of labour costs from the firm’s perspective for hires made during this
time. In this respect, it seems that firms’ hiring wages were even more flexible than
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our results for the initial real wages of new hires show. We therefore take our results
as evidence against any theory that hiring wages are especially rigid. Moreover, when
combined with the shift from full- to part-time hiring, firms were able to significantly





Note: This chapter will appear as an article in Research in Economics; DOI:
10.1016/j.rie.2017.10.005. An older version has also been published as Edinburgh
School of Economics Discussion Paper Series Nr. 267. This article was co-authored
with Carl Singleton, who is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the University of Edinburgh,
School of Economics; e-mail: carl.singleton@ed.ac.uk. Carl has agreed that this essay
represents in the majority my work, and that it can appear within this thesis.
2.1 Introduction
The Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model of search and matching frictions has
become the foundation for studying the cyclical behaviour of labour markets (see
Rogerson and Shimer, 2011 for a survey). The existence of search frictions in
labour markets is usually motivated by decentralisation, due to geography and other
differences between firms, and because each worker has characteristics which make
them more or less suitable for the available jobs. While they search and decide
whether or not to accept a match at some agreed upon wage, unemployed workers and
firms must form expectations of future variables relevant to their choices, including
aggregate conditions. The decentralised nature of labour markets makes it a priori not
obvious that workers and firms are able to correctly forecast these variables at all times.
Nonetheless the rational expectations (RE) assumption is usually made in search and
matching models. This is likely to pose overly strong requirements on the cognitive
abilities of economic agents, and is unrealistic in the presence of potentially frequent
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structural or policy shocks. Even small departures from RE might alter the qualitative
or quantitative predictions of these models.
Here we analyse the equilibrium properties and dynamics of the textbook real
business cycle (RBC) Mortensen-Pissarides model (see Hagedorn and Manovskii,
2008 for the standard discrete-time treatment), while representing agents as ‘good
econometricians’, who form forecasts according to their estimates of some structural
model parameters (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).1 We assume that agents employ a
recursive least squares (RLS) algorithm to update their parameter estimates when new
data become available. Econometric (or adaptive) learning can provide a behavioural
foundation for RE if the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is shown to be
learnable or E-stable (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001); i.e. small deviations from this
equilibrium are reversed over time, with asymptotic convergence. We show that the
model’s unique REE is E-stable. No parameter restrictions are required to ensure this
is the case, beyond those which make the model well-formulated, when agents use
a minimum-state-variable rule to form and update their forecasts of so-called labour
market tightness. Furthermore, we confirm that this equilibrium is globally stable and
satisfies the properties of Strong E-stability (i.e. being robust to over-parametrisation
of the econometric relationship by the agents). And so from this perspective, the
assumption of RE when studying or applying this model would seem to be reasonable.
This article contributes to a significant literature on the more realistic representation
of agents as behaving like econometricians in macroeconomic models. Mankiw et al.
(2004) offer empirical evidence against RE. Their analysis of surveys of professional
forecasters and households finds significant autocorrelation in forecast errors, which
is compatible with econometric learning, but not with RE. Milani (2007, 2011) also
argues for the presence of adaptive learning in the New Keynesian model. He shows
that learning by agents is capable of replacing the other ‘mechanical’ sources of
persistence in these models, such as habits, whilst at the same time increasing the
fit to the data as compared to assuming RE. Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) examine a
survey of households’ inflation forecasts over several decades and conclude that the
hypothesis of RE can be rejected, and that there is evidence in support of adaptive
learning dynamics. This view is further supported by Berardi and Galimberti (2012),
who examine post-WWII US inflation and output growth. Comparing the performance
of different adaptive learning algorithms in matching survey forecasts, their results
suggest that economic agents form these according to RLS.
1Strictly, the characterisation of agents who behave in this way as ‘good econometricians’ is used
by Branch and McGough (2016). One should think of these as being agents who make conditional
forecasts, which are pertinent to their decisions and based on a simple model such as linear regression,
and who update this model based on forecast errors.
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The formulation of learning we use here is such that agents need only make
one-step-ahead forecasts of the labour market’s condition. Ours is not the only recent
study to apply the principles of econometric learning to this class of model. From a
similar set-up, Di Pace et al. (2016) consider an approach where agents must make
infinite horizon forecasts about the future paths of wages, unemployment and profits in
order to make choices today. This latter type of learning fits into the anticipated utility
approach (Kreps, 1998), and has notably been applied to the RBC model by Eusepi and
Preston (2011). Di Pace et al. focus on results with constant gain learning, for which
there are no equivalent analytical results to the E-stability conditions we consider. The
authors use the model to address the ‘unemployment volatility puzzle’: the inability
of the Mortensen-Pissarides model to generate a realistically large amplification of
unemployment for a given change in wages or productivity (Shimer, 2005). Under
infinite horizon learning, they not only match US professional forecast errors, but
also find a greater cyclical unemployment rate response relative to the baseline model.
This is driven by persistence or inertia in agents’ expectations of the future path of
wages, which implies that firms are over-optimistic about future profits, post more
vacancies, and thus unemployment is more volatile relative to the REE baseline case.
They also find some, but significantly less, propagation of the unemployment response
when the model is reformulated in a one-step-ahead forecast guise. Kurozumi and
Van Zandweghe (2012) also apply econometric learning to an extended model of
the business cycle, which includes sticky prices and monetary policy, as well as
labour market search frictions. They analyse determinacy and E-stability conditions,
finding that these depend on model parameters. However, both this set-up and that
of Di Pace et al. (2016) differ form our own in so far as they move beyond the
textbook Mortensen-Pissarides model, and in both cases the agents must forecast
several aggregate variables, which do not appear in the reduced form of the REE
characterisation.
We also present illustrative simulations and analyse the dynamics of the
unemployment model, and show that the REE could be a poor approximation to an
economy in which agents are econometricians. Convergence to the REE is very slow,
even when agents have a short memory or give greater weight to more recent data. If
agents must learn the REE, then aggregate variables may be persistently some distance
away from their REE equivalents. We also demonstrate how structural shocks generate
a more gradual cyclical adjustment of wages after the introduction of learning, and
thus predicted unemployment volatility when such shocks occur frequently would
be reduced relative to the REE. Therefore we find some different results to Di Pace
et al. (2016). The same amplification mechanism described therein is not present here.
By keeping closer to the spirit of the most standard RBC variant of the model, in
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which the only relevant choice is the number of vacancies that firms post,2 agents need
only estimate a relationship between labour market tightness and productivity to form
expectations and close the model, and so wage determination is absorbed. Econometric
learning in our set-up then generates inertia in expectations of tightness (and wages)
following shocks.3
The REE of the model describes a choice of labour market tightness which
is independent of the state of unemployment. Therefore, agents’ learning of the
minimum-state-variable solution implicitly assumes their complete understanding of
the economy’s dynamics of unemployment and vacancy creation. We consider an
alternative decision rule, which relaxes this latter implied assumption. We consider
whether or not agents can learn how many vacancies to create in response to an
expanded state of the world, which includes the state of unemployment. In other words
we also ask if agents can learn the Beveridge curve. This alternative is not E-stable
for the complete range of possible model parameters. And where the economy does
converge to the REE, it does so more slowly than under the minimum-state-variable
representation. In this respect, the approximation of the REE for this model would be
even further weakened.
2.2 The search and matching model of unemployment
We outline a discrete-time search and matching model of the labour market, following
Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) by assuming that members of a representative
household perfectly insure each other against income fluctuations. We derive a
difference equation for so-called labour market tightness which summarises its
equilibrium, thus analogous to the treatment in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).4 This
can be regarded as a textbook model, which has been applied, critiqued and extended
exhaustively in the literature, not least in attempts to solve the unemployment volatility
puzzle.
2With linear production technology this is also equivalent to the decision of vacancy creation or
destruction when firms consist of a single worker. Given worker homogeneity, we will rule out states of
the world whereby workers would choose not to work.
3Although we do not expand on this point later, it is straightforward to see that the
minimum-state-variable solution of the model we apply, which agents learn and use to form
expectations, could be re-written in terms of wages and productivity by substituting for the standard
‘wage curve’ derived from Nash bargaining, (2.19).
4Our set-up of the model only differs in so far as we describe a representative household and firm,
rather than a continuum of the latter. The characterisation of the equilibrium is approximately identical,
though we hope our exposition is more familiar as an extended RBC model with aggregate uncertainty.
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2.2.1 The labour market
There is a continuum of identical, risk-neutral workers with total measure one, and
an infinite horizon. The matching function M(ut ,vt) provides the number of successful
matches in period t. It is increasing and concave in both of its arguments, ut and vt ,
which represent the share of the total workforce currently unemployed and the level of
vacancies relative to the size of the workforce respectively. Matches and separations
occur after agents in the economy have made decisions, i.e. at the end of each period.
A Cobb-Douglas, constant returns to scale matching function is chosen, due to its
simplicity, well-known features and being most common in the literature:
M(ut ,vt) = µuαt v
1−α
t , µ > 0, α ∈ (0,1), (2.1)
where µ gives a measure of matching efficiency and α the elasticity of the number of






Unemployed workers and vacancies are matched randomly, and so the probability of a




= µθ−αt . (2.3)





= µθ 1−αt . (2.4)
Matches are destroyed with probability λ ∈ [0,1]. Unemployment changes between
periods due to inflows, caused by exogenous separations, and outflows from new
matches. The resulting law of motion for the share of workers unemployed at the
beginning of period t +1 is
ut+1 = ut +(1−ut)λ −θtq(θt)ut , (2.5)
whereby the final two terms measure these inflows and outflows respectively. The
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2.2.2 The household
For expositional simplicity we consider an economy comprising a single
infinitely-lived representative household of size one, in which all workers are identical
and risk neutral. There is perfect consumption insurance across its members. In
period t, nt of the household’s members are employed and (1− nt) are waiting for
a match. In other words, labour supply is inelastic, which can be ensured by assuming
that the equilibrium wage is always strictly greater than the per-period utility value
from non-employment b; formally we assume wt > b ≥ 0. The household discounts
each additional period’s utility by a factor δ ∈ (0,1). In period t the household has










where E∗t denotes expectations (not necessarily rational). Income is given by
at = wtnt +b(1−nt)+Dt , (2.8)
with wtnt and b(1− nt) denoting total income from labour and non-employment
respectively, and Dt are dividends from a representative firm, which is owned by the
household. This household can also be represented by the Bellman equation
W (nt) = wtnt +Dt +b(1−nt)+δE∗t [W (nt+1)] , (2.9)
where W (nt) represents the household’s current value function, with their state of
the world given by the employment level nt = 1− ut . The household takes as given
wages wt , dividends from the representative firm Dt and labour market tightness θt .
The household’s expected continuation value is E∗t [W (nt+1)]. The law of motion for
employment follows directly from (2.5), and is given by
nt+1 = (1−λ )nt +θtq(θt)(1−nt). (2.10)
Applying the envelope theorem to (2.9) and using the law of motion (2.10), the
marginal value of household employment is given by
∂W (nt)
∂nt




i.e. the net utility value from wages exceeding non-employment income plus the
discounted expected continuation value from additional employment.
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2.2.3 The firm
The production side of the economy consists of a representative firm. This firm
employs workers and produces output ytnt , where yt is the marginal product of labour.
We assume that the process of worker productivity is a stationary AR(1) process in
logs:
log(yt) = ρ log(yt−1)+ εt , ρ ∈ [0,1), (2.12)
with some initial condition y0 and εt being drawn as an iid zero-mean shock. Because
labour is the only input into production, the firm maximises profits by choosing the
level of employment, subject to the law of motion for the labour market. However, due
to the exogeneity of separations, the optimal choice for the level of employment and
the optimal quantity of vacancies to open coincide. For each vacancy held open the
firm has to pay per-period unit cost c > 0.











Because the firm is owned by the household, the firm discounts future profits using
the same discount factor as the household. The firm takes wages wt and labour market
tightness θt as given. Employment at the firm follows the law of motion
nt+1 = (1−λ )nt +q(θt)vt , (2.14)
which shows that the more vacancies the firm creates, the higher aggregate
employment will be in the next period. Maximising (2.13), subject to (2.14), can be
represented as the Bellman equation
Π(vt ;nt ,yt) = max
vt≥0
(ytnt−wtnt− cvt)+δE∗t [Π(vt+1;nt+1,yt+1)] , (2.15)
where Π(vt ;nt ,yt) represents the firm’s current value function. Profit maximisation
in this case implies that the representative firm will open or close vacancies until the
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Applying the envelope theorem and using the above first order condition gives the







i.e. the net profit from employing an additional worker plus the discounted expected
continuation value, taking matching frictions into account. The optimal choices of











In other words, the representative firm must form expectations about the right hand side
of (2.18) to optimally choose the number of vacancies to open in the current period.
In particular, the firm forecasts labour productivity yt+1, the real wage which will be
realised next period wt+1, and the value of labour market tightness in the next period
θt+1. Note that this problem does not depend on the type of expectations formation;
we have not specified how forecasts of the right hand side of (2.18) are formed.
2.2.4 Wage determination
Wages are determined by generalised Nash bargaining between the firm and workers











Combining the surplus sharing rules which form the solution of this problem, iterating
forwards, and using (2.11), (2.16) and (2.17) gives what is referred to in the textbook
model as the ‘wage curve’:
wt = (1−β )b+β (yt + cθt). (2.19)
To ensure employment is always preferred and a wage successfully negotiated we also
restrict yt > b. Again, we do not have to specify rational expectations to obtain the
wage curve.
5Note, it is crucial here that both workers and firms are assumed to form expectations in the same
way, using the same rule, as otherwise the Nash bargaining solution would be significantly complicated.
In the sense of the model here, since workers own the firm, this is not an unreasonable assumption.
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2.2.5 The rational expectations equilibrium
Our search and matching framework consists of the goods and the labour market. Since
our focus is to study the labour market under econometric learning, we abstract from
the goods market. This can be justified by Walras’ Law, which states that equilibrium
in the labour market implies that the goods market clears.
The representative household supplies labour inelastically, and thus the REE of the
model can be summarised and determined uniquely by the value of labour market
tightness at which point the representative firm is indifferent between opening an
additional vacancy or not. In other words, the firm has to form expectations about the
future state of labour market tightness as this affects the current discounted value of
a match. The non-linear difference equation determining this value of θt , substituting











To provide intuition for this expression we stress the similarities to (2.18). Aggregate
labour market tightness θt will adjust immediately to deviations from this equality via
the firm instantaneously opening or closing vacancies. Thus today’s labour market
tightness is determined by expectations of the value of a filled vacancy in the next
period. In equilibrium it must also be that Dt = ytnt−wtnt− cvt .
Given the process for productivity (2.12), the equilibrium θt is the solution of the
non-linear difference equation (2.20). With this and initial condition u1, the remainder
of the interesting endogenous variables in the equilibrium, {at ,wt ,vt ,ut+1}t>0, can be
obtained using (2.2), (2.5), (2.8) and (2.19). In the next section we linearise around
steady-state values to obtain an analytical solution to (2.20) and discuss the rational
expectations equilibrium.
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2.3 Linearisation and the rational expectation
equilibrium
To solve the system consisting of (2.12) and (2.20), we linearise around deterministic
steady-state values θ̄ and ȳ = 1:6
θt = ψ0 +ψ1E∗t yt+1 +ψ2E
∗
t θt+1, (2.21)
yt = (1−ρ)+ρyt−1 + εt , (2.22)
where the coefficients are functions of the model’s parameters and steady state values
ψ0 = [1−ψ2] θ̄ −ψ1ȳ,






We now assume that expectations are rational, that is, the firm and the household
take all available information into account and forecast θ without systematic errors.
We denote the rational expectations operator by Et . Linear RE models where agents
form expectations regarding an endogenous variable can have multiple equilibria (or
bubble solutions, not related to economic fundamentals).7 If there are multiple stable
REEs then a model is said to be indeterminate. In B.1.2 we show that a unique stable
equilibrium exists so long as |ψ2| < 1. Intuitively, this condition requires that the
shocks ε are transitory and θ returns to its steady state value, analogous to a stationary
first-order autoregressive process. The solution in this case to the system (2.21) and
(2.22) is obtained by using the method of undetermined coefficients. After substituting
Etyt+1 = (1−ρ)+ρyt in (2.21), the solution can be guessed to have the form
θt = A+Byt−1 +Cεt , (2.23)
since the only predetermined variable in the above system is yt−1. The parameters A,
B, and C of the reduced form are functions of the parameters in (2.21) and (2.22).8
6See B.1.1 for derivation and all subsequently defined parameters, such as ψ’s, expressed in terms
of the model parameters and steady-state values.
7The literature on bubbles and the related concept of indeterminacy is reviewed in Benhabib and
Farmer (1999). The classic reference on bubble solutions is Blanchard and Watson (1983); see also
Bullard and Mitra (2002) for an analysis of indeterminacy in a New Keynesian framework.
8See B.1.3 for a description of how (2.23) can be obtained from (2.21) and (2.22), and also A, B and
C in terms of the model parameters.
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Using equation (2.23), RE about next period’s labour market tightness are given by
Etθt+1 = A+Byt , (2.24)
since Etεt+1 = 0. The parameters used thereby to estimate θt+1 are true values, that
is the firm and the household know the true underlying functional forms and their
associated parameter values. When εt is realised in period t, it becomes part of the
information set of firms and households and the resulting forecast Etθt+1 leads to an
immediate adjustment of vacancies, such that the difference between Etθt+1 and θt+1
is only from the next period’s shock Cεt+1. In the absence of new shocks the firm and
the household forecast the response of market tightness to productivity correctly using
(2.24).
2.4 Adding econometric learning to the model
We now depart from RE and apply the concept of econometric learning to this model.
Unlike the application of Di Pace et al. (2016), who suggest that agents might need
to form infinite horizon forecasts of multiple variables, such as wages or firm profits,
we depart from the REE summarised above by the single choice variable θt , which just
requires a one-step-ahead forecast of θt+1. Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2012) have
also considered the role of learning when agents need to make one-step-ahead forecasts
in the presence of labour search frictions. However, their model also includes sticky
prices and monetary policy, involves forecasting over several aggregate variables, and
the determinacy of the REE is not always certain. In what follows the expectational
stability results become more clear-cut.
2.4.1 E-Stability of the MSV solution
We relax the assumption of RE by modelling agents as econometricians attempting
to estimate the parameters A, B, and C, which underpin the true motion of the economy
under uncertainty. Agents are endowed with a perceived law of motion (PLM) in the
economy of the MSV form (2.23), because we derived its functional form without
having to impose rational expectations.9 In other words, agents know the structure of
the economy as expressed in the system (2.21) and (2.22), but the parameter values
are unknown to them. They make corresponding estimates of the true coefficients in
period t, given by Ât , B̂t and Ĉt , and update these each period when new data becomes
9If agents are not able to learn the simplest representation (as few state variables as possible), they
cannot be expected to learn equilibria containing more state variables and to coordinate behaviour
towards them.
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available. Therefore, the household and firm forecast as under RE in (2.24), but instead
of the true parameter values they use estimates Ât and B̂t to forecast labour market
tightness
E∗t θt+1 = Ât + B̂tyt . (2.25)
The main difference is that forecasts with rational expectations coincide with the true
realisation of next period’s θ on average, whereas this is not the case for econometric
learners. They possess less information than rational agents, since they do not know
the parameters of the model. We assume econometric learners perform the task of
estimating parameters using recursive least squares (RLS). This is the most widely
used estimation technique in the learning literature and Berardi and Galimberti (2012)
provide evidence that this estimator matches surveys of forecasts of US time series
closely.10 Let the vector of parameter estimates be denoted by x′t−1 = (Ât , B̂t), then the
general recursive updating algorithm can be represented by
xt = xt−1 +gtQ(θt− Ât− B̂tyt−1), (2.26)
which shows that agents update their previous parameter estimates xt−1 by a function
of the observed forecasting error. The function Q and the so-called “gain parameter”
gt are further described below. There are potential problems of simultaneity in forward
looking models. Therefore, it is assumed that although agents forecast θt+1 using yt ,
the variable yt is not in the information set for the estimation of Ât and B̂t . As proved by
Marcet and Sargent (1989), this does not alter the asymptotic stability results obtained
in the following, as compared to an algorithm allowing for simultaneity, so long as
agents are assumed to ignore outliers, defined as being observations outside of some
predetermined range. This timing assumption is usually thought of as realistic, since
robust macroeconomic data is only available to decision makers with a substantial
lag.11
Since the current value of labour market tightness depends on the prediction of next
period’s value, agents estimates have the potential to affect the path of labour market
tightness. To see this, we substitute the stochastic process of labour productivity
and the econometric forecast (2.25) into (2.21), which gives the actual law of motion
10The presented algorithm is comparable to a restricted form of the Kalman filter. For further
discussion see Berardi and Galimberti (2013).
11The assumption also plausibly implies that under subjective expectations agents would only
ever enter the wage bargaining process with pre-determined valuations. Otherwise, there would be
simultaneity between the bargaining result and subsequent expectations formation.
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(ALM) for labour market tightness:
θt =ψ0 +ψ1(1−ρ)(1+ρ)+ψ2Ât +ψ2B̂t(1−ρ)
+(ψ1ρ +ψ2B̂t)ρyt−1
+(ψ1ρ +ψ2B̂t)εt . (2.27)
This defines the following T -mapping from the PLM, θt = A+Byt−1 +Cεt , to the
ALM:
T (Ât) = ψ0 +ψ1(1−ρ)(1+ρ)+ψ2Ât +ψ2B̂t(1−ρ),
T (B̂t) = (ψ1ρ +ψ2B̂t)ρ,
T (Ĉt) = ψ1ρ +ψ2B̂t ,
where the function T : RN → RN maps the estimated coefficients into the actual
parameters, which are in turn determined by the estimates. There is a self-referential
feature inherent in all learning models which can be seen in equation (2.27). Although
the estimated parameters are non-stationary during their transition to REE values,
learners neglect this fact, since a least squares method assumes the ‘true’ A, B and
C to be constants. Intuitively, if the coefficient which determines the responsiveness to
expectations is sufficiently small, then this specification error becomes asymptotically
negligible and the economy converges to the REE (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
The T -mapping to Ĉt is determined by the other coefficients, and the estimate Ĉt is
independent of C and does not influence stability results. Therefore, in what follows




and for Ĉt : V (B̂t).
Let z′t−1 = (1,yt−1), x
′
t−1 = (Ât , B̂t) and
θt = z′t−1xt−1 +ηt . (2.28)
The estimation error ηt is perceived by the agents to be independently and identically
distributed iid. However, due to the self-referential nature of the model there is an
endogeneity bias which agents are unaware of, and thus ηt is not truly iid. We define
Rt = t−1 ∑ti=1 zi−1z
′
i−1, which allows us to write the RLS estimator as
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(zt−1z′t−1−Rt−1), (2.29)
xt = xt−1 + t−1R−1t zt−1(θt− z′t−1xt−1), (2.30)
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and thus













with the gain sequence 1/t, often referred to as decreasing gain learning.12 This gain
guarantees that asymptotically new information is disregarded by agents.
The stability of the system in (2.29) and (2.31) with decreasing gain is governed by















The REE is E-stable if (2.32) is asymptotically locally stable under learning (Evans
and Honkapohja, 2001). This is the case, if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of
T (Â, B̂)− (Â, B̂) have negative real parts. Here the necessary condition for E-stability










This holds for all possible well-defined sets of parameter values, and there is also
global convergence to the REE (see B.1.4): δ ∈ [0,1), λ ∈ [0,1], β ∈ [0,1], µ >
0, α ∈ (0,1), c > 0, and which all imply θ̄ ≥ 0. As explained in the previous section,
the model is determinate if |ψ2|< 1. We can therefore state the following:
Proposition 2.4.1 If the economy described by the system (2.21) and (2.22) exhibits
determinacy and the PLM is of the MSV form, and if agents learn using least squares
updating, then so long as ψ2 < 1 the unique REE is E-stable.
In other words, the textbook linearised model of labour market search and matching
frictions, with homogeneous agents and no-on-the-job search (Pissarides, 2000:
Chapter 1), has a unique E-stable equilibrium. Sets of parameter values which move
ψ2 closer to one will imply slower convergence to the REE. It is intuitive and clear
from (2.33) that these will be parameters which lessen the magnitude of the dynamics
in the labour market, such as a small separation probability or low worker bargaining
power.
12In the case of constant gain learning the weight given each observation is geometrically declining
with the time since it was observed, and the gain sequence would be 0 < γ < 1.
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2.4.2 Strong E-stability of the MSV solution
One potential criticism of the econometric learning literature is that it is not clear
how agents could settle upon a particular law of motion for the economy. Strong
E-stability of a system is defined if the previous result is robust to over-parametrisation
of the PLM (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). Assume instead that agents are forming
their expectations of θt+1 according to the general ARMA representation (B.4), and
are not endowed with a PLM of the MSV form. Moreover, due to econometric

















f jηt− j +d0εt + f0ηt . (2.34)



















f jηt+1− j, (2.35)
which can be substituted into equation (B.3) to obtain the new ALM and a
corresponding T -mapping in the same way as before (see B.1.5). Let b′ = (b1, ...,bs),
c′ = (c1, ...,cr), d′ = (d0, ...,dq), and also f′ = ( f0, ..., fl). Further, define φ ′ =
(a,b′,c′,d′, f′). According to the E-stability principle, the ODE governing the stability
of the above system is given by
dφ
dτ
= T (φ)−φ . (2.36)
To investigate whether agents will detect the over-parametrisation and converge
towards the MSV solution, the stability of (2.36) at the REE must be studied. In B.1.5
we show the following:
Proposition 2.4.2 If the economy described by the system (2.21) and (2.22) exhibits
determinacy and the PLM is of the over-parametrised ARMA form, and if agents learn
using least squares updating, then so long as ψ2 < 1 the unique REE is Strongly
E-stable.
2.5 Analysis
We present a brief analysis of the unemployment model with econometric learning
described above. We consider two illustrative simulations to demonstrate the implied
speed of convergence and dynamics of the model. First, we demonstrate E-stability
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when starting ‘realistically’ far away from the REE. Second, with agents initially
assumed to have learned the REE, we consider the impact of a structural shift implied
by an arbitrary change in some parameter value. We then discuss the speed of
convergence and results with constant gain learning. We also consider the implications
if we relax an implicit assumption that agents understand the joint dynamics of
unemployment and vacancy creation.
2.5.1 Simulations
We follow an illustrative parametrisation strategy, using seasonally adjusted UK
quarterly13 data for the period 2002-2013 (see B.2 for a brief discussion of this
strategy).14 Table 2.1 gives the complete list of parameters and implied values of
the endogenous variables for the deterministic steady-state equilibrium. Summary
statistics of some UK labour market variables are described in Table 2.2, which are
consistent with the parametrisation here.
TABLE 2.1: Assumed/estimated parameter values and steady-state equilibrium
Parameter Assumed value
y - labour productivity 1
b - non-employment flow value 0.8
c - vacancy flow cost 0.25
λ - separation rate 0.023
µ - matching efficiency 0.56
α - matching elasticity 0.67
β - worker bargaining power 0.67
δ - discount factor 0.99
ρ - persistence of y 0.84
σ - std dev. of innovations to y 0.006
Endogenous variable Steady-state eq. value
θ - tightness 0.35
u - unemployment 0.055
v - vacancy rate 0.019
w - wage 0.99
Source: authors’ calculations.
13As pointed out by a referee, the timing structure of the model implies an average time between hiring
and production for workers of one and a half months, and when calibrating a model with labour market
search frictions it would be more generally preferable to use a monthly periodicity. But when we wish
to capture the role of aggregate uncertainty affecting agents’ decisions, since UK National Statistics are
generally released quarterly, we believe our timing is justified. What matters for plausibly estimating the
role of learning dynamics is the frequency at which it is assumed new aggregate data becomes available
to the agents, since between times the agents’ model parameters will remain unchanged.
14All data used and described are from the Office for National Statistics, accessed 01/08/2014. Labour
market data are for those aged 16 and over. For a more complete calibration of the unemployment model
using UK data see Burgess and Turon (2010).
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For completeness we write out in full the stochastic recursive sequence that
represents the adaptive learning model, stating from an initial period t0:















z′t [T (xt)− xt ]+V (xt)εt+1
}
,
(IV ) yt+1 = (1−ρ)+ρyt + εt+1,
(V ) εt+2 ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2).
When written out in sequence order, the simultaneity which requires us to exclude yt
from the information set used to estimate xt becomes clearer. The adaptive learning
process, which takes place at the beginning of each period, can also be described
by Figure 2.1. To initiate the sequence from t0 we must choose initial values u1,
FIGURE 2.1: Timeline of the labour market and agents’ learning
x0, z0 R0 and ε1. The asymptotic properties of decreasing or constant gain least
squares recursion will hold irrespective of the initial conditions. As suggested by
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007), the approach to setting initial values z0 and
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TABLE 2.2: Summary statistics of labour market states & quarterly transition rates:
consistent with the model’s parametrisation, 2002q1-13q2
Mean Std err.
Tightness - θt = vtut 0.35 0.022
Job finding rate - θtq(θt) 0.39 0.011
Job separation rate - λt 0.023 0.00093




Unemployment rate 0.057 0.0022
Source: authors’ calculations using UK Labour Force Survey and Labour Market Statistics. The
unemployment rate is the share of the economically active population ILO unemployed. The job finding
and separation rates are consistent with in reality a three-state system, which includes inactivity; i.e. the
job separation rate is not only the direct flow rate from employment to unemployment but in addition the
indirect flow via inactivity (Smith, 2011). See B.2 for more details.
R0 should depend on the particular model in question and the empirical purpose of
the researchers. One approach could be to use historic or randomly generated data,
with t0 set sufficiently large such that R0 is invertible; in this case t0 ≥ 2. This would
be most appropriate when comparing the performance of models which assume that
agents are ‘good econometricians’ against real data. However, this gives few clues as
to how large t0 should be, and the subsequent simulation is likely to be sensitive to
this assumed level of agents’ memory, particularly for decreasing gain least squares.
Another attractive option is to choose initial values from an assumed distribution
around the REE.
To set initial conditions here, using the same data used to parametrise the model,
we estimate using least squares
θt = κ0 + cubtrt +Byt−1 +κ1ζt−1 +κ2ζt−2 +ζt , t = 2001q3...2013q3, (2.37)
where cubtrt represents a cubic time trend to address the possibility that agents could
recognise low frequency structural breaks in the relationship, output per worker is
normalised but not de-trended, and we include significant MA terms, to account
for auto-correlation when the MSV is applied to real world data, which the good
econometrician may in practice account for by what we have referred to before as an
over-parametrised PLM.15 Given an estimate of B̂ from (2.37), we choose an initial
value for Â such that the economy is initially at θ̄ , the deterministic steady-state
equilibrium. t0 = 49 is the maximum number of UK observations available. Using
15In determining initial conditions, one could also consider the class of GARCH, error correction,
or even VAR models, however we believe this would be an unnecessarily significant leap from the
straightforward least squares updating we assume that a ‘good econometrician’ carries out in practice,
and which constitutes the learning algorithm we study here.
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To analyse the impact of adaptive learning we focus on the simulated time paths of
wages and the tightness parameter, which are independent of the choice of u1. With
the parametrisation described above, the REE parameters of the MSV solution are
given by x′REE = (−0.70,1.055). The elasticity of θ to productivity at the long-run
average level is then around three, which is significantly lower than observed in the
data.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates a simulation over a hundred quarters of wages,
unemployment and labour market tightness for the baseline case of agents with RE.16
Unsurprisingly, as is common with this class of models, and as described in Table 2.3
when compared with Table 2.2, the generated sample path under the REE significantly
underestimates the variance of tightness in the UK labour market; i.e. the model does
not generate a realistic magnitude of unemployment fluctuations over the business
cycle, with the standard deviation being approximately a quarter of that observed in
the data.
TABLE 2.3: Simulation results under the REE, decreasing and constant gain learning
Number of qtrs after init. val. 20 100
Std dev. Std dev. Min. Max.
REE
w 0.011 0.0085 0.97 1.01
u 0.00054 0.00053 0.054 0.056
θ 0.0015 0.0012 0.32 0.37
Decreasing gain
w 0.012 0.0092 0.97 1.01
u 0.00072 0.00070 0.054 0.057
θ 0.0020 0.0016 0.31 0.38
Constant gain (γ = 0.05)
w 0.012 0.0090 0.97 1.01
u 0.00073 0.00069 0.054 0.057
θ 0.0021 0.0016 0.31 0.38
Source: authors’ calculations.
16See Appendix Figure B1 for the simulated paths of output per worker and shocks used in all
simulations here. These were generated using the random number seed 42 in the Python Numpy
application.
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Figure 2.2 also shows the equivalent simulation results when agents learn the REE
with decreasing gain, with initial estimates of the PLM parameters as described above.
Figure 2.3 shows the path of these parameter estimates as agents learn from their
forecast errors. The key result is that convergence is very slow, when agents are given
a relatively small amount of historical data (12.5 years) and with initial estimates of
the model parameters not unrealistically far from the true REE values. As shown in
Appendix Figure B3, this takes thousands of years despite being exponential. This
indicates that under adaptive learning, an economy could be persistently away from its
REE level of unemployment, on the high or low side, even though agents are behaving
rationally in the limited sense prescribed by the ‘good econometrician.’ In this sense,
RE can be a poor approximation in terms of levels to a model with learning. One
recommendation from this result is that when calibrating the Mortensen-Pissarides
model, targeting second moments of the data should always be preferable, whereas
not exactly hitting levels of the endogenous variables may not be too concerning.
As a further example, in Appendix Figure B4 and Figure B5 we simulate the model
with no memory, and allow the agents to have guessed the correct initial parameter
estimates, x0 = xREE , but suppose that there is an immediate negative twenty percent
shock to the flow value of unemployment b. In the REE, due to the rise in the surplus
of a match, firms immediately open more vacancies, and the unemployment rate falls.
Under learning, the initial increase in θ is smaller. Therefore, unemployment falls
more slowly as agents attempt to disentangle the effects of the structural shock from
the stochastic process. In this sense, the response to the shock under learning leads to
a less volatile path for unemployment. If actual labour market data contain the effects
of frequent structural shocks of this kind, then econometric learning will not improve
the ability of the standard search model to match their cyclical properties.
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FIGURE 2.2: Simulations of the labour market model and agents’ parameter estimates:
a comparison of the REE, decreasing gain and constant gain learning
Note.- initial parameter estimates of the PLM, and B̂0 is assumed to be ‘realistically’ far away from the
true REE values, whereas Â0 is chosen such that under learning the economy begins at θ̄ .
2.5.2 Speed of convergence
As shown theoretically in Benveniste et al. (2012), the learning of the agents results
in root-t convergence to the true REE parameter estimates if all the eigenvalues of
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FIGURE 2.3: Simulations of the labour market model and agents’ parameter estimates:
a comparison of the REE, decreasing gain and constant gain learning
Note.- initial parameter estimates of the PLM, and B̂0 is assumed to be ‘realistically’ far away from the
true REE values, whereas Â0 is chosen such that under learning the economy begins at θ̄ .
the system’s Jacobian have a real part strictly less than a half.17 Here this requires
ψ2 < 1/2. In the example parametrisation above this is not ensured, with ψ2 = 0.57.
More generally, it can be shown with simulations that the speed of convergence
decreases substantially as ψ2→ 1, the threshold for E-Stability. To illustrate a decrease
in the speed of convergence, in Appendix Figure B6 we consider a value of ψ = 0.91
by decreasing worker bargaining power to β = 0.1, keeping all other parameters
except c constant, which is always used to match the mean value of θ from the UK
data. As expected, the rate of convergence decreases, and the economy remains more
persistently away from the REE. As such, choosing parameter values which guarantee
a higher speed of convergence is one way in which the REE model could become an
improved approximation of an alternative with econometric learning.
17I.e. the rate of convergence at which in classical econometrics the mean of the least squares
parameter estimate converges to the true value.
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2.5.3 Constant gain learning
In Figure 2.2 we also compare the results of our first simulation with decreasing
gain learning to an equivalent example with constant gain parameter γ = 0.05.18
When agents weight recent data more, convergence to the REE is faster, and agents’
parameter estimates are more volatile. This faster convergence results in more volatile
series of labour market tightness, wages and unemployment. However, the gain
parameter generating this faster convergence roughly implies that agents only use
data over the past twenty quarters to update their beliefs, and is notably outside the
range suggested by the adaptive learning literature (see Di Pace et al. (2016) for a
discussion). Our simulation results with constant gain learning and more reasonable
levels of memory weighting are not dissimilar to those obtained with decreasing gain.
2.5.4 An alternative non-steady-state perceived law of motion
So far we have described a model of econometric learning in which agents
endeavour to forecast labour market tightness θ . However this is a construct of the
model and its assumptions. It is an attractive feature of the search and matching models
that the equilibrium can be described by this single choice variable, determined by
the state of the productivity process, but independent of unemployment. But firms in
the model are described as choosing the number of vacancies to post, or analogously
whether or not to enter the labour market. And for given levels of θ and productivity,
this choice does depend on the state of the labour market. In the REE, if we consider
the economy as initially being at some steady state (i.e. unemployment and vacancy
rates are on the Beveridge curve), then in moving to any new steady state the vacancy
rate changes non-monotonically. In characterising agents as learning how to choose
and forecast θ , we imply that they fully understand the non-steady-state dynamics of
the model. Here we consider the implications of relaxing this assumption (for what
follows, see B.1.6 for complete derivations and descriptions of parameter values).
Linearising (2.14), (2.20) and (2.12) around the steady-state deterministic values of
vacancies, employment and output per worker, we derive an alternative system defining
the economy:




t+1 +κ4nt , (2.38)
nt = φ0 +φ1nt−1 +φ2vt−1, (2.39)
yt = (1−ρ)+ρyt−1 + εt . (2.40)
18For constant gain learning there is no analytic solution for expectational stability and so we must
select a reasonably small gain parameter to ensure convergence.
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We endow agents with a PLM in which they use both the output per worker and
employment states to forecast vacancy creation,
vt = Ât + B̂tyt +Ĉtnt−1. (2.41)
Given (2.38)-(2.41), we can then derive the ALM for this version of the economy, and
subsequently a T̃ -mapping
T̃
(








, κ̃1 + κ̃2ρB̂t , κ̃3 + κ̃2Ĉt
)
. (2.42)
Assuming agents update their parameter estimates for the PLM using RLS as
previously, and applying the same E-stability principle, it can be shown that the
sufficient condition to guarantee local convergence to the REE is given by κ̃2 < 1.
Comparing this with the condition for stability of the MSV-PLM, κ̃2 ≥ ψ2. Hence,
convergence to the REE is slower when agents do not implicitly know the out of
steady-state dynamics of employment and vacancy creation. The REE model is then
a poorer approximation to an economy with econometric learning. What is more,
for a subset of parameter values we cannot claim that the model is E-stable. For
example, it is less likely to be E-stable in the circumstance of inefficiently high vacancy
creation, departing from the Hosios (1990) condition (i.e. α > β ). Though for the
parametrisation we have used here the model would still certainly converge to the
REE.
2.6 Conclusion
We take the textbook linearised RBC version of the model of search and matching
frictions for the labour market and show that the unique REE is not only always
E-stable, for all well-defined sets of parameter values, but this result is robust
to over-parametrisation of the MSV-PLM used by agents (Strong E-stability) with
decreasing gain learning. These local convergence conditions also extend trivially to
global convergence. Because the economy will eventually move to the REE when
agents use econometric learning, the potentially unrealistic RE assumption in this
class of model is nonetheless reasonable. We use recent UK data to parametrise
the model, and show that although the model is E-stable, implied convergence can
be very slow. Therefore, the RE model of unemployment fluctuations could in fact
be a poor approximation to an economy in which agents more realistically learn as
econometricians, especially in the presence of frequent structural or permanent shocks.
The MSV-PLM implicitly assumes that agents understand the out of steady-state paths
of employment and vacancy creation in the model. When we consider a version of the
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PLM which relaxes this assumption, we see that convergence is further slowed, and








Sectoral labour income shares provide a link from macroeconomic performance to
households’ perceptions of fairness and economic well-being (Atkinson, 2009), which
makes labour income shares a primary concern for political economists and policy
makers. Additionally, the recent surge of economic analysis in the fields of structural
transformation and development accounting increases the need for data on labour
income shares at the sectoral level. These shares do not only matter for quantitative
exercises, but also qualitatively: differences between sectoral labour income shares
within countries can drive structural transformation (Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008).
Despite their importance, comparable cross-country data on sectoral labour income
shares do not exist.1 Therefore, I compute labour income shares of the goods and the
services sector for a large cross-section of countries. I find that these sectoral labour
income shares significantly increase with the level of development. On average, the
goods sector labour income share increases by 4.6 percentage points, and the services
sector labour income share by 3.9 percentage points when an economy’s output per
person doubles.
1Evidence is limited to certain industries, for example, the network industries in OECD countries
(Azmat et al., 2012), or manufacturing industries (Mareek and Orgiazzi, 2015). In developed countries,
the latter typically accounts for only a small share of economic output.
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Multi-sector models are usually formulated as value-added frameworks, in which
output is produced using capital and labour as the only inputs. But industries also
use intermediate inputs, and these inputs are commonly supplied by other industries.
Because of these intermediate input linkages, constructing labour income shares at
the sectoral level requires information on the input-output structure of an economy.
Input-output tables from the World Input-Output Database (hereafter WIOD) provide
all the necessary information for this exercise.
First, I compute the Total Requirements Matrix for each country and year in the
WIOD for 1995-2009. Then I follow Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008), and use these
matrices to allocate capital and labour income across sectors, as if each sector used
only its own output as intermediate input. In other words, I first derive value-added
production functions for each country and category of final expenditure. Then I
compute the goods sector labour income shares by aggregating all of those production
functions which are associated with final expenditure on goods. The labour income
share of the services sector follows similarly.
To adjust for the labour income of the self-employed, I first construct series of
Net Operating Surplus for each industry, year, and country in the WIOD, using data
collected from National Accounts. Then I use these series to impute the labour income
of the self-employed, similar to Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001) and Gollin (2002).
Using different adjustment methods only affects the average level of the sectoral
income shares, but does not notably change any other result in this paper. In contrast to
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008), my estimates suggest that the labour income share
of the services sector is on average slightly larger than the labour income share of the
goods sector, and the differences between the goods sector and services sector labour
income shares within countries are uncorrelated with the level of development across
countries.
Further, I document that the labour income shares of the goods and the services
sector increase significantly with the level of development, and hence the aggregate
labour income share is also positively correlated with aggregate income. This contrasts
with the results of Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001) and Gollin (2002), who find
that aggregate labour income shares are cross-sectionally uncorrelated with aggregate
income. My results differ, because I use average labour income shares over 1995-2009,
and thus I can exclude business cycle fluctuations as drivers of measured differences.
Also, the sample of analysed countries differs from the above mentioned studies,
mainly because the WIOD does not include African countries.
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To assess the quantitative impact of using country-specific sectoral labour income
shares vs. their corresponding U.S. values, I conduct a development accounting
exercise. To allocate quantities of physical and human capital across the goods and
the services sector, I use first-order conditions, which are derived from a simple cost
minimisation problem of a representative firm. This approach is similar to Herrendorf
and Valentinyi (2012), who also use first-order conditions to impute unobserved
quantities of sectoral production factors, however, in contrast to their work, I do not
assume that sectoral labour income shares are identical across countries. I find that the
goods sector is less productive in poor countries than the services sector, supporting the
findings of Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012). Because sectoral labour income shares
increase with development, using their corresponding U.S. values overestimates the
elasticity of the production function with respect to labour input in relatively poor
countries. I find that the sectoral productivity disparities are underestimated by nearly
20 per cent across countries.
3.2 Input-output tables: linking the production and
the expenditure-side of the economy
To study economic phenomena and variables at the sectoral level, for example,
structural change or productivity differences at the sectoral level across countries,
economists have to make assumptions about sectoral production functions. Most
commonly, these production functions are assumed to combine capital and labour
inputs. Although production functions that do not restrict the elasticity of substitution
between inputs to equal one are becoming increasingly popular, the Cobb-Douglas
production function is still the benchmark in the literature (Herrendorf et al., 2014).
For a given country, suppose that real output of sector z ∈ {G,S}, where G denotes the
goods sector and S denotes the services sector, is produced according to:
yz = Azk1−αzz h
αz
z , (3.1)
with total factor productivity Az, the quantity of physical capital inputs kz, and the
quantity of human capital inputs hz. The coefficient αz ∈ (0,1) is the sectoral
labour income share. As Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) note, this functional form
abstracts from intermediate inputs. Formulating a sectoral production function without
intermediate inputs implicitly assumes that each sector uses only intermediate inputs
which it produced itself. However, the fact that large quantities of intermediate inputs
are traded between the goods and the services sectors within countries (Grobovšek,
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2017), means that abstracting from these intermediate input linkages is potentially not
an innocuous assumption.
Taking the intermediate input linkages across sectors seriously requires data on
the producers and consumers of these intermediate inputs - that is, one requires
input-output tables. In the following explanation, I use the notation of the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis as outlined in Horowitz and Planting (2006).2 Suppose
the economy consists of n industries and m commodities, where industries combine
intermediate inputs with capital and labour to produce output. Bold face lower case
letters denote vectors and bold face upper case letters denote matrices throughout the
paper.
Let W denote the Make matrix with dimension (m×n). The entries of a particular
row of W show the value of the produced output of a particular commodity, which is
supplied by each of the n industries, expressed as a share of the total value of the output
of this commodity. For example, the commodity of “Motor Vehicles and Trailers”
is produced mostly by the “Transport Equipment” industry, but is also produced by
the “General Machinery” industry. For the latter, Motor Vehicles and Trailers is a
secondary output, while for the Transport Equipment industry it is the primary output.
Note that (3.1) implicitly abstracts from these secondary outputs. The (m×1) vector q
has the typical element {q} j which equals the total value of the output of commodity
j.
Similarly, let B denote the Use matrix with dimension (m×n). The columns of the
Use matrix B show the value of the commodity inputs required for the production
of one unit of gross output of a given industry in U.S. Dollar. For example, the
“Transport Vehicles” industry uses mostly the commodity of “Fabricated Metals”,
but also “Rubber and Plastic Products”. Again, (3.1) abstracts from the use of these
intermediate inputs, since they are not produced by the Transport Vehicles industry in
this example. The (n×1) vector g has the typical element {g}i which equals the total
value of the output of industry i.
The k-th element of the (m× 1) vector e shows the value of the final expenditure
on commodity k. These three vectors and matrices are related through accounting
identities as follows:
q = Bg+ e , (3.2)
g = W′q . (3.3)
2See also Miller and Blair (2009) for more details about the analysis of input-output data.
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The first identity (3.2) states that the value of total domestic output of a commodity
equals the value of this commodity used as intermediate input in the production of
gross output by all industries plus the value of final expenditure on this commodity.
The second identity (3.3) links the value of the gross output of an industry to the value
of this industry’s primary and secondary commodity output.
Denote the (n×n) identity matrix by I. Combining the above identities (3.2)-(3.3)
to eliminate the vector of commodity outputs q gives
g = W′(I−BW′)−1e ,
:= Le , (3.4)
where the last line introduces the (n×m) Leontief matrix L = W′(I−BW′)−1. This
matrix is an industry-by-commodity Total Requirements Matrix, where entry {L}i j
gives the value of industry i’s gross output which is required to deliver one U.S. Dollar
of commodity j to final use.
Let αz ∈ (0,1) denote the labour income share of sector z ∈ {G,S}, and let r be an
(n× 1) vector, with entry {r}i equal to the ratio of labour income to gross output in
industry i. Similarly, let V be an (n× 1) vector, with entry {V}i equal to the ratio of
value-added to gross output in industry i. With this notation, the labour income share





The entries of expenditure vector ez equal the final expenditure on commodity j if
j ∈ z and zero otherwise. The vector r′L computes the value of labour income in each
final expenditure category, and the vector V′L computes value-added in each final
expenditure category. Weighting both vectors by the vector ez then computes the ratio
of labour income to value-added in sector z. Appendix C.2 shows the final expenditure
on commodities included in each sector.
3.3 The World Input Output Database and other data
sources
I use data from the WIOD, 2013 Release (see Timmer et al. (2015) for details on the
construction of this dataset).3 The WIOD contains annual data covering 40 countries
- 27 European Union members (Croatia being the one EU member state not available,
as of November 2017) and 13 other major economies, including China, India, and
3Available at http://www.wiod.org/release13; accessed 01/09/15
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the United States, for the period from 1995 to 2011. I exclude Mexico, Slovakia,
and Turkey from the following analysis, because required additional data were not
available to adjust for the labour income of the self-employed. Not excluding these
three countries would likely strengthen the finding that sectoral labour income shares
are increasing with the level of development.
The WIOD contains input-output tables as well as Socio Economic Accounts
(SEA), which provide information about economic variables at the industry level,
including hours worked by employees and self-employed, labour compensation, and
value-added. The WIOD is constructed using only publicly available national account
statistics and therefore can be adjusted and updated if new data becomes available or
old data is revised.
I use the International Supply and Use tables of the WIOD, because these
tables exclude imports from the intermediate inputs and final expenditures. I focus
exclusively on the domestic economy and results thus reflect domestic labour income
shares. To supplement the data in the WIOD, I collect data on Net Operating Surplus
and Net Mixed Income (NOPS) for each industry, year, and country. Data on NOPS
is obtained mostly from national accounts and from EUROSTAT, and the country
sources are listed in Appendix C.1. The same data sources were used to construct
the NOPS series and the WIOD, thus guaranteeing consistency between the two data
sets. NOPS consists of two parts: profit of incorporated businesses after paying labour
input costs and making allowances for the consumption of fixed capital, and Net Mixed
Income, which is the equivalent measure for unincorporated businesses (small family
businesses and self-employed). Therefore, NOPS provides an upper bound for labour
income of the self-employed. As explained below, one would like to have data on Net
Mixed Income instead of NOPS, but most countries do not provide data on these two
variables separately at the industry level.
Additionally, I use data from the Penn World Table 9.0 (PWT): (1) expenditure-side
real GDP, using prices for final goods that are constant across time and countries; and
(2) the quantity of the capital stock using prices for structures and equipment that are
constant across countries (Feenstra et al., 2015).4 I also compute an aggregate index
of human capital based on the average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013)
which I use in the development accounting exercise below.
4Available at http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/; accessed 25/08/17.
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3.3.1 Adjustments for the labour income of the self-employed
Total labour income in an industry is the sum of two components: employees’
compensation and labour income of the self-employed. In the WIOD, wages and
salaries of employees as well as other forms of remuneration in return for work, such
as the contribution of employers to social insurances and pensions, are obtained from
payroll data and labour force surveys for each country and industry. Additionally,
information on the hours worked of employees from national labour cost surveys and
enterprise surveys is used to compute the total compensation of employees.
However, as Krueger (1999) emphasises, national account statistics do not account
for the second component, labour income of the self-employed, although some share
of the reported earnings of the self-employed should clearly be attributed to labour
income, with the reminder then comprising returns on invested capital, land rents, or
monopoly profits. Different methods have been proposed in the literature to account
for the labour income of the self-employed. These methods are: (1) considering only
employees in the corporate sector; (2) assuming that the self-employed earn the same
wage per hour as employees; (3) using additional data on operating surplus for each
industry to impute profits of the self-employed; (4) applying a combination of methods
(2) and (3) by assuming that self-employed earn the same wage per hour as employees,
but this value can’t exceed the total surplus of the self-employed.
To answer how the different adjustment methods of the labour income share affect
its relationship with the level of economic development, I estimate the following
regression using least squares:
ᾱi = a+β rGDPei +ui , (3.6)
where ᾱi is the average aggregate labour income share over 1995-2009 in country i,
and rGDPei denotes the log of the geometric average of real GDP per person from the
expenditure-side (from the PWT), in prices that are constant across time and countries
(hereafter International Dollar), in country i over 1995-2009.5 I compare averages to
exclude business cycle effects. Figure 3.1 displays the labour income share estimates
for each of the adjustment methods discussed in the following.
The first adjustment method simply excludes the self-employed, and considers
only employees on payroll (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). This method has
the advantage of being transparent, and its results reflect payments to labour (Elsby
5Results presented here are robust to different measures of development: using real GDP per worker
from the expenditure side, real GDP per person/worker from the production-side, or arithmetic instead
of geometric averages does not change results notably.
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FIGURE 3.1: Aggregate labour income shares across countries, 1995-2009:
comparison of adjustment methods for the labour income of the self-employed
Notes.- plot of the average aggregate labour income share of each country against the geometric
average of real GDP per person in International Dollar over 1995-2009. Solid line shows the
estimated slope coefficient from (3.6). Luxembourg is excluded in figures, but is included in
the regression.
et al., 2013) unambiguously. However, this assumption potentially excludes a
large share of labour income. Especially in cross-country settings, where the
number of self-employed varies substantially across countries, this approach seems
problematic. For example, while the share of self-employed among all working
individuals in the U.S. is on average 6.9 per cent over 1995-2009 according to the
WIOD SEA, the corresponding values for Portugal and India are 19.2 and 55.4 per
cent, respectively. Attributing only payroll compensation to labour income could
systematically underestimate the share of labour income in poorer countries relative to
rich countries. The first row of Table 3.1 shows that the share of payroll compensation
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to economy-wide value added is 52.2 per cent, averaged across all years and countries
in the sample, and Figure 3.1A shows the payroll labour income share for each country.
The third column of Table 3.1 displays the coefficient estimates β̂ for each
adjustment method. The significant estimate of 0.04 for the payroll labour income
share means that this share increases by 0.04 percentage points when real GDP per
person increases by one per cent. Gollin (2002) also finds a positive relationship
between the aggregate payroll labour income share and economic output per person.
However, if the self-employed have a systematically higher labour income share in
poorer countries than in richer countries, then the aggregate labour income share could
actually be uncorrelated, or even negatively correlated, with the level of development.
TABLE 3.1: Comparison of different labour income adjustments, and regression
estimates, 1995-2009
Average Standard Slope Spearman
1995-2009 deviation estimate coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Only corporate sector 0.522 0.061 0.040∗∗∗ 0.81
(0.013)
2. Equal hourly wages 0.614 0.070 0.057∗∗∗ 0.88
(0.014)
3. Labour income 0.565 0.049 0.044∗∗∗ 0.95
equal to OSPUE (0.009)
4. Equal wages constrained 0.548 0.048 0.045∗∗∗ 1.00
by OSPUE (0.008)
Notes.- column (1) shows the average of labour income shares over 1995-2009. Column
(2) shows the standard deviation of labour income shares over 1995-2009. Column (3)
shows estimates β̂ , obtained from regression (3.6). Column (4) shows Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient for pairwise comparison of the country-ranking of each row with the
country-ranking of the fourth row. Newey-West standard error estimates in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, two-sided test.
A second approach of accounting for labour income of the self-employed is to
assume that the self-employed earn the same hourly wage rate as employees. This is
the method which the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses to compute their
headline measure of labour income. An advantage of this method is that it accounts
for differences in the hours worked between employees and self-employed. However,
Gollin (2002) argues that the imputation of equal wages will be a poor approximation
if systematic differences between the earnings of self-employed and employees exist.
Because this assumption seems particularly unrealistic in emerging economies, the
WIOD uses household surveys and census data to determine the labour income of the
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self-employed in relatively poor countries. These countries are: Brazil, China, India,
Indonesia, Taiwan. The average labour income share increases to 61.4 per cent when
this method is used (second row Table 3.1), and for some countries with a particularly
high ratio of self-employed-to-employees (e.g., Poland and Korea) this method implies
labour income shares larger than 75 per cent (Figure 3.1B).
Gollin (2002) proposes to take the operating surplus of private unincorporated
enterprises (OSPUE) into account, arguing that most of this surplus will be labour
income of the self-employed. However, because OSPUE data is not available for
most of the WIOD countries, I follow the approach of Bernanke and Gürkaynak
(2001): they argue that in countries with a relatively large share of self-employed,
unincorporated surplus should also be relatively large compared to incorporated
surplus. Hence, Bernanke and Gürkaynak assume that the ratio of incorporated
to unincorporated surplus in total NOPS is identical to the ratio of employees to
self-employed. This adjustment using imputed OSPUE has the advantage of being
straightforward and transparent. However, if incorporated businesses generate higher
returns per employee than unincorporated businesses, then splitting NOPS based on
labour-input ratios will overestimate the share of unincorporated surplus in NOPS.
Another disadvantage is that all the imputed OSPUE is assumed to be labour income,
which is certainly an overestimation because, according to Gollin (2002), even in poor
countries self-employed tend to use considerable quantities of capital inputs. The third
row of Table 3.1 shows that the resulting average labour income share equals 56.5 per
cent.
The last estimate of the self-employed labour income is computed by assuming
that the self-employed earn the same hourly wage rate as employed workers (as in
adjustment method (2)), but additionally I assume that the imputed OSPUE is the
maximum of the labour income of the self-employed. This method has the advantage
of using most of the available information by accounting for differences in hours
worked between payroll employees and self-employed. However, especially in less
developed countries where this assumption seems more unlikely to hold, imputed
OSPUE is an upper bound for the labour income of the self-employed. As the fourth
row of Table 3.1 shows, the average labour income share equals 54.8 per cent, which
is by construction larger than the value of the payroll labour share, and smaller than
for the other two estimates in the second and third row. Column (2) of the same table
displays the standard deviation for each estimate. Because the standard deviation is the
smallest for the estimate in the fourth row, and this estimate uses most of the available
information, this is the preferred method. The associated coefficient estimate of (3.6)
equals 0.045 and is significantly positive, as shown in the third column of Table 3.1.
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To understand how the different estimates affect the relative ranking of countries
based on their respective labour income share, I compute Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient between the preferred estimate of the labour income share and all other
estimates. This coefficient equals one if a perfect positive monotone relationship
exists between the resulting rankings. For pairwise comparison of each adjustment
method with the preferred adjustment method in the last row, the resulting Spearman
coefficients are shown in the fourth column of Table 3.1. The rank correlation between
adjustment methods which take the labour income of the self-employed into account
is 0.88 and 0.95. This indicates that there is a strong positive monotone relationship
between the different estimates of the average aggregate labour income shares, and so
this ranking is relatively robust to different adjustment methods.
The aggregate labour income shares are increasing in the level of development, as
measured by real GDP per person in International Dollar. This pattern is visible in
all panels of Figure 3.1, and confirmed by the significantly positive slope estimates
in Table 3.1. Most importantly, this result does not depend on the method used to
impute the labour income of the self-employed. For the preferred estimate of the labour
income share in the fourth row of Table 3.1, the last column shows that the labour
income share significantly increases by 0.045 percentage points when real GDP per
person increases by one per cent.
3.4 Main empirical results: Sectoral labour income
shares across countries
Figure 3.2 plots the labour income shares of the aggregate economy, the goods sector,
and the services sector across countries against the log of real GDP per person in
International Dollar. Labour income shares are arithmetic averages over 1995-2009,
and real GDP per person refers to the geometric average over the same period.
Appendix Table C.1 and C.3 display the classifications of commodities into the goods
and services sector and the sectoral labour income shares, respectively.
Figure 3.2 suggest that the labour income shares in the goods and the services sector
increase with the level of development across countries. Table 3.2 displays the means
and the estimated slope coefficients from regression (3.6), using as dependent variable
the aggregate and sectoral labour income shares, and as explanatory variable the log
of real level of expenditure-side GDP per person in International Dollar, all variables
averaged over 1995-2009. The first row of Table 3.2 shows that the labour income
share is slightly smaller in the goods sector than in the services sector. However, the
hypothesis that the means of the sectoral labour income shares are identical can not be
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FIGURE 3.2: Sectoral labour income shares, 1995-2009 averages
Notes.- goods sector and services sector labour income shares. Averages over 1995-2009.
The horizontal axes show the geometric average over 1995-2009 of log real GDP per person
from the expenditure-side in International Dollar (PWT). The solid line shows the least squares
regression line from (3.6), varying the dependent variable accordingly. Luxembourg is omitted
from this figure, but included in the regression.
rejected at the one per cent level: assuming independent sampling or paired sampling
for the statistical test does not change this result.
TABLE 3.2: Means and coefficient estimates for sectoral labour income shares,
1995-2009
Aggregate economy Goods sector Services sector
(1) (2) (3)
1. Arithmetic mean 0.550 0.546 0.554
2. Estimate β̂ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Notes.- the first row shows arithmetic means computed over countries and years. The second
row shows coefficient estimates from regression (3.6). Newey-West standard error estimates in
parenthesis.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, two-sided test.
The second row of Table 3.2 suggests that the sectoral labour income shares are
increasing with the level of development: the coefficient estimates of the slopes are
significant and positive at the one per cent level. When real GDP per person in
International Dollar increases by one per cent, then the goods and services sector
labour income shares increase by 0.046 and 0.039 percentage points, respectively. In
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other words, suppose that income per person doubles, then the expected increase in
the labour income shares of the goods sector and the services sector is 4.6 and 3.9
percentage points respectively.
Figure 3.3 displays the differences between the goods and the services sector labour
income shares in each country. These within-country differences and the level of
development are not correlated. This is due to the previous finding that both the
services and goods sector labour income shares increase with the level of development,
thus keeping the difference approximately constant.
FIGURE 3.3: Within-country differences in labour income shares between the services
and the goods sectors, 1995-2009 average
Notes.- horizontal axis shows geometric average of real GDP per person in International Dollar
over the period from 1995-2009. Vertical axis shows the difference in labour income shares in
percentage points, services sector less goods sector. Luxembourg is excluded in this figure.
Figure 3.3 also shows substantial differences within some countries: for example,
the services labour income share in Indonesia exceeds the goods sector labour income
share by nearly 20 percentage points. In contrast, the services sector labour income
share in Romania is over 10 percentage points lower than in the goods sector. These
relatively large differences are a significant finding, because they can be drivers
of structural transformation (Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008). In their theoretical
framework, the elasticity of substitution between the outputs of the goods and the
services sector determines whether the sector with the relatively higher labour income
share grows or declines in terms of capital and labour allocation. If the outputs are
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complements, countries positioned above the dotted line in Figure 3.3 will allocate a
larger share of their capital and workforce to the goods sector as their economies grow,
and vice versa.
The results in this section suggest that the labour income shares of the goods
and the services sectors do not have the same value across the countries in the
WIOD. Moreover, there is a significantly positive relationship between the level of
development and the level of the sectoral labour income shares. This relationship is
stronger for the goods than for the services sector. Thus, the assumption that sectoral
labour income shares are equal to their respective U.S. values is not supported by the
data. Both the levels of the labour income shares and the within-country differences
are not constant within a relatively homogeneous group of mostly developed countries.
3.5 Decomposition of differences in labour income
shares across countries
To better understand the causes of the observed differences in sectoral labour income
shares across countries, this section decomposes the sectoral labour income shares.
Since the usual practice in the literature is to assume that sectoral income shares are
identical to their corresponding U.S. values, I choose the U.S. as a benchmark.
Denote the labour income share of sector z in country i by αiz. The difference in









where the notation is the same as in section 3.2, but here I make the
country-dependency explicit. Production-side labour income shares are linked through
the input-output structure to the expenditure-side, where they are weighted using the
expenditure shares of final use. The observed difference is decomposed into these
components as follows (see Appendix C for derivations):




+ S′izLUS(∆eiz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expenditure weights
. (3.8)
The first term on the right-hand side represents differences in the production-side
labour income share in value-added (hereafter VA labour share). For example, if
country i had the same input-output structure and expenditure weights of final use as
the U.S., then observed differences in expenditure-side labour income shares could
only be caused by differences in the ratio of labour income to value-added at the
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production-side. The second term captures the effects of differences in the input-output
network (supply chain) between the U.S. and country i. While not impacting on the
aggregate labour income share, linking value-added labour income shares differently to
the expenditure-side can result in varying sectoral labour income shares. For example,
relatively high value-added labour income shares might be linked to the goods sector
in the U.S., but to the services sector in country i. The last term represents difference
in the weights which are used to aggregate the underlying final expenditure labour
income shares into the sectoral labour income shares.
Figure 3.4 shows the contribution of each component to the observed difference in
sectoral labour income shares between the U.S. and country i, separately for the goods
and the services sectors.
The horizontal axes of each panel in Figure 3.4 show the observed differences
in labour income shares, the left-hand side of (3.8). The vertical axes show the
counterfactual differences, in percentage points, resulting from imposing on country
i two of the three components that form the sectoral income shares of the U.S. For
example, panel A imposes the U.S. supply chain and expenditure weights of the goods
sector on country i, but keeps the observed value of the value-added labour income
shares as in country i. The resulting differences between the sectoral labour income
share in country i and the U.S., attributed to differences in the value-added labour
share, are shown on the vertical axes. The U.S. value is centred at coordinate (0,0)
in all panels. The proximity to the 45 degree line indicates visually how much of
the observed total differences between sectoral labour income shares each component
explains.
Figure 3.4 suggests that the main drivers of the observed differences in labour
income shares between the U.S. and other countries are differences in value-added
labour income shares. Differences in the supply chains or the expenditure weights
contribute relatively little to the observed differences in sectoral labour income shares.
Table 3.3 displays the average contribution of the different components to the observed
total average difference between sectoral labour income shares of the U.S. and all other
countries.
The first row of Table 3.3 shows that the value-added labour income shares explains
on average 2.8 percentage points (column (1)) of the observed average difference of 3.7
percentage points (column (4)) in labour income shares of the goods sector between
the U.S. and all other countries. This suggests that approximately 75 per cent of
cross-country variation in the goods sector labour income share originates from the
production-side. The value of -0.3 percentage points in the first row of Table 3.3,
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FIGURE 3.4: Decomposition of differences in expenditure-side labour income shares
between the U.S. and other countries into value-added, supply chain, and expenditure
weight, 1995-2009 averages
Notes.- decomposition of sectoral labour income shares according to equation (3.8), individual
components averaged over the period 1995-2009. Each dot represents a country. The horizontal
axes show the observed difference in percentage points to the U.S. sectoral labour income
shares, αiz − αUSz. Vertical axes show the differences to the U.S. labour income share in
percentage points caused by the considered component, as indicated in the title of each panel.
The U.S. value is centred at (0,0).
column (2), suggests that the goods sector in other countries uses on average more
intermediate inputs of industries with relatively low value-added labour income shares.
Similarly, column (3) suggests that countries spend on average a larger share of their
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TABLE 3.3: Decomposition of sectoral labour income shares
VA labour Supply chain Expenditure Total
share weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Goods Sector −0.028 −0.003 −0.006 −0.037
2. Service Sector −0.027 0.007 0.005 −0.015
Notes.- decomposition of expenditure side labour income shares according to equation (3.8),
individual components averaged across countries and over the period 1995-2009. Column (4)
shows the observed difference in percentage points to the U.S. sectoral labour income shares,
αiz−αUSz.
income, compared to the U.S., on goods-sector commodities which have relatively low
labour income shares.
The second row of Table 3.3 shows the results for the decomposition of the total
observed difference in labour income shares of the services sector between the U.S.
and other countries. If all countries in the WIOD had supply chains and expenditure
weights as in the U.S. (column (1)), then the services sector labour income shares
would be on average 2.7 percentage points below the corresponding U.S. value,
instead of only 1.5 percentage points. As column (3) shows, this is due to other
countries consuming relatively more commodities of the services sector with relatively
higher expenditure-side labour income share. Additionally, column (2) shows that
these commodities are produced using relatively more intermediate inputs with higher
value-added labour income shares.
The decomposition results suggest that the positive correlation between the level
of development, as measured by real GDP per person, and sectoral labour income
shares is related to the production-side labour income shares in general, and less
associated with specific differences of the supply chain network or the structure of final
expenditure across countries. While these two components tend to further decrease the
labour income share of the goods sector, the decomposition suggests that they are
increasing the labour income share of the services sector, relative to the corresponding
U.S. value.
3.6 Approximations by the value-added labour income
shares and the aggregate labour income shares
The data requirements for computing sectoral labour income shares, which take the
full input-output structure into account, are relatively high; input-output tables are not
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always available, and classifications and accounting standards vary significantly across
countries. Therefore, the finding that differences in sectoral labour income shares
between countries are mainly caused by differences in production-side labour income
shares suggests that these shares can provide a reasonable approximation to sectoral
labour income shares.
Figure 3.5 plots the sectoral labour income shares against value-added weighted
production-side labour income shares, separately for the goods and the services sectors,
for each year and country. The 45 degree line provides a visual benchmark for a perfect
FIGURE 3.5: VA-weighted industry labour share approximation
Notes.- value-added weighted industry labour income shares (horizontal axes) and sectoral
labour income shares (vertical axes) for each year and country. The solid line represents 45
degrees.
fit. Value-added production-side shares are not systematically different from sectoral
labour income shares, as expected from the decomposition results. The fit is better for
the service sector than for the goods sector, but both approximations are significantly
better than assuming the corresponding sectoral labour income shares of the U.S. apply
across countries.
Although using value-added labour income shares does not require knowledge of
the input-output structure, these income shares are also not available for a large number
of countries. Therefore, I provide a visual assessment of the goodness-of-fit of the
approximation by the aggregate labour income share, because these aggregate shares
are available for almost all countries. Results are shown in Figure 3.6.
The interpretation is similar to the one of Figure 3.5: the 45 degree line indicates
exact matches between aggregate and sectoral labour income shares. The services
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FIGURE 3.6: Aggregate labour share approximation
Notes.- aggregate labour income shares (horizontal axes) and sectoral labour income shares
(vertical axes) for each year and country. The solid line represents 45 degrees.
sector labour income share is relatively better approximated than the goods sector
share, owing to the fact that the expenditure vector places more weight on the relatively
larger services sector in the WIOD sample of countries. The aggregate labour income
share in each country also provides a better approximation to its sectoral labour income
shares than the corresponding sectoral U.S. values.
Therefore, even if no data are available on the input-output structure or value-added
labour income shares, it still seems preferable to approximate sectoral labour income
shares by the aggregate labour income share within each country, rather than to assume
sectoral shares are identical to their corresponding U.S. values across countries.
3.7 Development accounting at the sectoral level
To assess the quantitative importance of the variation in labour income shares across
countries, I conduct a development accounting exercise using a framework similar
to Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012). I assume that markets are competitive and
production factors are mobile across sectors. However, in contrast to these authors,
I do not assume that sectoral labour income shares are identical across countries given
the evidence presented above.
96
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 3.7
Suppose sector z ∈ {G,S} in country i produces commodity output y(i)z according










The sectoral quantities of physical capital and human capital are k(i)z and h
(i)
z ,
respectively. Total factor productivity (TFP) of sector z in country i is A(i)z . The
parameter α(i)z ∈ (0,1) can vary across sectors and countries.
To implement this accounting exercise, it is necessary to obtain sectoral quantities
of yz, kz, and hz for each country. Because the quantities of factor inputs at the
expenditure-side are unobserved, I use first-order conditions to obtain these quantities,
as in Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012). Assume the sectoral production function
exhibits constant returns to scale and let production factors be mobile across sectors.
Let the production function for a given country and for output of sector z be
yz = Fz(kz,hz) . (3.10)
In this expression, kz is physical capital and hz denotes human capital input in sector
z. Note that it is not necessary to restrict F to be identical across sectors, and that this
method does not require the production function to be of the Cobb-Douglas form. The
first-order conditions of a cost minimising representative firm in sector z, combined








where skz denotes the capital income share in sector z, pz denotes the price of sector z’s
output, and r is the nominal rental rate for capital. It follows that the ratio of capital
income across any two sectors z and j is given by
skz pzyz












due to capital being fully mobile across sectors. Summing over all sectors j, the
sectoral share in the aggregate quantity of capital is equal to this sector’s share in
total capital compensation
kz
∑ j k j
=
skz pzyz
∑ j sk j p jy j
. (3.13)
The sectoral allocation of human capital inputs follows similarly.
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The PWT provide data on the stock of physical capital for each country in the
WIOD (Feenstra et al., 2015). I construct the measure of aggregate human capital
as follows: from the WIOD SEA I obtain the number of total hours worked in each
country. Then I multiply this number by an index of human capital, provided in the
PWT, which is based on the average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) and
the returns to schooling from Psacharopoulos (1994).
To derive quantities of sectoral output, I transform their nominal expenditure values
into constant cross-country prices using purchasing power parities. The International
Comparison Program (ICP) of the World Bank collects data on prices of a variety of
goods and services from almost every country, including all countries in the WIOD,
based on national surveys (World Bank, 2008). I use the 2005 version, since this is
the most recent version available that lies within the sample period 1995-2009.6 For
a given country, denote nominal expenditure on final use c by ec, and define the share
of expenditure on final use c in total expenditure on sector z as λc = ec/∑c∈z ec. The
relevant purchasing power parity in International Dollar for sectoral output z is:
PPPz = Πc∈zPλcc , (3.14)
where Pc is the purchasing power parity for final use c. The classification of ICP
expenditure categories and the associated sectors is provided in Appendix Table C.2.
Finally, I obtain sectoral output quantities by dividing final expenditure on sector z by
PPPz, for every country in the WIOD.
3.7.1 Development accounting results
I compute the TFP of sector z in country i, A(i)z , using equation (3.9) and the quantities
as described above. Figure 3.7A-B displays the results for the TFP of the goods
and the services sector, using the country and sector-specific labour income shares,
and Figure 3.7C-D shows the results using the corresponding U.S. values for sectoral
labour income shares. The dashed lines indicate the normalised U.S. productivity level
and the log of real GDP per person in the U.S. in International Dollar, which is constant
since the U.S. labour income share is identical for both methods.
As expected, sectoral TFP is increasing with the level of development. Comparing
panels A and C of Figure 3.7 suggests that productivity differences across countries
in the goods sector are slightly smaller when the U.S. labour income shares are used.
Similarly, productivity of the services sector seems to increase less in panel D relative
6Source: World Bank’s ICP 2005, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/...(icp)-2005; accessed
12/04/17.
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FIGURE 3.7: Sectoral productivity relative to corresponding U.S. values, all countries
2005: comparison of results using country-specific income shares and U.S. income
shares
Notes.- vertical axes show real GDP per person in International Dollar in 2005. The horizontal
axes show the level of sectoral productivity in 2005, normalised such that U.S.=1. Each dot
represents a different country in the WIOD, Luxembourg and is omitted from this figure, but
included in the regression.
to panel B of Figure 3.7 with the level of development. To quantify the results of this
comparison, I follow Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) and report the results of this
development accounting exercise in a succinct form: I regress the log of A(i)z on the log
of real GDP per worker in International Dollar of country i, Y (i). Because I obtain Y (i)












where cz is a sector-specific intercept, γz is the elasticity of the TFP of sector z with
respect to the real GDP per person, and ε(i)z is the residual which captures remaining
variation in sectoral productivity not related to aggregate output per worker. A larger
value of the estimate γ̂z indicates larger differences of TFP in sector z across countries
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Therefore, if γ̂z equals one, then the difference in aggregate labour productivity
between the U.S. and other countries is on average as large as the difference between
sectoral TFP of those countries in sector z. If γ̂z equals zero, then there is no systematic
relationship between aggregate labour productivity and the TFP of sector z across
countries. Table 3.4 displays the estimates of γ̂z for the goods and the services sector
of all countries in the WIOD.
TABLE 3.4: Parameter estimates of γ̂z, all countries 2005
Country and
sector-specific U.S. Fixed = 0.66
(1) (2) (3)
1. Aggregate economy 0.66∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
2. Goods sector 0.77∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
3. Services sector 0.55∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Notes.- column (1) shows sectoral TFP using sector- and country-specific labour income
shares. Column (2) assumes sectoral labour income shares equal their corresponding U.S.
values across countries. Column (3) assumes a fixed value equal to 0.66 for sectoral labour
income shares. Newey-West standard error estimates in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, two-sided test.
Column (1) of Table 3.4 shows the estimates of γ̂z when sectoral productivity levels
are computed using country and sector-specific labour income shares. The estimate of
0.66 in the first row shows that the aggregate TFP difference increases on average by
0.66 per cent when the difference in aggregate output per worker increases by one
per cent. The sectoral TFP differences across countries are on average larger in the
goods sector than in the aggregate economy. In contrast, systematic TFP differences in
the services sector are smaller than aggregate TFP differences. These results support
the findings of Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012), who also document larger TFP
disparities in the goods sector than in the services sector.
Table 3.4 column (2) displays the estimates when I impose that sectoral labour
income shares are equal to the corresponding U.S. value across countries. The
qualitative results are unchanged: productivity differences are larger in the goods
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sector than in the services sector across countries. However, the magnitudes of all
coefficients are reduced by almost 20 per cent, which implies that the association
between aggregate labour productivity and sectoral TFP is on average weaker.
Relatively poor countries have on average lower ratios of physical to human capital.
Therefore, decreasing the exponent of human capital in the production function (3.9)
decreases the part of the observed output difference which can be explained by physical
capital intensity. This means that the accounting residual, TFP, has to increase across
countries.
The third column of Table 3.4 shows the estimates when the sectoral labour
income shares are equal to two-thirds, a common value for the labour income share
found in the literature. Not surprisingly, the qualitative results from columns (1)
and (2) are unchanged, and the estimates are resembling those from the first column,
because a relatively high labour income share increases the dispersion on the left hand
side of regression (3.16). Coefficient estimates in this column are relatively better
approximations of the benchmark estimates in column (1), suggesting that imposing
U.S. labour income shares across countries provides a poor approximation.
Less developed countries on average have lower stocks of physical and human
capital than more developed countries. Therefore, using the relatively high U.S. values
for labour income shares across countries overestimates the contribution of human
capital in the production process. Using the country and sector-specific labour income
shares thus increases the productivity differences across countries, since the input
factors account for less of the observed differences in aggregate output.
3.8 Conclusion
The expenditure-side labour income shares of the goods and services sectors vary
substantially across countries and increase significantly with the level of development.
This result is robust to different adjustment methods to account for the labour income
of the self-employed. Therefore the usual assumption that sector-specific labour
income shares are identical across countries to their corresponding U.S. values is not
justified.
I use a decomposition to show that the observed differences in sectoral labour
income shares across countries are mainly driven by differences in labour income at the
production-side of the economy. The input-output structure and expenditure weights
do not contribute substantially to the variation across countries in the labour income
shares of the goods sector. Moreover, expenditure weights and input-output linkages
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even decrease the variation in the labour income shares of the services sector across
countries.
The accounting method used in this paper to compute the labour income shares
at the sectoral level require relatively detailed data on the structure of an economy,
and thus it is not applicable to countries who lack statistical capacity. Therefore, I
show that a less data-intensive approximation of the sectoral labour income shares
by the value-added weighted production-side labour income shares provides a good
fit. Moreover, even the aggregate labour income share provides a reasonably close
approximation, superior to the fit achieved by imposing U.S. labour income shares
across countries.
The findings here also have implications for development accounting exercises:
cross-country productivity differences are larger than previously thought. Computing
sectoral TFPs using labour income shares which increase in the level of development
increases the accounting residual, because less developed countries have a lower
capital intensity. I find that the goods sector exhibits relatively larger productivity
differences across countries than the services sector.
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Conclusion
The first essay provided new estimates of the flexibility of real wages during the UK’s
Great Recession. The novelty of my findings is that I was able to control for cyclical
job-switching, which might have obscured I found that job-stayer real wages respond
by as much as 2.6 per cent for every one percentage point rise in the unemployment
rate. Hiring wages are at least as responsive to the business cycle as the wages
of job stayers. I also found that the hours worked by job stayers did not respond
to the Great Recession. Conversely, the hours of new hires among the same firms
responded significantly, decreasing by 1.5 per cent for every one percentage point rise
in the unemployment rate, mostly through firms switching between full- and part-time
workers.
Cohorts hired during the Great Recession were not only paid lower wages initially,
but were also locked into low-wage growth paths. This significantly reduced the
present value of labour costs from the firm’s perspective for hires made during this
time, ceteris paribus. In this respect, it seems that firms’ hiring wages were even more
flexible than the results for the initial real wages of new hires indicate. Moreover, when
combined with the shift from full- to part-time hiring, firms were able to significantly
reduce their labour costs per new employee. While these large and significant wage and
hours responses seem very likely to account for the UK economy’s unusual experience
of the Great Recession, the puzzle still remains as to why firms were able to adjust
wages so freely, and why workers were so willing to accept these changes. This is
potentially a fruitful area for future research.
In the second essay, I showed that relaxing the assumption of rational expectations
in the textbook search and matching model of the labour market does not affect
the equilibrium level of market tightness, wages, and unemployment. In particular,
assuming that agents use linear forecasts does not only result in local convergence
but also extends trivially to global convergence for all reasonable parameter values
usually found in the literature. So, the potentially very restrictive rational expectation
assumption in this class of models is nonetheless reasonable with respect to
103
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 3.8
equilibrium outcomes. I used recent UK data to parametrise the model, and
showed that implied convergence to the equilibrium can be very slow, however.
Therefore, the rational expectation model of unemployment fluctuations could in fact
be a poor approximation to the dynamics of an economy in which agents learn as
econometricians, especially in the presence of frequent structural or permanent shocks.
In the final essay, I found that the expenditure-side labour income shares of the
goods and services sectors vary substantially across countries and increase significantly
with the level of development. This result is robust to different adjustment methods to
account for the labour income of the self-employed. Therefore the usual assumption
that sector-specific labour income shares are identical across countries to their
corresponding U.S. values is not justified for the countries studied, which together
account for nearly 85 per cent of the global output.
These findings also have implications for development accounting exercises:
cross-country productivity differences are larger than previously thought. Computing
sectoral TFPs using the here computed labour income shares, which increase in
the level of development, increases the accounting residual, because less developed
countries have a lower capital intensity. I find that the goods sector exhibits relatively
larger productivity differences across countries than the services sector, providing




Real wages and hours in the Great
Recession: Evidence from firms and
their entry-level jobs
Appendix A.1 Further description of the data and sample
In what follows we give some additional details regarding the datasets used and how
we have constructed sub-samples thereof. All of the relevant documentation and
variable descriptions attached to these datasets are publicly available from the UK Data
Service. The ONS has also published various documents concerning the data quality
and consistency of the ASHE. We will publish our replication files for the analysis and
sample construction.
We focus on methodological details through the period 1998-2016. Throughout
this period, the ASHE should be a true random sample of all employees in employment,
irrespective of employment status, occupation, size of employer etc. Given the legal
obligation of employers to respond using payrolls, it has a high response rate and
is believed to be accurate. There is no cumulative attrition from the panel, as any
individual not included in the ASHE in any year, for whatever reason, remains in
the sampling frame the following year. Conditional on a hundred per cent response,
the ASHE is a true one per cent random sample of employees: all with a National
Insurance Number which has a numerical part ending in 14. However there are two
major sources of under-sampling, both occurring if individuals do not have a current
tax record. This could happen for some individuals who have very recently moved
job, or for those who earn very little (mostly part-time) and are not paying income
tax or National Insurance in the period when their employers are looked up. From
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2004 the ASHE aimed to sample some of those employees under-represented. It added
supplementary responses for those without a PAYE reference, and also attempted to
represent employees whose jobs changed between the determination of the sampling
frame in January and the reference period in April. Since the ONS states that the
biases that these amendments were introduced to address were actually small, we do
not believe they could affect our results substantially. The ASHE also introduced some
imputations, using similar matched ‘donor’ observations where responses were, for
example, missing an entry of basic hours but had recorded pay. These imputations were
added for weighting purposes, but throughout our analysis we ignore the weights in the
ASHE, since they are designed to make the aggregate results population representative
in terms of worker observables, and are not firm-level.
From 2005 a new questionnaire was also introduced, which was intended to reduce
the latitude for respondents’ own interpretations of what was being asked of them.
From 2007 there were further notable changes. Before occupations were classified as
follows: if the respondent stated an employee’s job had not changed in the past year
the previous year’s occupational classification was applied - otherwise, it was manually
coded. Afterwards an automatic coding, text recognition, tool was used. “The effect
of using ACTR was to code more jobs into higher paying occupations. The jobs that
tended to be recoded into these higher paying occupations generally had lower levels
of pay than the jobs already coded to those occupations. Conversely, they tended to
have higher levels of pay than the other jobs in the occupations that they were recoded
out of. The impact of this was to lower the average pay of both the occupation group
that they had moved from and that they had moved to.” From 2007 the sample size
of the ASHE was reduced by 20 per cent, with reductions targeted at those industries
exhibiting the least variation in earnings patterns.
We use the ASHE annual cross-sections for each year from 1998 to 2016 and
construct a panel as follows: first, we merge the two separate cross-sections for
the year 2010, where one contains occupations coded in SOC2010 and the other in
SOC2000. This is done to match occupations across classification schemes for the
same individuals. In case of multiple jobs per individual, we exclude non-main jobs.
In case of missing main job markers, we impute these based on the job with the highest
working hours. In a next step we link employees across consecutive years based
on their unique identifiers. This enables us to impute missing enterprise reference
numbers (entrefs) backwards, since the ASHE contains a variable which indicates
whether an employee is holding the same job as in the last reference period. Note
that this “same job” variable alone does not allow between-firm and within-firm job
changers to be distinguished. Subsequent to linking two consecutive years in this way,
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we use local unit identifiers to impute missing entrefs across individuals within the
same year (the ONS states that the local unit identifiers are not consistent across years,
rather they are created to identify establishments within years). We continue to update
missing entrefs in this way back to and including 1998. The number of observations
with non-missing entrefs after imputation declines rapidly as we go further back in
time. While for the years 2003-2016 we are only adding a couple of missing entrefs
per year, prior to 2003, and especially prior to 2000, we are imputing almost all entrefs.
We could also impute entrefs for 1997, but this year does not include the marker that
indicates whether an individual is working in the same job, which is vital to our sample
selection strategy.
We keep only observations for individuals aged 16-64, and which have not been
marked as having incurred a loss of pay in the reference period through absence,
employment starting in the period, or short-time working, and which are marked as
being on an adult rate of pay (i.e. dropping trainees and apprenticeships). This is
practically the same filter applied for annual ONS published results on UK “Patterns
of Pay” using the ASHE. We drop observations with missing basic hours, gross weekly
earnings, or hourly wage rates. Basic hours are intended to be a record for an employee
in a normal week, excluding overtime and meal breaks. Gross weekly pay is the main
recorded value in the survey, and from this overtime records are subtracted. Hourly
rates are then derived from dividing by basic hours worked. We drop observations with
over a hundred or less than one basic hour worked, as these could reflect measurement
error and the inclusion of overtime. Full-time is defined as working over thirty basic
hours in a week. But there are a tiny number of discrepancies in some years, we
believe relating to teaching contracts, where the definition applied by the ONS differs.
We however recode these such that for all observations the thirty hours threshold
applies. To further address some potential for measurement error, especially in the
recorded basic hours, we drop observations whose derived hourly rate of pay, excluding
overtime, is less than 80 per cent of the applicable National Minimum Wage (NMW)
each April, with allowance for the different age-dependent rates of the NMW over
time. We set the threshold lower to avoid dropping observations where employers
have rounded figures about the NMW, where the degree of rounding could vary with
the actual value of the NMW, a behaviour which has been hypothesised by the ONS.
We define an entry or new hire into a firm as an individual with less than one
year of tenure. For this we make use of the employment start date. The ASHE
contains information on when an employee starting working for an enterprise from
2002 onwards. We drop a tiny number of unrealistic entry dates, where the start
date lies either in the future or implies an employee started work aged fifteen or
107
APPENDIX A SECTION A.2
younger. Unfortunately there are some inconsistencies across years in these records.
First, an employee can be employed by the same company for three consecutive years,
holding the same job, but the starting dates recorded in the first and third years, though
identical, can vary from the second. In this case we update the “one-off” deviation
with the value of the previous year. Second, if we observe an employee in a chain
of consecutive years in the same firm, holding the same job, but the start date differs
for some years, then we impute the earliest date available. This decision is based on
a conservative interpretation of a “new hire”: in case of previous employment within
the same firm, we do not include an employee in our CH-firms sample of new hires if
we are in any doubt. Given our finding is that hiring earnings cyclicality is larger in
absolute terms than that of job stayers, any expected bias would go in the opposite
direction. Finally, we use employment start date to impute entrefs for employees
backwards again. This enables us to no longer have to observe employees in a chain
of consecutive years to make imputations. We then again use within-year local unit
identifiers to update longitudinal entrefs within a year for other employees with missing
entrefs. The ASHE contains the number of employees of an enterprise as listed in the
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). A very small fraction of employees in
the same enterprise and year have missing or varying values for this variable. We
impute the same value for all employees within year and enterprise as the modal value
for the firm.
For 1996-2001 occupations are classified using the three-digit ONS1990 Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC). For 1998-2010 occupations are classified using
the four-digit SOC2000, and for 2011-2016 with the SOC2010. We experimented
using the ONS’ publicly available cross-walk from 2010 and 2000, but discovered that
this causes a large structural break in the distribution of occupations. In particular
it causes a substantial additional degree of polarisation of work from 2002 onwards.
Therefore we use our own cross-walk obtained from the ASHE cross-section 2010, as
discussed above, to map SOC2010 into SOC2000 within an enterprise. However, some
occupations for some firms are not observed in the year 2010, but are in the following
years, for which we do not have double coded data. To address this we first convert
SOC2010 to the 2008 International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO),
obtained from the ONS website. Then we convert SOC2000 to ISCO1988, where we
obtain conversion tables from the Cambridge Social Interaction and Stratification Scale
(CAMSIS) project. Finally, we use the ISCO2008 to ISCO1988 cross-walk, available
from the International Labour Organization. For the industry classification, we convert
ONS Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 to 2003, using files made available
by the UK Data Service. This conversion uses the 2008 Annual Respondents Dataset,
where both classifications were applied, and where any 2007 code mapping to multiple
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2003 codes is decided using whichever of the two bore a greater share of economic
output.
Appendix A.2 Further robustness checks
Table A.1 presents some further robustness checks of the main empirical results
TABLE A.1: Estimated semi-elasticity of real wages and hours with respect to the
unemployment rate, 1998-2016: more robustness checks
Wages Hours
New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Baseline −2.83∗∗∗ −2.60∗∗ −1.47∗∗∗ −0.20
(0.87) (1.13) (0.42) (0.22)
2. Job means −2.98∗∗∗ −2.67∗∗ −1.08∗∗∗ −0.28
(0.91) (1.17) (0.31) (0.18)
3. Baseline, but −2.78∗∗∗ −2.61∗∗ −1.49∗∗∗ 0.02
without controls (0.80) (1.10) (0.48) (0.21)
4. Baseline, but incl. −2.63∗∗∗ −2.62∗∗ −2.17∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗
public sector (0.95) (1.31) (0.30) (0.10)
5. RPI instead of CPI −2.21∗∗∗ −1.97∗∗
(0.67) (0.90)
6. Including other pay −2.82∗∗∗ −2.61∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(0.81) (1.10) (0.34) (0.12)
Notes.- second-step regression results of estimated period effects on unemployment rate, γ̂ .
The first row is identical to Table 1.3, included here for comparison. The second row uses
mean wages in jobs as the dependent variable in the first step. The third row excludes all
time-varying controls from the first step. The forth row includes public sector firms in the
analysis. The fifth row uses the Retail Price Index, instead of the Consumer Price Index, to
deflate wages. The sixth row uses less restricted values of the first-step dependent variables:
wages include shift-work, incentive payments, overtime, and all other payments; hours refer to
basic and paid overtime.
Newey-West standard error estimates robust to first-order serial correlation in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
presented in Table 1.3. The first row repeats our baseline/main result for convenience.
The robustness discussed here is with regards to the specification of the first step of
the regression model: (1.1) & (1.3). The specification of the second step is unchanged
compared with the baseline. The second row describes the estimated semi-elasticity
of real wages and hours with respect to the unemployment rate when typical job-level
measures are employee sample means, rather than median values. Qualitatively the
results are unchanged: wages for hires and job stayers exhibit a sizeable and significant
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cyclical response, as do hiring hours, though the difference in wage response between
hires and job stayers is larger. We prefer the median as a measure of the typical wage
because it is less sensitive to changes in the extent of sampling error within jobs over
time, given our specific sample selection criteria for jobs. The third row removes
all controls for time-varying job characteristics from the first step. In doing so we
would expect to underestimate the cyclical response of wages because of a procyclical
composition bias along some observable characteristics. However the results here
show that those observables that we do control for at the job level, namely gender,
union coverage, age and firm size, are collectively not important in this regard. The
fourth row includes jobs from the public sector. The main findings are qualitatively
unchanged. The hiring hours in public sector entry-level jobs were somewhat more
responsive to the Great Recession than in the private sector, potentially reflecting the
squeeze on labour costs imposed by fiscal austerity. The fifth row simply illustrates
the difference in results when we use an alternative price deflator. The RPI notably
includes the cost of housing, including mortgage interest payments, whereas the CPI
does not. Interest rates were cut during the Great Recession, and so the RPI is
itself more cyclical than the CPI. Hence the measured real RPI-wage cyclicality is
smaller, though still significant. We prefer the CPI because it is more internationally
comparable and is the basis of the Bank of England’s inflation target. The sixth row
includes other work-related payments in earnings and the derived hourly wage rate,
such as incentive or overtime pay. It similarly includes overtime and shift work in
hours worked. There are reasonable arguments why including these other payments
could lead to both increased or decreased wage responsiveness. Here their inclusion
has no significant effect, except for job stayers’ hours, suggesting that working hours
for employees with overtime and shift work are more responsive than standard working
hours.
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TABLE A.2: Estimated semi-elasticity of real wages and hours with respect to the
unemployment rate, 1998-2016: sample selection robustness - varying the minimum
number of employees per job-year required for inclusion in the CH-firms sample
Wages Hours
Min. hires New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
requirement (1) (2) (3) (4)
2 employees −2.93∗∗∗ −2.22∗∗ −1.73∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.74) (0.90) (0.54) (0.17)
3 (baseline) −2.83∗∗∗ −2.60∗∗ −1.47∗∗∗ −0.20
(0.87) (1.13) (0.42) (0.22)
4 −2.71∗∗∗ −2.44∗∗∗ −1.83∗∗∗ −0.16
(0.76) (0.91) (0.56) (0.13)
5 −2.72∗∗∗ −2.53∗∗∗ −1.43∗∗∗ −0.13
(0.77) (0.96) (0.51) (0.13)
6 −2.92∗∗∗ −2.18∗∗∗ −2.40∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗
(0.68) (0.81) (0.67) (0.18)
7 −2.94∗∗∗ −2.19∗∗ −2.23∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗
(0.70) (0.89) (0.55) (0.21)
8 −2.62∗∗∗ −2.24∗∗ −2.27∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗
(0.66) (0.94) (0.65) (0.22)
9 −2.54∗∗∗ −2.41∗∗ −2.75∗∗∗ −0.46
(0.62) (0.94) (0.81) (0.24)
10 −2.59∗∗∗ −1.96∗∗∗ −2.87∗∗∗ −0.48
(0.56) (0.74) (0.92) (0.27)
Notes.- second-step regression results of estimated period effects on unemployment rate, γ̂ .
Each row gives results varying the minimum number of employees per job-year required for
selection into the analysis sample. “3 (baseline)” is identical to Table 1.3, included here for
comparison.
Newey-West standard error estimates robust to first-order serial correlation in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
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TABLE A.3: Estimated semi-elasticity of the difference in β̂t series between new hires
and job stayers with respect to the unemployment rate, 1998-2016
Difference wages Difference hours
Baseline sample 0.24 −1.38∗∗
(0.32) (0.36)
Table 3
2. Including controls for −0.19 −0.57
share of full-time workers (0.31) (0.32)
3. Job hires in at least 25% of −0.16 −0.27
years when the firm is observed (0.36) (0.29)
4. All jobs observed 0.41 −0.31
in at least 2 years (0.41) (0.20)
5. Baseline sample, but weighted −0.27 −2.29∗∗
by number of employees per year (0.49) (0.81)
Table 4
2. Baseline with −0.37 −1.29∗∗∗
quadratic trend (0.17) (0.37)
3. First differences (OLS) 0.20 0.31
(0.52) (1.09)
4. Baseline sample, but weighted −0.29 −1.38∗∗∗
by number of jobs per years (0.28) (0.43)
Table 5
1. Labour productivity (I) −0.12∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
whole economy (0.05) (0.09)
2. Labour productivity (II) −0.14∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
services sector (0.05) (0.09)
Notes.- second-step regression results of estimated period effects on unemployment rate, γ̂ .
Dependent variable is the difference in composition-adjusted period means, β̂t , between new
hires and job stayers.
Newey-West standard error estimates robust to first-order serial correlation in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Statistically significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
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Appendix A.3 Additional tables
TABLE A.4: Distribution of new hires over industries, all years 1998-2016
Industry (SIC2003) Hires Share
Wholesale and retail (52) 26,792 0.49
Accommodation and restaurants (55) 9,842 0.18
Financial intermediation (65) 3,821 0.06
Industrial cleaning and labour recruitment (74) 9,295 0.17
Other 5,467 0.10
Notes.- absolute and frequency distribution of new hires over industries. Shares might not sum
to one due to rounding. Classification according to the ONS Standard Industrial Classification
2003.
TABLE A.5: Distribution of new hires over occupations, all years 1998-2016
Occupation (ISCO88) Hires Share
Customer services clerks (41) 5,468 0.10
Personal and protective services workers (51) 6,561 0.12
Models, salespersons and demonstrators (52) 26,245 0.48
Sales and services elementary (91) 8,202 0.15
Labourers in mining, construction, 2,734 0.05
manufacturing and transport (93)
Other 5,467 0.10
Notes.- absolute and frequency distribution of new hires over occupations. Shares might
not sum to one due to rounding. Classification according to the ILO International Standard
Classification of Occupations 1988.
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TABLE A.6: Estimated period-fixed effects for real hourly wages (β̂t from first-step
regressions)
CH-firms ASHE
New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1998 −0.103 −0.084 −0.075 −0.093
1999 −0.087 −0.071 −0.083 −0.077
2000 −0.087 −0.051 −0.081 −0.052
2001 −0.046 −0.036 −0.044 −0.026
2002 −0.011 −0.005 −0.018 −0.007
2003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2004 0.006 −0.002 0.009 0.003
2005 0.022 0.015 0.024 0.018
2006 0.017 0.027 0.033 0.021
2007 0.031 0.023 0.033 0.019
2008 0.003 0.020 0.020 0.011
2009 0.023 0.017 0.020 −0.009
2010 −0.010 −0.022 −0.009 −0.050
2011 −0.054 −0.062 −0.033 −0.078
2012 −0.079 −0.099 −0.063 −0.114
2013 −0.087 −0.124 −0.074 −0.134
2014 −0.089 −0.136 −0.087 −0.144
2015 −0.069 −0.116 −0.069 −0.130
2016 −0.021 −0.088 −0.015 −0.112
Notes.- time series of period-fixed effects for different subsamples of the ASHE. Estimated
using (1.1) and (1.3). Normalised to zero in 2003. (1) Entry-level new hires, (2) job stayers in
CH-firms (3) ASHE new hires, (4) ASHE job stayers.
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TABLE A.7: Estimated period-fixed effects for basic weekly hours worked (β̂t from
first-step regressions)
CH-firms ASHE
New hires Job stayers New hires Job stayers
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1998 0.063 0.004 0.014 −0.005
1999 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003
2000 0.040 0.007 0.001 −0.001
2001 0.018 0.004 0.005 0.001
2002 0.021 0.002 −0.003 −0.001
2003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2004 0.003 −0.002 0.015 0.001
2005 −0.010 −0.010 −0.018 −0.011
2006 −0.027 −0.009 −0.015 −0.011
2007 0.016 0.005 −0.012 −0.013
2008 −0.052 0.010 −0.008 −0.011
2009 −0.053 0.003 −0.024 −0.017
2010 −0.059 0.003 −0.040 −0.015
2011 −0.131 −0.004 −0.049 −0.015
2012 −0.139 −0.009 −0.053 −0.016
2013 −0.154 −0.006 −0.048 −0.012
2014 −0.129 0.004 −0.046 −0.008
2015 −0.132 0.005 −0.051 −0.006
2016 −0.119 0.007 −0.062 −0.008
Notes.- see Table A.6
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TABLE A.8: Time series of price deflators and business cycle indicators
Labour prod. Labour prod.
Year CPI RPI SPPI whole economy services sector
1998 95.56 92.48 97.58 90.62 91.73
1999 97.04 93.96 96.08 93.00 94.26
2000 97.58 96.78 95.97 95.99 96.37
2001 98.66 98.52 98.27 98.26 98.36
2002 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2003 101.48 103.10 101.61 102.60 101.94
2004 102.69 105.68 103.34 105.67 104.52
2005 104.57 109.06 104.72 106.59 105.27
2006 106.72 111.89 108.06 109.46 108.60
2007 109.68 116.93 110.94 110.76 110.12
2008 112.90 121.84 115.09 112.34 111.79
2009 115.59 120.38 113.59 110.38 110.29
2010 119.89 126.76 115.67 109.80 109.88
2011 123.92 133.35 116.94 111.32 110.68
2012 123.03 138.02 117.86 112.15 111.48
2013 132.12 142.02 118.78 110.99 111.35
2014 134.54 145.57 120.51 110.65 110.87
2015 134.27 146.88 120.97 111.65 111.90
2016 134.68 148.79 122.81 112.42 112.62
Notes.- “CPI” - Consumer Price Index; “RPI” - Retail Price Index; “SPPI” - Services Producer
Price Index; “Labour prod. whole economy” - chain volume measure of gross value added at
basic prices in the UK; “Labour prod. services sector” - chain volume measure of gross value
added at basic prices in services industries.
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TABLE A.9: Estimated hiring-year-tenure-fixed effects for real wages and hours
relative to their hiring levels: workers who stay in entry-level jobs
Wages Hours
Hiring year 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
2002 1.79 4.40 7.35 1.60 2.78 1.66
(0.51) (0.62) (0.73) (1.11) (1.35) (1.59)
2003 −0.09 2.63 6.68 0.80 2.62 2.09
(0.60) (0.73) (0.87) (1.30) (1.59) (1.88)
2004 2.07 7.13 8.61 0.91 2.79 0.95
(0.54) (0.67) (0.81) (1.17) (1.46) (1.76)
2005 4.86 6.89 8.78 1.37 0.46 3.54
(0.48) (0.61) (0.74) (1.04) (1.33) (1.60)
2006 2.26 2.67 4.53 −0.52 2.63 1.67
(0.52) (0.67) (0.84) (1.14) (1.45) (1.82)
2007 2.44 5.66 4.27 1.40 2.25 3.40
(0.51) (0.67) (0.77) (1.10) (1.45) (1.66)
2008 4.85 4.00 4.12 −1.20 2.08 2.13
(0.49) (0.59) (0.68) (1.06) (1.27) (1.48)
2009 −0.20 0.28 −0.80 1.25 3.55 4.72
(0.47) (0.59) (0.79) (1.02) (1.28) (1.72)
2010 1.11 −0.35 −0.37 0.98 1.06 3.20
(0.54) (0.74) (0.90) (1.17) (1.61) (1.96)
2011 −1.24 −1.65 −0.18 1.64 6.04 9.88
(0.53) (0.67) (0.82) (1.16) (1.46) (1.78)
2012 −0.39 1.17 5.79 4.63 8.28 14.64
(0.51) (0.67) (0.86) (1.11) (1.45) (1.86)
2013 3.04 7.70 14.30 8.75 16.35 18.46
(0.54) (0.72) (0.94) (1.17) (1.55) (2.04)
Notes.- see Section 1.5, Figure 1.6. Ordinary least squares standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix A.4 Additional figures
FIGURE A.1: Characteristics of employees in the consistent-hiring-firms sample and
whole ASHE: comparison of new hires in entry-level jobs vs. job stayers, 1998-2016
Notes.- shaded area marks official UK recession dates. “Hires in sample firms" refers to
employees in entry-level jobs with less than twelve months tenure. “Job stayers in sample
firms" are for jobs and employees who have more than 12 months tenure in the same job, and
only for firms which are represented in the CH-firms sample. “All hires” and “All job stayers”
show the corresponding series for new hires and job stayers in the ASHE, estimated as averages
at the worker level. Ages 16-64 only.
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FIGURE A.2: Comparison of business cycle indicators, 1998-2016
Notes.- see Section 1.2 and Table 1.5 for sources. Shaded area marks official UK
recession dates.
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FIGURE A.3: Estimated period-fixed effects for real wages, 1998-2016: comparison
of entry-level jobs, all new hires, job stayers in the CH-firms sample, and all job-stayers
Notes.- see Figure A.2 and Section 1.2 for further details of sample construction. “All” here
refers to all firms and jobs represented in the ASHE. Shaded area marks official UK recession
dates.
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FIGURE A.4: Estimated period-fixed effects for hours worked, 1998-2016:
comparison of entry-level jobs, all new hires, job stayers in the CH-firms sample, and
all job-stayers
Notes.- see Figure A.2 and Section 1.2 for further details of sample construction. “All” here
refers to all firms and jobs represented in the ASHE. Shaded area marks official UK recession
dates.
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FIGURE A.5: Estimated period-fixed effects for real wages including linear
trend, 1998-2016: comparison of new hires in entry-level jobs vs. job stayers
Notes.- see Figure 1.2, except here the series are not adjusted for linear trends. 2003
normalised to zero.
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Appendix A.5 Nominal wage changes of job stayers in CH-firms
FIGURE A.6: Distribution of year-to-year changes in log nominal hourly wages for
job stayers in CH-firms, 2005-06 and 2009-10
Notes.- solid line marks zero, dashed line marks the log change in the Consumer Price Index.
Bars show half-open intervals, excluding the upper limit. Ages 16-64, private sector only.
123
APPENDIX A SECTION A.5
TABLE A.10: Percentage of job stayers with year-to-year change in log nominal
hourly wages in given category, 1997-2016
Percentage of log nominal wage change in given category
Nominal Real
Years [−.01;0) Exactly 0 (0; .01] wage cut wage cut Inflation
1997-98 2.6 1.1 2.6 36.1 41.8 1.8
1998-99 1.7 0.9 2.2 22.8 27.2 1.5
1999-00 2.7 1.5 3.2 22.0 25.3 0.6
2000-01 2.5 1.4 2.8 18.0 22.5 1.1
2001-02 2.0 2.1 2.8 20.1 26.1 1.3
2002-03 2.9 0.7 3.5 23.7 29.2 1.5
2003-04 2.6 0.5 2.9 34.5 38.4 1.2
2004-05 2.6 0.8 3.3 20.0 27.5 1.8
2005-06 2.4 0.7 3.9 17.1 27.2 2.0
2006-07 2.4 1.7 3.2 21.7 37.2 2.7
2007-08 2.8 1.7 3.5 17.9 37.0 2.9
2008-09 3.4 2.9 4.2 20.1 34.3 2.4
2009-10 4.7 5.7 7.9 26.8 69.2 3.7
2010-11 3.8 3.7 5.7 24.5 61.2 3.3
2011-12 4.4 4.4 5.4 24.8 66.7 4.0
2012-13 3.8 4.3 5.3 24.7 55.8 2.4
2013-14 3.2 3.2 5.6 24.3 40.4 1.8
2014-15 2.7 1.5 4.7 18.9 18.0 -0.2
2015-16 3.2 2.4 4.3 25.9 29.6 0.3
Notes.- share of job stayers in CH-firms with log nominal wage changes in the indicated
interval. Inflation is computed as average log change in CPI over previous four quarters.
Nominal wage changes of job stayers in the UK have been analysed previously
by Nickell and Quintini (2003) and most recently by Elsby et al. (2016). We briefly
summarise results for year-to-year changes in the log nominal wages of job stayers in
our baseline sample of firms. Figure A.6 shows the distributions of log changes for job
stayers between 2005-06 and 2009-10. These two periods are representative of periods
with relatively low (2005-06) and relatively high (2009-10) shares of job stayers with
nominal wage cuts, see Table A.10 which displays summary statistics for all years in
our sample. The dashed line marks the inflation rate in the histograms. Bars in the
histograms exclude upper limits, so log wage changes of exactly zero are included in
the bin to the right of the solid line.
The spike at zero is relatively small during normal times, ranging from 0.5 per cent
to 2.1 per cent in the period before the Great Recession as Table A.10 shows. The
distribution in panel A also suggests that most wages increase with the rate of inflation
during normal times, thus keeping the real wage constant. Nevertheless, even during
this period a notable share of job stayers, around 20 per cent, experienced nominal
wage cuts. This share increased during the recession to around 25 per cent on average.
Similarly, the share of job stayers with exactly zero nominal wage growth peaked at
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5.7 per cent between 2009-10. In particular, Figure A.6B displays a relatively large
share of nominal wage changes between zero and two per cent for job stayers in
CH-firms between 2009-10. However, the large increase in the percentage of job
stayers which experienced negative changes in log real wages, as shown in the last
column of Table A.10, was mainly caused by the rise in inflation.
These findings suggest that zero is a significant threshold for nominal wage changes
and limited the downward adjustment of nominal wages, as Nickell and Quintini
(2003) argue, but on average more than 20 per cent of job stayers experience nominal
wage cuts in the UK, suggesting that there is a relatively high degree of nominal wage
flexibility in the British labour market. Nevertheless, the increase in inflation during
the Great Recession resulted in over two-thirds of job stayers seeing their real wages
cut.
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Appendix A.6 Description of the kernel re-weighting method
This section describes the method of DiNardo et al. (1996), which we use to estimate
the counterfactual densities of real hiring wages: the exposition here follows closely
theirs.
Let f i(w|x;mi) be the density of real hiring wages in period i, conditional on
observable attributes x and the real minimum wage mi. The density of observed
attributes in period i is h(x|t = i). The observed densities of real hiring wages in two
periods, say 2004 (i = 04) and 2013 (i = 13), are
g(w|t = 04;m04) =
∫
Ωx
f 04(w|x;m04)h(x|t = 04)dx , (A.1)
and
g(w|t = 13;m13) =
∫
Ωx
f 13(w|x;m13)h(x|t = 13)dx , (A.2)
where Ωx is the domain of observed attributes. Differences in attributes at the
job-level between the two periods are captured by the density functions h(x|t = 04)
and h(x|t = 13). Differences in the “price” paid for these attributes are captured by
differences in f 04(w|x;m04) and f 13(w|x;m13), and these differences can depend on
the real minimum wage.
The counterfactual density of real hiring wages that would prevail if the level of
the real minimum wage of 2004 was realised in 2013, and prices had remained at their
2013 level, is
g(w|t = 13;m04) =
∫
Ωx
f 13(w|x;m04)h(x|t = 13)dx , (A.3)
where we know h(x|t = 13), but the density of prices f 13(w|x;m04), consisting of the
real wage schedule of 2013 and the real minimum wage of 2004, is unobserved. We
can partition the density in (A.3) into the part of real wages below the real value of the
minimum wage in 2013 and the part of real wages above this threshold:
g(w|t = 13;m04) =
∫
Ωx




I(w≤ m13) f 13(w|x;m04)h(x|t = 13)dx , (A.4)
where I(w ≤ m13) is an indicator function that equals one if the observed wage is at
or below the level of the real minimum wage in 2013. We follow DiNardo et al. and
make quite restrictive economic assumptions, but because of this restrictiveness, they
are also transparent.
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Assumption 1 Between two periods i = {L,H} with mL < mH , the conditional density
of hiring wages above the real value of the minimum wage mH is not affected by the
minimum wage:
[1− I(w≤ mH)] f i(w|x;mH) = [1− I(w≤ mH)] f i(w|x;mL) . (A.5)
This is a conservative assumption, and we later conduct a sensitivity analysis where we
allow the minimum wage to affect the wage density above its real value. Our results
vary with the size of this spillover effect, but not substantially.
Assumption 2 The shape of the conditional density at or below the minimum wage
depends only on the real value of the minimum wage. Thus, the conditional density in
i = L below mH is proportional to the conditional density in i = H below mH:
I(w≤ mH) f H(w|x;mL) = I(w≤ mH)ψw f L(w|x;mL) , (A.6)
where the re-weighting function ψw will be defined below.
With this assumption we can regard the density in 2004 below the real value of the
2013 minimum wage as the latent hiring wage distribution, conditional on observable
attributes x. Without a structural model, it is not possible to impute the wage schedule
below the real minimum wage in 2013 without making strong assumptions like
Assumption 2, but we think this assumption is at least relatively transparent. The
last assumption necessary to derive a counterfactual hiring wage density is:
Assumption 3 The level of the minimum wage can affect the number of new hires, but
has no effect on the number of entry-level jobs.
This assumption is weaker than the corresponding one originally made by DiNardo
et al. (1996), who assumed that the level of the minimum wage does not affect the
level of employment.
We illustrate the method in Figure A.7, which shows estimated densities of real
hiring wages (we pool data over multiple periods in Figures A.7 and A.8 for data
confidentiality reasons). The kernel density estimate in the top panel uses pooled
data from 2002-04, a period where the NMW was relatively less binding. The solid
vertical line shows the real value of the NMW at its 2013 level. Panel B shows the
corresponding density for 2012-14, where the real NMW remained nearly constant
around its 2013 value. The counterfactual density displayed in panel C is a simple
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combination of the part of the density to the left of the solid line in panel A and to the
right of the solid line in Panel B, scaled to integrate to one.
Increasing the assumed spillover of the NMW acts as if shifting the NMW in
panels A-C to the right: the area of the density below the new threshold, consisting
of the NMW plus spillover, will increase. This means that a larger part of the 2012-14
density will be replaced by the 2002-04 density. In the extreme case that the NMW
plus spillover exceeds the highest measured job-level hiring wage in 2012-14, the
counterfactual density would fully consist of the estimated density in 2002-04.
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FIGURE A.7: Illustration of the re-weighting procedure for
log real hourly hiring wages
Notes.- densities estimated using Gaussian kernel and bandwidth of 0.03
(A) and 0.02 (B-C). Monetary values deflated to 1998 values using the
CPI. Solid lines show the real value of the adult rate minimum wage in
2013.
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Figure A.8D plots the estimated (connected circles) and counterfactual (solid line)
density for 2012-14 together. Most of this mass originates from jobs which are
observed to hire slightly above the NMW, a result of the smoothing by the kernel
estimator. For hiring wages which exceed the NMW substantially, the estimated and
counterfactual density are, as expected, indistinguishable. Figure A.8E displays the
difference between the estimated and counterfactual wage densities shown in Panel D
of this figure. The difference is negative for values around the value of the NMW in
2013 and positive for log hiring wages between ln(4) and ln(4.6).
Assumptions 1-3 allow us to write
g(w|t = 13;m04) =[1− I(w≤ m13)] f 13(w|x;m04)dx
I(w≤ m13)ψw f 04(w|x;m04)dx , (A.7)
with
ψw =
Pr(w≤ m13|x, f = f 13)
Pr(w≤ m13|x, f = f 04)
, (A.8)
which ensures that the density integrates to one over the distribution of attributes.
The counterfactual real hiring wage density is found by integrating over the observed
distribution of attributes:
g(w|t = 13;m04) =
∫
Ωx




I(w≤ m13)ψw f 04(w|x;m04)h(x|t = 13)dx . (A.9)
The key insight of DiNardo et al. is that the wage density that would result from
combining the wage schedule in 2004, f 04(w|x;m04), and the marginal distribution of
attributes, h(x|t = 13), can be obtained by taking the observed density of attributes in
2004, h(x|t = 04), and re-weighting it to reflect differences between the two periods.
Let this re-weighting function be denoted θ , then
g(w|t = 13;m04) =
∫
Ωx




I(w≤ m13)ψw f 04(w|x;m04)θh(x|t = 04)dx , (A.10)
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FIGURE A.8: Estimated and counterfactual densities of real log hiring wages at the
job-level, 2012-14
Notes.- densities estimated using Gaussian kernel and bandwidth of 0.02. Monetary values deflated to
1998 values using the CPI. Solid vertical line shows the real value of the adult rate minimum wage.
The last equality follows from Bayes’ rule. We combine the two re-weighting functions
to
ψ = θ ·ψw =
Pr(t = 13|x,w≤ m13)
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We estimate the probability of a job being below the NMW in 2013, conditional on
its observed attributes parametrically, using a logit model
Pr(t = 13|x,w≤ m13) = Λ(C(x)) , (A.13)
with C(x) being a vector that is a function of the covariates x. The covariates are:
one-digit industry dummies, a cubic in age and firm size, and the shares of workers that
are female, full-time, permanent, and covered by a collectively bargaining agreement.
We then compute estimates of ψ̂ for each observation, and use these weights in the
kernel density estimation to derive the counterfactual density of real hiring wages in
2013. In particular, the weight equals one if an observation is above the NMW in 2013,
it equals zero if the observation is below the NMW in 2013, and the weight equals ψ̂ j
if an observation j in the pooled data is from 2004 and from the section of the density








We take a first order Taylor approximation around the deterministic steady-state
values of θ and y, θ̄ and ȳ = 1 respectively, approximating the right and the left hand

















(θt− θ̄) =(1−β )(ȳ−b)+(1−β )(yet+1− ȳ)











= (1−β )(ȳ−b)+ (1−λ )c
q(θ̄)
− θ̄βc
must hold in equilibrium according to (2.20), this steady-state condition can be
subtracted from both sides of the approximated equation. Then solving explicitly for
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which can be simplified to the form given in the text, (2.21), with coefficients


















B.1.2 Determinacy of the REE
The operator Et denotes mathematical expectations formed at period t. The
linearised dynamics of output (2.22) can be substituted into (2.21) by noting under
RE that Etyt+1 = (1−ρ)+ρyt ;








A REE of the system (2.22) and (B.3) is a stochastic process for θt that satisfies this
system with Etθt+1 = θ et+1. To see this possibility, note that (B.3) can be written
in ARMA(1,1) form by iterating (B.3) forward by one period, and subsequently
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+ ψ̃−12 θt−1 +d1εt +d2ηt ,
(B.4)
with d1 and d2 being arbitrary parameters, and ηt := Et [θt+1]− Et−1[θt+1] being a
martingale difference sequence with Et [ηt+1] = 0 by the law of iterated expectations.
No restrictions are imposed on d1 or d2, since RE formed according to (B.4) regarding
θt+1 are unaffected by those parameters. Therefore there is a continuum of possible
solutions to (B.4). Evans and Honkapohja (1986) have shown that any finite degree
ARMA solution of an equation in the form of (B.3) can at most be ARMA(1,1), and
the particular form of (B.4) nests all possible ARMA solutions of finite degree. The
ARMA class of solutions is stable if |ψ2|> 1, and is unstable for |ψ2|< 1.
. In this case the solution to (2.21) and (2.22) is the fundamental or
minimal-state-variable (MSV) solution; it is impossible to delete any state variable
from the minimum set and still obtain solutions to (2.22) and (B.3) for all permitted
parameter values (McCallum, 1983). The MSV solution here is guessed to be
B.1.3 ARMA(1,1) and the MSV solution














with L denoting the lag operator such that Lxt = xt−1. The parameters d1 and d2 can be
chosen arbitrarily. In particular, to obtain the MSV solution θt = A+Byt−1 +Cεt one
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Therefore, to derive an MSV solution from a broader the class of ARMA(1,1)























which corresponds to the condition for stable ARMA(1,1) solutions. Otherwise, the
MSV solution cannot be derived from the class of unstable ARMA(1,1) solutions, and
is instead the only stable solution.














where we have assumed that ψ̃2 6= 1 and ψ̃2ρ 6= 1.
B.1.4 Global convergence
Given the model discussed here has a unique equilibrium, and satisfies the
assumptions of Evans and Honkapohja (1998) that guarantee global convergence, we
simply apply their Theorem 2 to the recursive learning algorithm given by (2.29) and
(2.31).
For Rt , using Eztz
′
t = Mz, where Mz is some positive definite matrix, taking




which is globally asymptotically stable and independent of xt .
It is possible that for some t Rt may not be invertible, though this will happen only
a finite number of times with probability 1. We modify the algorithm for xt to
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where u(R) is a bounded regular function from the space of 2x2 matrices to the
subspace of positive definite matrices such that u(R) = R−1 in the neighbourhood of
Mz. Then taking expectations the ODE is given by
dx
dτ
= u(R)Mz(T (Â, B̂)− (A,B))
′
(B.11)
= u(R)Mz(ψ2−1)((Â, B̂)− (A,B))
′
. (B.12)
Given that the other requirements of the theorem are trivially satisfied, then it applies,
and this differential equation is clearly globally asymptotically stable for ψ2 < 1, and
this stability is exponential; (Â, B̂)→ (A,B) globally almost surely.







































f jηt+1− j. (B.13)






























f j+1, j = 0, ..., l−1, fl = 0. (B.20)
Since (B.14) - (B.20) describes a non-linear system of differential equations, we first
have to linearise (B.13) to study stability properties. However, the subsystem (B.18) is
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independent of the other equations and can be analysed separately. The eigenvalues of
the Jacobian of T (c)−c at the REE values c j = 0 for j = 1, ...,r are found to be r times
repeatedly equal to −1 and therefore the subsystem (B.18) will converge towards the
REE values. Due to the convergence of c it is apparent that d (apart from d0) and f will
also converge to their REE values of vectors of zeros. Moreover, b j = 0 for j = 2, ...,s
is easily verified to be the values towards which the economy under learning converges.
Finally, convergence of a, b1 and d0 are studied by analysing the Jacobian of the system
(B.14)-(B.16). If this Jacobian has eigenvalues strictly less than unity, then the whole
system is E-stable. It can easily be verified that the eigenvalues are ψ2 and ψ2ρ .
B.1.6 A non-steady-state PLM
The system defined as (2.38)-(2.40), linearised around steady-state values v̄, n̄, ȳ =
1 has derived parameter values as follows,
κ0 = (1−κ2) θ̄ − ȳκ1,
κ1 =











φ0 = αq(θ̄)(v̄+ θ̄ n̄),
φ1 = (1−λ )−αθq(θ̄),
φ2 = q(θ̄)(1−α).
Given the PLM (2.41), agents form expectations according to
vet+1 = Ât + B̂t [(1−ρ)+ρyt ]+Ĉtnt , (B.21)
and the ALM is given by
































Given the mapping T̃ defined in the main text, the REE is E-stable if all the eigenvalues




whereby the second condition implies the validity of the first. Therefore, we need to
check for what range of parameter values of the model the second condition is true.
Writing out the term κ̃2 and rearranging, we see that the required condition is
δ
[












Given that κ̃2 ≥ ψ2, if the E-stability condition holds with this alternative PLM, then
convergence will be slower. For the complete range of possible model parameters,
this condition does not hold. As realistic levels of λ are small, the condition would
be sensitive to assumed parameter values of β and α . For example, given α > β > 0,
which is the case of low worker bargaining power, whereby wages are reduced towards
the value of the outside option, and there is excessive firm entry, or inefficiently high
according to the Hosios (1990) condition, it is more likely E-stability will not hold.
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Appendix B.2 Parametrisation of the model
We normalise average productivity to be one. For the productivity process we
estimate an AR(1) in log deviations from trend output per worker, dynamically
de-trended using the HP filter with standard quarterly smoothing parameter, and find
an auto-regressive parameter ρ for the period of 0.84, and a standard deviation for the
shocks σε of 0.0063 (assuming them to be normally distributed). For the labour market,
we parametrise the model to the unemployment rate, measured as the fraction of the
economically active population aged 16 and over who are ILO unemployed. We use
official quarterly time series from Office for National Statistics (ONS) Labour Market
Statistics. For transition rates between labour market states we use the flows time series
similarly published by ONS, which are derived from the Two-quarter Longitudinal
Labour Force Survey and are consistent with all stocks series. The economy we
describe has two states. In reality there is a third: economic inactivity. To adhere
to our interpretation of ut as the unemployment rate, abstracting from the relative
size of the inactive population over the business cycle, as is common in the literature
(Shimer, 2005; Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008), we must carefully construct from the
raw data measures of job finding and separation rates. In the notation of the model, the





As per Smith (2011), using three-state flows data between the stocks in employment,
unemployment and inactivity, denoted by {E,U, I}, with transition rates, for example











pIUt + pIEt︸ ︷︷ ︸
θtq(θt)
. (B.26)
As such, the separation rate from real data which is consistent with the model described
here is the sum of the direct transition rate from employment to unemployment and a
term which captures the indirect role of transitions to unemployment via inactivity -
with a similar interpretation for the job finding rate.
Using this measure of the hiring rate from the transition rates data, we estimate
the parameters of the aggregate matching function using least squares as follows for
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where data for vt come from the quarterly ONS aggregate vacancies series, and ut is
the UK national unemployment rate. Following Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013), we
consider time trends in the estimation to account for the endogeneity of unobserved
shifts in the matching efficiency with the number of vacancies that firms open, but
these all drop out. We also carry out tests that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas,
and reject the alternative. In line with the existing literature, we find that the data
suggests the matching function has decreasing returns to scale, although we proceed
as though it is constant (see Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001) for a thorough review
of estimates of the aggregate matching function). We find estimates of α = 0.67 and
µ = 0.56. For the constant separation rate parameter in the model, over the same period




λ = 0.023. (In practice we regress the data on a constant and cubic trend to account
for low frequency shifts for the short period in question, then selecting the estimated
constant as the parameter value - we similarly do this when estimating moments of the
labour market variables presented in Table 2.2). The discount factor is set as δ = 0.99,
and to restrict the number of free parameters we let the bargaining power adhere to
the Hosios (1990) condition, β = α = 0.67. We set the flow value of unemployment
to 0.8. How to select or estimate appropriate values of both the bargaining power and
the flow value of unemployment are open to debate. Shimer (2005) and subsequently
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) are often considered in the literature as more extreme
examples for parametrisations, and highlight how this affects the ability of the model
to match the observed volatility of unemployment and vacancy creation. With the
relatively arbitrary parametrisation applied here, we are somewhere in between these
two examples. The remaining parameter, the flow vacancy cost c, is chosen to match
the observed level of average labour market tightness over the period, as displayed in
Table 2.2 and as used to estimate the parameters of the matching function.
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Appendix B.3 Additional figures
FIGURE B1: Simulation of the equilibrium of the stochastic model with the
assumption of rational expectations: the REE
Note.- The simulation here is identical to that described under decreasing gain learning for Figure 2.2.
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FIGURE B2: Simulation of the equilibrium of the stochastic model with the
assumption of rational expectations: the REE
Note.- The simulation here is identical to that described under decreasing gain learning for Figure 2.2.
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FIGURE B3: Convergence of agents’ parameter estimates under decreasing gain
learning to the REE values
Note.- The simulation here is identical to that described under decreasing gain learning for Figure 2.2.
Dashed lines give the true REE parameter values.
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FIGURE B4: Comparison of sample paths for endogenous variables under RE and
decreasing gain learning, and agents’ parameter estimates, following a structural shock
Note.- these simulation paths are the results of a negative 20% shock to the flow value of unemployment
b, with initial parameter estimates assumed to be at the true pre-shock REE values.
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FIGURE B5: Comparison of sample paths for endogenous variables under RE and
decreasing gain learning, and agents’ parameter estimates, following a structural shock
Note.- these simulation paths are the results of a negative 20% shock to the flow value of unemployment
b, with initial parameter estimates assumed to be at the true pre-shock REE values.
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FIGURE B6: Comparing the speed of convergence to the REE under decreasing gain
learning: changing worker bargaining power β
Note.- given β = 0.1, then ψ2 = 0.91. For β = α , ψ2 = 0.57, as in Figure 2.2. The crossing of the time
paths indicates a decreased speed of convergence since, for example, the REE parameter value with
β = 0.1 of B = 0.56 is substantially lower than value with β = α .
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Measuring sectoral income shares:
Accounting for input-output
structures across countries
Appendix C.1 Data sources for Net Operating Surplus
This section provides information on the sources of the Net Operating Surplus (NOPS)
data at the industry level. Further, the assumptions made in cases of missing data for
individual industries or years on a country basis are stated. The data is obtained from
two main sources: the OECD’s Database for Structural Analysis (STAN) and National
Accounts Aggregates by Industry from Eurostat.1 For some countries for which no
data on NOPS is available in these two databases, data from national statistics agencies
have been collected.
STAN is based on OECD countries’ Annual National Accounts By Activity tables
and uses national industrial surveys and census data to estimate any missing detail. The
latest version of STAN is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification
of all economic activities, revision 4 (ISIC Rev. 4). However, due to the larger coverage
of countries in the previous version, STAN based on ISIC Rev. 3 will be used, which
was last updated in May 2011. Since in the WIOD SEA industries are classified
according to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community (NACE) revision 1, NOPS industry data is linked between STAN and the
WIOD using correspondence tables from the United Nations Statistics Division. All
data in national currencies has been converted into U.S. Dollar using the exchange rates
1Source OECD’s STAN: https://stats.oecd.org/...STAN08BIS; accessed 04/12/14. Source Eurostat:
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/...lang=en; accessed 04/12/14.
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provided by the WIOD. Data on NOPS for the following countries is available from
OECD STAN: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and Slovenia. STAN data, combined with imputations which are listed
below, is also used for Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Korea, and Sweden.
Eurostat collects data from EU member states and also compiles data at the
industry level. The major data source for this are enterprise surveys, production
surveys and annual reports or business accounts from major companies. Eurostat’s
National Accounts Aggregates by Industry Database uses a different classification
system than the WIOD, namely NACE Rev. 2, and thus correspondence tables to
NACE Rev. 1, available from Eurostat, are used to allocate NOPS to industries in the
WIOD. The aggregate “Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related
products” needs to be split between NACE Rev. 1 codes 17t18 and 19. For this I use
value added shares from the WIOD. Complete data is available for Bulgaria, Cyprus,
France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and the United Kingdom.
Imputations, explained below, were made for Latvia, Malta, and Spain.
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden: NOPS for 2009 is imputed using
least squares projections on value added from simple regressions of NOPS on value
added for each individual industry between 1995-2008. Additionally for Sweden,
NOPS data on industries 60-63 is only available as aggregate prior to 2004. I allocate
this sum to industries by applying the 2004 shares in the following years. Korea: No
disaggregated data is available on sub-industries in trade (NACE 50-52) and transport
(NACE 60-63). I allocate these aggregates according to value added shares from the
WIOD. Latvia, and Spain: NOPS at the industry level for the period 1995-1999 is
imputed by applying the shares in total NOPS from 2000 in the previous years. Malta:
Only the aggregate value of NOPS for industries 62 (Air transport) and 64 (Postal
services and telecommunication) is available. This is allocated according to value
added shares from the WIOD. No data is available for category 23 (Coke and refined
petroleum products), so I set NOPS equal to value added in the WIOD.
Australia: NOPS data is obtained from the Australian System of National
Accounts - 5204.0, Tables 46 & 47.2 Industries between ANZSIC and the WIOD
are mapped according to the EU KLEMS correspondence table. Aggregate value of
“transport” is allocated to NACE 60-63 according to value added shares from the
WIOD. Russia: Agricultural labour income is based on Mincer-type regressions,
and for other industries, wages of employees are imputed for the self-employed
(Voskoboynikov, 2012). Data on NOPS is generally not available, thus Gross
2Available at http://www.abs.gov.au/...Document; accessed 01/06/15.
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Operating Surplus (GOPS), obtained from Rosstat, (only post 2001) for main sectors
is used instead. I allocate GOPS according to value added shares from the WIOD.
Prior to 2001 I use least squares projections on value added from the WIOD. USA:
The GDP-by-Industry accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) contain
information on mixed income at the industry-level for 1998-2009. Data for the years
1995-1997 is projected on value added from the WIOD by regressing mixed income
on industry level value added for 1998-2009. Further, only the aggregate of NACE
50 and 51 is available. This value is allocated to its sub-categories using value added
shares from the WIOD.
For certain countries, no adjustments were made, because the data on labour
compensation from the WIOD is based on micro-level regressions which take into
account observable characteristics of the self-employed, obtained from additional
non-public data sources. These countries are Brazil, Canada, China, Indonesia,
India, Japan, and Taiwan.
Appendix C.2 Industry and commodity classifications
Expenditure on products (goods as well as services) in the WIOD is classified
according to the 2008 version of the statistical classification of products by activity
(CPA) in the European Economic Community.3 The sub-categories j ∈ G which
belong to the goods sector are: Products of agriculture, hunting and related services
(1), Products of forestry, logging and related services (2), Fish and other fishing
products; services incidental of fishing (5), Coal and lignite; peat (10), Crude
petroleum and natural gas; services incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding
surveying (11), Uranium and thorium ores (12), Metal ores (13), Other mining and
quarrying products (14), Food products and beverages (15), Tobacco products (16),
Textiles (17), Wearing apparel; furs (18), Leather and leather products (19), Wood
and products of wood and cork (except furniture); articles of straw and plaiting
materials (20), Pulp, paper and paper products (21), Printed matter and recorded
media (22), Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels (23), Chemicals,
chemical products and man-made fibres (24), Rubber and plastic products (25), Other
non-metallic mineral products (26), Basic metals (27), Fabricated metal products,
except machinery and equipment (28), Machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29), Office
machinery and computers (30), Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (31), Radio,
television and communication equipment and apparatus (32), Medical, precision and
optical instruments, watches and clocks (33), Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
(34), Other transport equipment (35), Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c.
3Source: http://ec.europa.eu/.../cpa-2008; accessed 13/04/16.
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(36), Secondary raw materials (37), Electrical energy, gas, steam and hot water (40),
Collected and purified water, distribution services of water (41), and Construction work
(45).
The sub-categories j ∈ S which belong to the services sector are: Trade,
maintenance and repair services of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of
automotive fuel (50), Wholesale trade and commission trade services, except of
motor vehicles and motorcycles (51), Retail trade services, except of motor vehicles
and motorcycles; repair services of personal and household goods (52), Hotel and
restaurant services (55), Land transport; transport via pipeline services (60), Water
transport services (61), Air transport services (62), Supporting and auxiliary transport
services; travel agency services (63), Post and telecommunication services (64),
Financial intermediation services, except insurance and pension funding services (65),
Insurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social security services
(66), Services auxiliary to financial intermediation (67), Real estate services (70),
Renting services of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and
household goods (71), Computer and related services (72), Research and development
services (73), Other business services (74), Public administration and defence services;
compulsory social security services (75), Education services (80), Health and social
work services (85), Sewage and refuse disposal services, sanitation and similar services
(90), Membership organisation services n.e.c. (91), Recreational, cultural and sporting
services (92), Other services (93), Private households with employed persons (95).
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TABLE C.1: Classification of industries in the WIOD into the goods and services
sector
Goods Services
Industry Code Industry Code
Agr., forestry & fishing AtB Motor veh. & fuel trade 50
Mining & quarrying C Wholesale trade 51
Food, bever. & tobacco 15t16 Retail trade 52
Textiles 17t18 Hotels & restaurants H
Leather & footwear 19 Land transport 60
Wood products 20 Water transport 61
Paper, printing & publ. 21t22 Air transport 62
Coke & refined petrol. 23 Transport services 63
Chemical products 24 Post & telecomm. 64
Rubber & plastics 25 Financial services J
Non-metal. mineral prod. 26 Real estate 70
Basic & fabric. metal 27t28 Business services 71t74
Other machinery 29 Government L
Electr. & optical equip. 30t33 Education M
Transport equip. 34t35 Health N
Other manufacturing 36t37 Other services O
Utilities E Households w/ empl. pers. P
Construction F
Notes.- industries included in the goods and services sector. The codes in the WIOD follow the
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Rev. 3 of the
United Nations. Source: http://unstats.un.org/.../regcst.asp?Cl=2; accessed 13/04/16.
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TABLE C.2: Allocation to the goods and services categories of the World Bank’s ICP
2005
Sector Description Code
Goods sector Food and non-alcoholic beverages 1101
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 1102
Clothing and footwear 1103
Housing, water, electricity, 1104
gas, and other fuels 1104
Furnishings, household equipment, 1105
and household maintenance
Miscellaneous goods and services 1112
Machinery and equipment 1501
Construction 1502
Other products 1503
Services sector Health 1106
Transport 1107
Communication 1108
Recreation and culture 1109
Education 1110
Restaurant and hotels 1111
Notes.- descriptions and codes of the World Bank’s ICP 2005. Categories and their associated
expenditure sector in the WIOD.
Appendix C.3 Decomposition: derivations
The difference between the labour income shares of country i and the US in sector




]−1− r′USLUSeUSz [V′USLUSeUSz]−1 . (C.1)
The difference operator ∆ is defined as ∆a = ai − aUS for any vector or matrix a.
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Gathering terms gives




+ S′izLUS(∆eiz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expenditure weights
. (C.2)
The vector (∆Siz)′ consists of the differences between industry level labour income
and value added in country i and the US, and weighting terms (see below). By post
multiplication of this vector with country i’s supply chain network and expenditure
weights, those differences are translated into changes of sectoral labour income shares
at the expenditure side and hence the effect of varying industry labour income shares,
while keeping all other things equal, can be measured in this way.
Similarly, (∆Li) is a matrix which captures the deviations in the supply chain
networks of country i and the US. Entries of this matrix equal zero whenever country i
and the US exhibit the same input-output linkages. For example, if a larger fraction of
the total supply of a certain commodity is produced by a particular industry in country
i than in the US, the entry of (∆Li) representing this industry-commodity combination
will be positive and equal to the difference in supply shares.
The last term refers to deviations of the expenditure vectors between country i
and the US, which means that it measures the effect that aggregation has on the
sectoral labour income shares. Each of the components in the above equation gives
the observed difference in labour income shares, if the other two components were
identical to the US values.




and, with a slight abuse of notation, the disparity between country i and the
corresponding US values is
(∆Siz)′ = (∆ri)′Xiz− (∆Vi)′Yiz. (C.4)














The weights Xiz and Yiz normalise the quantities of labour and total compensation by
the relative size of the compared economies, which is necessary since these values are
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not ratios. Note that varying labour income while holding capital income constant,
thus allowing value added to change, is an alternative of allocating the difference in
labour income across countries to the terms that form value added. Alternatively, one
could treat value added as fixed and vary only labour income while adjusting capital
income in an offsetting way to guarantee value added equals labour income plus capital
income. However, the latter method has an ambiguous interpretation as it only captures
differences in labour compensation and not in the labour income share. Once the above
terms are derived for each year during 1995-2009, the arithmetic average is computed
to arrive at the result of the decomposition shown in the main text.
Appendix C.4 Additional tables and figures
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TABLE C.3: Labour income shares, averages over 1995-2009
Aggregate economy Goods sector Services sector
AUS 0.547 0.488 0.584
AUT 0.586 0.574 0.594
BEL 0.598 0.592 0.602
BGR 0.460 0.451 0.468
BRA 0.520 0.480 0.545
CAN 0.579 0.547 0.602
CHN 0.484 0.491 0.471
CYP 0.541 0.512 0.551
CZE 0.509 0.504 0.515
DEU 0.596 0.638 0.566
DNK 0.637 0.609 0.652
ESP 0.578 0.574 0.581
EST 0.552 0.566 0.542
FIN 0.585 0.572 0.594
FRA 0.591 0.611 0.581
GBR 0.616 0.585 0.630
GRC 0.490 0.508 0.485
HUN 0.548 0.535 0.558
IDN 0.486 0.420 0.606
IND 0.527 0.515 0.543
IRL 0.527 0.461 0.590
ITA 0.522 0.528 0.519
JPN 0.507 0.532 0.492
KOR 0.557 0.543 0.570
LTU 0.478 0.466 0.486
LUX 0.534 0.600 0.516
LVA 0.497 0.496 0.497
MLT 0.527 0.479 0.548
NLD 0.589 0.549 0.611
POL 0.484 0.466 0.500
PRT 0.599 0.597 0.600
ROU 0.497 0.533 0.458
RUS 0.504 0.493 0.515
SVN 0.618 0.625 0.611
SWE 0.627 0.609 0.637
TWN 0.599 0.567 0.625
USA 0.566 0.574 0.563
Notes.- labour income shares are the arithmetic average of the annual shares over 1995-2009. Annual
shares are computed using the method described in section 3.2. Labour income of the self-employed is
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